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Abstract 
 
This study is focused on the origins of the 1922 agreement between the Commonwealth 
government and Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) to establish a wireless communications 
service between Australia and Britain. This agreement, which saw a partnership between the 
government and Australia’s principal wireless firm, represented a dramatic departure from the 
preceding history of Australian communications, which had hitherto been organised around 
the principle of government monopoly. The thesis explores the causes of this paradigmatic 
shift in policy through an analysis of wireless’ history in Australia from its origins to the 
enactment of the 1922 agreement. It is principally based on analysis of primary documents 
from the collections of the Postmaster-General’s, Prime Minister’s, and Navy departments 
held by the National Archives of Australia.    
 
The thesis finds that the 1922 agreement reflected the complex interaction of large, underlying 
structural forces and small, immediate factors. In relation to the former category, there were 
strong and constant international influences on domestic policymaking, related to the 
geopolitical dimensions of wireless and Australia’s place in the British Empire. The 1922 
agreement also bore the indelible imprint of the Great War. One wartime development was 
the power accumulated by Prime Minister Hughes during the conflict, who became the leading 
advocate of the agreement within the government. Another was the economic disruption 
unleashed by the conflict, which spurred a rise in economic nationalism and efforts to promote 
the development of industries of strategic significance within Australia. In addition to its 
consideration of structural influences, the thesis uses Multiple Streams Analysis to examine 
the process through which the agreement became enacted as policy. Multiple Streams 
Analysis is a model of policymaking which shows how the actions of individuals and groups, 
political conditions, and timing combine to produce policy outcomes.   
 
Overall, the thesis argues that major shifts in policy cannot be solely attributed to the actions 
of interested groups or other powerful actors, and that it is necessary to situate those actions 
within a dynamic process of policymaking that is given shape by a wider context, and in which 
other factors such as framing and timing are pivotal to the outcome. It also demonstrates the 
value of policymaking theory, such as Multiple Streams Analysis, to understanding major 
historical policy decisions. 
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Part I – Introduction and Framework 
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Introduction 
 
In April 1927 the ‘beam’ shortwave wireless service between Australia and Britain commenced 
operation. Enabling swift and direct wireless transmission of telegraphic messages between 
the antipodes and the heart of the Empire, the service’s opening marked the biggest advance 
in Australia’s international communications since the first submarine cable connecting Darwin 
with Singapore was put ashore in 1871. In the inaugural message, Australian Prime Minister 
Stanley Bruce, writing to his British counterpart, rhapsodised about the blow struck against 
Australia’s isolation by beam wireless:   
 
It must be a source of deep pride to every member of our race that we should be 
associated in the provision of the longest and most important direct telegraphic 
service in the world. It is a tribute to British imagination, enterprise, and skill. We in 
the antipodes realise, perhaps even more than the people of Britain, the full 
significance of this great achievement. From the dawn of our history, when 
communication lay across thousands of miles of trackless ocean, and took months of 
hazardous and uncertain travel, we have striven incessantly to annihilate distance, and 
bring our two countries closer together. To-day marks the culmination of a great 
phase of effort, and ushers in a new era.1 
 
The opening of the service, and its promise to strengthen the flow of trade and people 
between Australia and Britain, was met with universal approbation by the Australian press. 
“The possibilities of the wireless system are well nigh boundless”, opined an editorial in the 
Brisbane Telegraph, “the nearer this country is brought by the agencies of science to Britain 
the more will the feeling of remoteness lose its influence to deter people making the big 
journey out here, and in a more direct way Imperial trade will be expanded”.2 
 
                                                          
1 “The Beam – First Day’s Work” in Sydney Morning Herald, 9th April 1927. 
2 “Beam Wireless” in The Telegraph, 9th April 1927. 
2 
 
The acclaim with which the opening of the beam wireless service was met belied the 
controversy that had surrounded the question of international wireless since its first 
appearance on the agenda of Australian policymakers almost two decades earlier. At the heart 
of this dispute was a pivotal question of policy: what, if any, role would private enterprise play 
in the provision of an Australian international wireless service? This question had been 
decisively settled years before the service’s realisation, over the course of 1921 and 1922, 
when Parliament assented to an agreement to entrust its construction and operation to 
Australia’s major wireless firm, Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) (hereafter AWA). The 
terms of this agreement saw the company receive a substantial financial investment from the 
Commonwealth government, in exchange for a majority stake in the company. A new Board of 
Directors, comprised of representatives from the Commonwealth and AWA’s private 
shareholders, was also established to oversee the ‘hybrid’ enterprise’s operations.  
 
This novel arrangement, formally ratified in March 1922, represented a paradigmatic shift in 
the organisation of Australian communications. Up to the early twentieth century the “major 
distinguishing characteristic” of the establishment and operation of communications in 
Australia was the central role played by government.3 Prior to Federation in 1901 the colonial 
governments were instrumental in the creation of Australia’s postal, telegraphic, and 
telephonic communications networks, and, in the case of the telegraph, also the largest 
customer base.4 The first submarine telegraph cable put ashore at Darwin in 1871 was an 
initiative of British private interests, the Eastern Extension group, but the Overland Telegraph 
Line connecting it with Australia’s major population centres was a project of the South 
Australian government.5 By 1901, the year of Federation, the new Commonwealth government 
attained constitutional authority over “postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services” 
and the Postmaster-General’s Department was established to supersede the hitherto separate 
colonial post and telegraph departments.6 That year also saw the passage of the Post and 
Telegraph Act through Parliament, granting the Commonwealth “monopoly powers over the 
provision of Australia’s internal and external communications services” and signifying its place 
                                                          
3 G. Osborne and G. Lewis, Communication Traditions in 20th-century Australia, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1995, p. 13. 
4 See chapters 1-4 in A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia: A History of Telecommunications, Thomas Nelson 
Australia, Melbourne, 1984; J. Hirst, “Distance in Australia – Was it a Tyrant?” in Australian Historical 
Studies, Vol. 16, 1974-5, p.444. 
5 T. Barr, “Broadband Bottleneck: History Revisited” in Media International Australia, No. 129, 2008, pp. 
131-132. 
6 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s.51 (v).  
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as “the dominant policy-maker in the telecommunications” field.7 The Commonwealth was 
also heavily involved in the laying of the government-owned Pacific cable connecting Australia 
with Canada’s western coast that was opened in 1902.8 Thus, prior to 1922 there was a 
tradition, hardened by over a century of practice, of government participation in the 
development of Australia’s communications services.  
 
The first years after Federation saw this organisational trend extended to cover wireless 
telegraphy as well. In 1905 the Wireless Telegraphy Act was passed by Parliament “to make”, 
in the words of one supporting Senator, “a Government monopoly of wireless telegraphy in 
the Commonwealth”.9 Illustrative of this, when Australian policymakers first turned their 
attention towards the prospect of an international wireless service in the years preceding the 
Great War, there was a strong consensus regarding the inadvisability of any collaboration with 
private enterprise in the area. The pivot towards cooperation between the government and 
private enterprise under the 1922 agreement was therefore not only a marked departure from 
policies towards other Australian communication services, but also from those that had been 
in place since the first appearance of wireless on Australian shores at the dawn of the 
twentieth century.  
 
This thesis is focused on explaining this change in paradigm; how the involvement of private 
enterprise in Australia’s international wireless service came to be accepted by Australian 
policymakers despite the established history of government monopoly in the medium. The 
central development under consideration is the triumph of an idea, but it is not a history of 
ideas, nor are ideas its primary focus. Instead, it is concerned with how an idea in conflict with 
the established tradition of Australian communications policy up until that point came to be 
adopted. The thesis considers ideas in relation to their political fortunes, and bound to the 
                                                          
7 K.T. Livingstone, The Wired Nation Continent: The Communication Revolution and Federating Australia, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, p. 185. 
8 See chapter 7 in E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant: The first one hundred years of Australia’s international 
communication services, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987. 
9 Quoted in R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting: 1900-1923”, in I. Bedford and R. Curnow 
(eds), Initiative and Organisation, Sydney Studies in Politics 3, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963, p. 53. 
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political conditions enabling them to be rendered from abstractions into the foundations of 
policy.10    
 
The years under focus in the study, between 1901 and 1922, marked the formative period of 
wireless communication. Over the course of the twentieth century, wireless came to be 
synonymous with broadcasting. However, the adoption of broadcasting around the world from 
the early 1920s followed more than two decades of experience with communication through 
the airwaves. The use of wireless as a means of broadcasting news and entertainment to the 
general public was unanticipated by its pioneers.11 Instead, the original use for wireless was as 
a means for point-to-point telegraphic communication. Invented at the close of the nineteenth 
century, wireless telegraphy was a novel means of transmitting primitive electrical signals, 
such as Morse code, through the airwaves. In this sense it superseded an earlier nineteenth 
century invention, the (wired) telegraph. However, unlike the telegraph, wireless was not 
constrained by the need for fixed lines. This simple difference brought hitherto unknown 
capabilities. It enabled communication with ships and other vehicles beyond line-of-sight for 
the first time in human history. It unlocked the potential to transform trans-oceanic 
communication, offering improvements in speed, reliability, and cost compared with 
submarine telegraph cables. Furthermore, because it sent transmissions out into the airwaves 
indiscriminately, rather than along a line, it later enabled the creation of broadcasting as a 
mass medium that delivered news and entertainment into the home.12 Because of the new 
possibilities its creation opened, wireless was, in the words of Susan Douglas, “arguably the 
most important electronic invention of the century”, with profound implications for politics, 
culture, and economics.13 Through the new capabilities it offered, never before seen in human 
history, the spread of wireless around the world in the early twentieth century was a 
development of great historical import. It saw the ability to communicate at a distance without 
the need for connecting wires transformed from an unproven and small-scale venture to an 
                                                          
10 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, 
pp. 222-223. 
11 H. Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The Origins of Radio, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1976, pp. 306-307. 
12 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-1945, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 116; L. Gorman and D. McLean, Media and Society in the Twentieth 
Century: A Historical Introduction, Blackwell Publishing, Melbourne, 2003, p. 45. 
13 S. Douglas, Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 2004, p. 9. 
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established, growing and diversified global industry that had begun to revolutionise 
communication within and between countries. 
 
As is revealed in the commentary surrounding the opening of the international service in 1927, 
the adoption of wireless carried a particular importance in the Australian context. This came 
from what Geoffrey Blainey famously dubbed ‘the tyranny of distance’. Australia’s immense 
and sparsely-populated landmass, in conjunction with its isolation from Europe – the origin of 
most of its “people, equipment, institutions and ideas” – made distance, and its overcoming, 
one of the foremost themes of Australian history.14 Though Blainey’s work largely neglected 
the ameliorative effects of communications technology upon distance, his central point is 
indisputable.15 Entwined with broader concerns relating to national survival in a potentially 
hostile region, overcoming distance was a crucial dimension of Australia’s development from 
the colonial era until the mid-twentieth century.16 The establishment of electrical 
communications services, beginning with the erection of the first telegraph line in 1854, 
represented one of the principal responses to the challenges posed by distance.17 The coming 
of wireless in the early twentieth century was another means by which some of these 
challenges could be overcome. 
 
The connection between advances in communication and the uses to which they would be put 
is one of the major themes of this study. Wireless communication was made possible by 
scientific, technological, and engineering progress from the mid-nineteenth century. 
Achievements in these fields demonstrated new possibilities of communicating through the 
airwaves, and formed the foundation upon which the medium’s subsequent history was 
erected. The steady march of technological change is an indispensable aspect of the story of 
wireless’ development into a medium of global significance. Yet it is not solely a story of 
technology. It also involves the response of human beings to the appearance of new 
technological forms, and the settling of questions regarding how technology would be 
organised socially; how it would be used and towards which ends. While much depended on 
                                                          
14 G. Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History, Sun Books, Melbourne, 
1966, p. viii. 
15 G. Osborne, “Communication – see Transport” in G. Osborne and W.F. Mandle (eds), New History: 
Studying Australia Today, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, p. 158.  
16 G. Osborne and G. Lewis, Communication Traditions in 20th-century Australia, pp. 4-5, 11-17. 
17 J. Hirst, “Distance in Australia – Was it a Tyrant?”, p. 442. 
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the specific properties of wireless communications technology, namely the capabilities it 
offered compared to existing forms of communication, “the nature of the technology itself did 
not unambiguously indicate the economic uses to which it could be put”.18 The utilisation of 
wireless telegraphy, initially as a form of maritime communication, and then, with further 
technological progress, as a way to communicate across the ocean, reflected the properties of 
the new technology combined with decisions regarding the way its capabilities should be 
harnessed.  
 
Paul Starr discusses this concept in The Creation of the Media, which offers a wide-ranging 
examination of the political aspects of communications’ developmental history in the United 
States and Europe between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. He identifies the notion 
of ‘constitutive choices’ that must be made in response to the creation of new forms of 
communications technology. Constitutive choices relate to “the material and institutional 
framework” erected around technology.19 Because there are often numerous potential ways 
for a technological breakthrough to be put to practical application, decisions regarding its use 
must be made between its initial creation in a workshop or laboratory and its adoption by 
society at large. These decisions relate to basic questions of organisation. For instance, should 
the new technology be the preserve of the government or the private sector? Should it act as a 
commercial or a public service? 20 The power intrinsic to the control of communications make 
constitutive decisions fundamentally political. They are the result of the different potential 
applications of a form of technology interacting with “constellations of power, pre-existing 
institutional legacies, and models from other countries”.21 The importance of the constitutive 
choices made with regard to a medium means that the story of the expansion of wireless 
communications is irremovable from the political decisions that were made in relation to it. As 
Daniel Headrick, writing in a similar vein, summarises, “the history of radio cannot be told 
simply in terms of devices, inventors, and manufacturers, but must be integrated with the 
history of political power”.22  
                                                          
18 H. Aitken, Syntony and Spark, p. 306. 
19 P. Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications, Basic Books, New 
York, 2004, p. 1. 
20 P. Starr, The Creation of the Media, pp. 1-6. 
21 P. Starr, The Creation of the Media, pp. 1-2. 
22 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 116; K. Ward, Mass Communications and the Modern World, 
Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, 1989, pp. 18-20.  
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Following in this manner, the study examines the Commonwealth government’s policy 
response to the appearance of wireless in Australia from Federation in 1901 to the enactment 
of the 1922 agreement with AWA. It surveys the early history of a communications medium 
initially constituted as the preserve of government – with little opportunity for private 
participation – subsequently transformed into one in which private enterprise came to be the 
main driver of development. Its principal goal is to explain why this paradigmatic shift 
occurred; what factors were most influential in the formation of Australian policy towards 
wireless telegraphy. Its aim is to expand our understanding of the political considerations 
surrounding the introduction of this important medium in Australia.  
 
Explanations for major shifts in public policy, such as that embodied by the 1922 agreement, 
must account for the combined influence of the large-scale and long-term, and the small-scale 
and short-term. Recognising this, the thesis portrays the form of the 1922 agreement as an 
outcome of powerful structural influences and a dynamic policymaking process. In other 
words, it assigns causal significance to large-scale pressures, as well as the small-scale actions 
of individuals and groups operating within a fluid process of policy formation.  
 
The thesis’ structure is based around this analytical approach, the basis for which is outlined in 
Part I of the study. Part II of the study, consisting of Chapter Two, examines the structural 
context within which Australia’s international wireless service was constituted, documenting 
influences that would prove to be of great importance to the process of policy formation 
examined in Part IV of the study. Those involved in policymaking in relation to wireless were 
not endowed with complete autonomy of action, but were influenced by larger factors beyond 
their direct control. Though the actions of individuals and groups are indispensable aspects of 
explaining the policy outcome, they are not sufficient in and of themselves. The policymaking 
process under examination in Part IV of the study was bounded and influenced in myriad ways 
by the context in which it took place. 
 
 There were constant international influences on Australian wireless, and from the very 
beginning policy decisions made in Australia concerning wireless were intrinsically linked with 
different dimensions of the international environment. Most significant of these was wireless’ 
potential as a geopolitical asset that allowed for the coordination of naval forces and rapid 
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trans-oceanic communication. In an era of escalating great power rivalries, culminating in the 
Great War, the medium’s unique capabilities were of great interest to governments. As a 
result, the global development of wireless in the early twentieth century largely reflected the 
priorities of governments, rather than those of business. This is not to say that international 
business was without influence over the development of Australian wireless – from its very 
beginning AWA was bound with international wireless companies and, though it evolved into a 
national company over the years under focus in the study, it retained important advantages 
through its continued relationships with foreign enterprises. Nevertheless, wireless companies 
around the world required the acquiescence of governments for their commercial activities.  
 
The geopolitical situation in the early 1920s was an important influence over the 
Commonwealth government’s decision to abandon the paradigm of government enterprise 
and partner with AWA for the provision of international wireless. With the British Empire 
lagging behind its great power rivals in the field, and the evident inadequacy of Australia’s 
exclusive reliance on submarine cables for its international communications, the government 
made a pragmatic decision to secure its geopolitical interests. This involved the adoption of a 
ready-made scheme for international communication in partnership with AWA, and a rejection 
of the schemes promoted by British Imperial authorities. In this sense the 1922 agreement 
represented a confluence of government and private interests. While AWA was motivated by 
the commercial opportunities offered by control of Australia’s international wireless service, 
those actors within the Commonwealth government – most notably Prime Minister William 
Morris ‘Billy’ Hughes – were interested in the strategic benefits of the service. The scheme for 
collaboration with AWA won Hughes’ support in large part because it was seen as a better 
means of securing Australia’s national interest than the alternative proffered by the British 
government. His promotion of the scheme was motivated by Australia’s geopolitical position. 
 
The study also identifies Hughes’ power as Prime Minister and the rise of economic 
nationalism as key dimensions of domestic context which influenced the direction of wireless 
policy in the early 1920s. Though neither were directly related to Australian wireless, each in 
its own way exerted a significant influence over the policymaking process covered in Part IV of 
the study. The power exercised by Hughes while Prime Minister proved important in light of 
the widespread resistance to any collaboration with AWA evident within other parts of the 
Commonwealth government, including the Cabinet and bureaucracy. Prior to Hughes’ 
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ascension to the office, bureaucratic officials had exercised a good deal of influence over 
wireless policy. However, his autocratic style consigned bureaucratic influence to the margins, 
and his willingness to entertain a deal with AWA gave the company an opportunity to promote 
its scheme as the best way to establish a wireless link between Australia and Britain. Hughes 
also played an important role in securing the agreement’s passage through Parliament, 
through his ability to set the agenda, and to frame the issue in terms capable of securing 
majority support.  
 
Economic disruption resulting from structural changes in the global economy triggered by the 
Great War was another important contextual factor in relation to policymaking in the field of 
wireless. The abandonment of government enterprise in favour of government support for 
private sector growth in the wireless sector came at a time of pervasive restructuring of the 
relations between government and business in Australia. This structural change saw the 
adoption of government support for new secondary industries for the purpose of encouraging 
industrialisation, particularly in relation to industries of strategic significance. The replacement 
of one paradigm by another in the field of wireless was eased by fact that it took place within a 
broader context of changes in the government’s form of encouraging development, as it 
enabled proponents of the 1922 agreement to promote it as a means to further boost 
Australia’s economic development. It allowed AWA to frame the agreement as a means to 
inspire the growth of a national industry, consistent with a prevailing ethos of economic 
nationalism and a desire for ‘self-sufficiency’.  
  
Part III of the study, Chapters Three and Four, surveys the preceding history of Australian 
wireless prior to Part IV’s consideration of specific schemes for the international service 
between 1918 and 1922. Part III focuses on the development of the field between 1901 and 
1918. It shows that although wireless’ earliest days were marked by public sector dominance, 
in accordance with the established Australian communications tradition, the seeds of private 
involvement that would later germinate in the 1922 agreement were planted a decade earlier, 
as AWA gained a small foothold in the field of maritime wireless and steadily expanded its 
operations. This portrays the 1922 agreement as the culmination of an evolutionary process 
that unfolded over the course of years. The evolution of the sector, marked by a steady 
increase in private involvement, saw AWA in the position to credibly position itself as capable 
of constructing and operating the international service by the time the subject came up for 
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consideration in the post-war years. The study traces the sector from its initial establishment 
as the domain of government, with virtually no scope for private participation, to the point 
where private industry was established enough to push for a greater role for itself. 
 
The thesis places considerable emphasis on the Great War as instrumental to the subsequent 
development of the Australian wireless industry. The conflict represented a pivotal episode 
that saw dramatic changes which fed into the policy decisions made in the post-war years. The 
structural factors covered in Part II were each influenced by wartime experience. The conflict 
confirmed the strategic importance of communications networks, within which wireless was 
emerging as a crucial component. Furthermore, it exposed the limitations of submarine cables 
as a means of trans-oceanic communication, exposing the imperative to embrace wireless as a 
means of remaining competitive against strategic rivals and securing Australia’s means of 
external communication in the post-war years. In addition, Hughes’ attainment of unrivalled 
power within the Australian political system from 1915 – which would prove so decisive to 
international wireless policy in the post-war years – was a direct result of the crisis. Wartime 
circumstances allowed the Prime Minister to break free from traditional constraints upon the 
power of the office. The massive disruption to the world economy resulting from the conflict 
was also instrumental by way of promoting widespread changes in the role of government in 
relation to the Australian economy, leading to an upswing in government support for new 
industries and a climate of economic nationalism.  
 
The war’s impact was not, however, limited to the structural considerations presented in Part 
II of the study. As Part III outlines, it also led to considerable changes within the newborn 
Australian wireless sector itself. The war proved to be a powerful solvent, breaking down the 
arrangements that had characterised the industry prior to August 1914, and creating 
opportunities for policymakers to recast the industry following the resumption of peace. The 
war led to a recasting of the relationship between AWA and the Commonwealth government. 
Whereas it had previously been characterised by antagonism, the pressures of wartime 
circumstances saw the first steps towards cooperation between the two entities; something 
which was later entrenched in the 1922 agreement. Furthermore, the war prompted changes 
in the company’s ownership that would later allow it to portray itself as an Australian 
enterprise deserving of governmental support. 
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Part IV – Chapters Five and Six – represents the core of the study. It adopts a specific focus on 
the policymaking process surrounding international wireless between 1918 and 1922, using 
the analytical framework of Multiple Streams Analysis. This framework emphasises the varying 
roles played by different actors in policymaking, the existence of relatively-independent 
‘streams’ of problems, policies, and politics that come together to present opportunities for 
policy change, and the importance of timing to policy outcomes. Part IV details how the notion 
of entrusting AWA with control of Australia’s international wireless service was transformed 
from an idea with few supporters into formal policy. The level of investigation offered by 
Multiple Streams Analysis is granular and small-scale; focused on the actions of individuals and 
groups within a “complex, messy and…unpredictable” policymaking process.23  
 
Part IV of the study reveals the importance of AWA’s efforts to lay the foundation for policy 
change years before any formal decision, by constructing detailed plans for an international 
service, honing arguments in support of their plans, and identifying the Prime Minister as a 
supporter. Because of the preliminary work done by the company’s executives, by the time 
that the subject of wireless appeared on the political agenda in 1921, AWA was able to 
promote its scheme as the basis for future policy. It also reveals the important role that 
Hughes played in placing the subject on the agenda at an opportune time, and framing the 
issue in terms calculated to secure the agreement’s passage through Parliament in a 
challenging political environment. Part IV of the study demonstrates the importance of 
immediate considerations at the moment of decision – the availability of specific policy 
options, the political environment – to the eventual outcome.  
 
Overall, the thesis argues that in order to understand major policy decisions, it is necessary to 
account for the influence of long-term, underlying factors as well as short-term, proximate 
factors. The structural context within which decisions are made exerts strong pressures on the 
actions of individuals and groups. However, although policy change is influenced by structural 
factors, they are not determinative. Explanations of policy change must retain space for 
immediate factors, such as individual agency, choice, and chance. Nevertheless, because 
policymaking takes place within a dynamic process with multiple inputs, it eludes the direct 
control of individual and group actors. Because of this, it is necessary to combine different 
                                                          
23 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy, p. 4. 
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levels of analysis – focused on large, underlying structural forces and small, immediate factors 
that combine within a dynamic process – to explain policy change. 
      
Related Literature 
 
The development of Australian wireless telegraphy in the early twentieth century has not been 
widely-researched. The subject occupies a virtual ‘no man’s land’ in the literature on Australian 
communications. On one side there are studies on various dimensions of telegraphy, the 
preceding medium of electrical communication pioneered in the nineteenth century.24 On the 
other side there is a wide literature covering different aspects of broadcasting, which formally 
commenced in 1923.25 In comparison to these subjects, wireless telegraphy has received scant 
                                                          
24 See, in chronological order, F. Clune, Overland Telegraph: The Story of a Great Australian Achievement 
and the Link Between Adelaide and Port Darwin, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1955; J. Hirst, “Distance 
in Australia – Was it a Tyrant?”; K.S. Inglis, “The Imperial Connection: Telegraphic Communication 
between England and Australia, 1872-1902” in A.F. Madden and W.H. Morris-Jones (eds), Australia and 
Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1980; P. Taylor, An End to 
Silence: The Building of the Overland Telegraph Line from Adelaide to Darwin, Methuen Australia, 
Sydney, 1980; K.T. Livingstone, “Anticipating Federation: The Federalising of Telecommunications in 
Australia” in Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 26, No. 102, 1994; K.T. Livingstone, The Wired Nation 
Continent; K.T. Livingstone, “Charles Todd: Powerful communication technocrat in colonial and 
federating Australia” in Australian Journal of Communication, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1997; T. Barr, “Broadband 
Bottleneck: History Revisited”; P. Putnis, “The Early Years of International Telegraphy in Australia: A 
Critical Assessment” in Media International Australia, No. 129, 2008.  
25 See, in chronological order, I.K. Mackay, Broadcasting in Australia, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1957; W.H.N. Hull, “The Public Control of Broadcasting: The Canadian and Australian 
Experiences” in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1962; R.R. 
Walker, The Magic Spark: The story of the first fifty years of Radio in Australia, Hawthorn Press, 
Melbourne, 1973; A. Thomas, Broadcast and Be Damned – The ABC’s First Two Decades, Globe Press, 
Fitzroy, Vic., 1980; M. Counihan, The Construction of Australian Broadcasting: Aspects of Radio in 
Australia in the 1920s, M.A. Thesis, Monash University, 1981; L. Johnson, “Radio and everyday life: The 
early years of broadcasting in Australia, 1922-1945” in Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1981; G. 
Mundy, “’Free Enterprise’ or ‘Public Service’? The Origins of Broadcasting in the U.S., U.K. and Australia” 
in The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1982; A. Barnard, “Broadcasting 
in the 1920s: Government and Private Interests” in Prometheus, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1983; K.S. Inglis, This 
is the ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932-1983, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1983; J. Kent, Out of the Bakelite Box: The Heyday of Australian Radio, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1983; W. Muscio, Australian Radio: The Technical Story 1923-83, Kangaroo Press, 
Kenthurst, NSW, 1984; L. Johnson, The Unseen Voice: A Cultural Study of Early Australian Radio, 
Routledge, London, 1988; J. Potts, Radio in Australia, NSW University Press, Kensington, NSW, 1989; P. 
Geeves, The Dawn of Australia’s Radio Broadcasting, Federal Publishing Company, Alexandria, NSW, 
1993; C. Jones, Something in the Air: A History of Radio in Australia, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, NSW, 
1995; J. Ross, Radio Broadcasting Technology: 75 Years of Development in Australia, John F. Ross, Port 
Macquarie, 1998; chapter 3 in D. Craig, Fireside Politics: Radio and Political Culture in the United States, 
1920-1940, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2000; B. Harte, When Radio Was The Cat’s 
Whiskers, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, NSW, 2002; B. Griffen-Foley, Changing Stations: The Story of 
13 
 
attention from scholars. This is despite the fact that the first form of wireless communication 
was vital link between the telegraph and broadcasting – freeing the signalling capabilities of 
the former from its need for fixed wires, and subsequently enabling the latter.   
 
Only two authors have presented analyses of the constitution of Australia’s international 
wireless service: Ross Curnow and Jock Given. Their works represent the principal sources 
related to this study. The approaches of these scholars, though different, both emphasise the 
actions of individuals and groups directly involved in the sector as the drivers of policy. This 
study differs by placing a greater emphasis on the context within which these actors operated, 
and through providing a more detailed examination of how their actions related to the process 
of policy formation. It aims to complement, not revise, the accounts provided by Curnow and 
Given. 
 
Ross Curnow 
The pioneering work on Australian wireless telegraphy is a monograph published by Ross 
Curnow in 1963. Curnow is the only political scientist to have examined the matter until now, 
and his study is based on a combination of archival sources, contemporary newspapers, and 
Hansard. Curnow surveys Commonwealth government policy towards wireless telegraphy 
between 1901 and 1923 as a way to explain the initial creation of Australian broadcasting. He 
contends that the history of policy towards wireless telegraphy “helps to explain why 
Australia’s peculiar system of broadcasting evolved as it did: certain established interests and 
attitudes moulded in the development of ‘point to point’ communication exercised a marked 
influence on the growth of the new medium”.26 Though his study’s primary focus is the origins 
of broadcasting, most of its content deals with the Commonwealth government’s approach to 
wireless telegraphy.  
 
Curnow’s narrative, the first examination of the major developments in this area, is durable. 
However, its explanatory power is undermined by its reliance upon pluralism as an analytical 
                                                          
Australian Commercial Radio, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2009; B. Carty, Australian 
Radio History, Bruce Carty, Gosford, 2011.  
26 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 47. 
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tool. His pluralist analysis is limited by a narrow conception of politics and a neglect of the 
contextual factors which influenced the events under consideration, treating the field of 
wireless as largely self-contained. In comparison to this study, Curnow overemphasises the 
importance of interest groups to policy outcomes and underemphasises the capacity for those 
outcomes to be affected by external factors. 
 
Curnow describes policymaking as influenced by “the interplay of political parties, 
administrative agencies and interested groups”.27 However, his narrative portrays the actions 
of interest groups as having disproportionate influence over policy outcomes when compared 
to either the Parliament or the Commonwealth bureaucracy. In contrast to the actions of 
interest groups, he concludes that “neither political parties nor the Postmaster-General’s 
Department took the initiative in developing wireless”.28 He attributes little importance to 
political or bureaucratic actors with regard to the settling of constitutive decisions over the 
medium. Curnow also briefly mentions two other considerations that helped to influence the 
development of Australian wireless. At the beginning of his study he describes some of the 
larger structures that shaped the environment in which policy was made, such as the 
relationship between events in Australia and the international wireless business, the 
technological improvements in wireless spurred by the Great War, and the displacement of 
smaller entrepreneurial firms by larger, more complex commercial organisations.29 In addition, 
he concludes with a passing remark on the importance of individual leadership to 
developments, but this notion is not developed any further.30 However, consideration of these 
themes comprises a tiny fraction of the overall study, most of which is concentrated upon the 
minutiae of interest group advocacy. This weighting demonstrates the degree to which 
Curnow’s explanation of policymaking is linked to the small-scale actions of individuals and 
groups.    
 
One consequence of Curnow’s emphasis on the importance of interest group advocacy upon 
policymaking is that it marginalises other potential considerations. For instance, with the 
“possible exception” of the second Fisher government, in office from 1910-1913, he attributes 
                                                          
27 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 103. 
28 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 103. 
29 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, pp. 47-49. 
30 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 105. 
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little influence over policy to political factors, noting that “the claim that the policies of 
Australian political parties evolve in a pragmatic, piecemeal fashion is supported by the history 
of wireless telegraphy”.31 Though he describes some variance in policy preferences expressed 
by the Labor and non-Labor parties, these are portrayed as functions of those parties’ 
alignment with different interest groups.32 In his assessment, neither Parliament nor the 
bureaucracy possessed any inclination to shape policy themselves: “the Government and 
Postmaster-General’s Department were content to wait until the pressures and demands of 
interested groups became sufficiently strong to require a decision”.33 The acceptance of the 
1922 agreement between the Commonwealth and AWA – the central focus of this study – is 
claimed to be the result of “a reasonable compromise” between the preferences of political 
actors and AWA.34 However, he portrays the interest of politicians in the field of policy as 
motivated by little more than political opportunism: “more as political footballs than as 
matters which should be viewed according to some consistent policy”.35 This claim is further 
confirmation of Curnow’s assumption that the content of policy is driven by the preferences of 
interest groups.  
 
Curnow’s analysis is based upon pluralist theory. It interprets policy as open to influence by 
different, competing interest groups with the role of the government being “to uphold the 
general or public interest against the inevitably narrow and selfish interests of organised 
groups”.36 This theme pervades Curnow’s study through references to one or another policy 
decision as representing a compromise between different demands. Although different 
interest groups varied in their capacity to influence policy, the policies that were instituted 
reflected a balance between competing interests. Curnow’s assessment is that the 
Commonwealth’s approach to wireless was characterised by “procrastination” and a 
preference “to avoid contentious issues”.37 Its willingness to only act in response to the 
demands of interest groups is taken as axiomatic by Curnow, and presented as one of the 
major factors explaining the development of policy towards wireless telegraphy.  
                                                          
31 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 103. 
32 See, for instance, R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, pp. 63-66. 
33 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 103. 
34 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 83. 
35 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 89. 
36 B. Head and S. Bell, “Understanding the modern state: Explanatory approaches” in S. Bell and B. Head 
(eds), State, Economy and Public Policy in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 28-
29. 
37 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 105. 
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In the years since his study was published pluralist theory has come under sustained assault 
from several directions. One avenue of criticism relates to pluralism’s emphasis on, as 
expressed by Robert Dahl, “the careful examination of a series of concrete decisions…taken in 
the political system”.38 This focus on the realm of formal decision-making – ‘concrete 
decisions’ – has been criticised for embodying a narrow conception of power and the 
political.39 By restricting its analysis to the formal political system, it only considers those 
aspects of politics that are most easily observable. Through emphasising the outcomes of 
formal decisions, it neglects the political considerations involved in an issue ever becoming the 
subject of formal decision-making. Pluralism does not consider the notion of agenda-setting: 
that which determines which matters will, or will not, be subject to formal deliberation in the 
political system, and the terms in which they are framed.40 
 
Another weakness of pluralist analysis, stemming from its conception of power and focus on 
outcomes, is its privileging of certain actors over others. Pluralism places a strong emphasis on 
the advocacy efforts of interest groups as determinants of policy.41 Though interest groups 
vary in their degree of influence in accordance with their possession and use of ‘political 
resources’, they are seen to influence the outcomes of formal decision-making through 
applying pressure to decision-makers within the political system. In this view governance is 
characterised by “the steady appeasement of relatively small groups” by elected officials.42 
This conceptualisation depicts elected officials as highly responsive to the overtures of interest 
groups, although they often have to balance the competing demands of different groups. 
Nevertheless, the political system is portrayed as “permeable, [and] capable of being 
penetrated by any group” which can mobilise sufficient ‘power resources’ to advance its 
interests.43 One corollary of this view is that elected officials, those who are responsible for 
formal decisions, are effectively stripped of their capacity for making those decisions 
autonomously. This is a questionable assumption. Furthermore, with respect to pluralism’s 
depiction of bureaucratic involvement in policymaking, bureaucracies are usually portrayed as 
                                                          
38 R. Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, 
1958, p. 466.  
39 P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, 
No. 4, 1962; S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1974. 
40 C. Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002, pp. 172-176. 
41 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, Macmillan 
Education, Basingstoke, 1987, p. 32.  
42 R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, p. 145. 
43 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State, p. 37. 
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a ‘weathervane’ – responsive to the prevailing winds of interest group advocacy – or as 
‘neutral’ – the upholder of the ‘public interest’ against the sectional preferences of interest 
groups; a “mediator, balancer and harmonizer of interests”.44 In pluralist theory, it is interest 
groups, and the conflicts between them, that are the key determiners of policy outcomes. In 
contrast, politicians and bureaucrats are credited with little capacity to influence the shape of 
policy. 
 
 
This view is untenable. Though few would dispute that interest groups function as important 
players in policy formation, they represent only one part of a wider array of actors that can 
influence the shape of policy in their own ways, including ministers, other politicians, political 
parties, bureaucrats, and the media.45 To depict interest groups as the dominant forces, and 
other actors as in thrall to their demands, is to engage in an unjustifiable oversimplification.  
 
 
Furthermore, pluralism’s narrow conception of the political renders it poorly equipped to 
address external influences on political outcomes. Its view of politics as an arena of interest 
group struggle does not conceptualise the participation of any forces in a particular field of 
policy that do not have a direct interest in the area.46 As a result, it depicts policymaking in a 
given field as essentially self-contained; restricted to the elected officials responsible for 
formal decisions and the interest groups with a stake in the matter.47 As a consequence, it has 
no capacity to explain the influence of external factors upon political outcomes. Related to 
this, it does not appreciate the context in which policy decisions are made, and the various 
ways in which this context itself can shape matters such as the relative influence of interest 
                                                          
44 P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State, p. 46; B. Head and S. Bell, “Understanding the 
modern state”, pp. 28-29.  
45 The importance of wide range of actors is a prominent theme in the literature on Australian public 
policy. See, for example, M. Edwards, “The policy-making process” in D. Woodward, A. Parkin and J. 
Summers (eds), Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, Ninth Edition, Pearson Australia, 
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46 See C. Hay, Political Analysis, pp. 72-74. 
47 See, for example, C.J. Hewitt, “Elites and the Distribution of Power in British Society” in A. Giddens 
and P. Stanworth (eds), Elites and Power in British Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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groups in a particular policy field, the policies given consideration, or the predisposal of 
decision-makers towards particular choices.48  
 
 
All of the above are characteristics of Curnow’s analysis of early Australian wireless policy. His 
pluralistic account of policy change in the area is a narrow one that overemphasises the 
preferences of interest groups when it comes to explaining the developments under scrutiny. 
It also treats the field of wireless as largely self-contained, with little consideration of how the 
policy decisions that were made were influenced by context.  
 
 
This study follows the trail that was blazed by Curnow over half a century ago. It revisits the 
subject of Commonwealth government policy towards wireless communications between 1901 
and 1922, discarding the pluralist underpinnings of his analysis in favour of an approach that 
conceptualises policymaking as a multifaceted process. It demonstrates that the influence of 
interest groups – principally AWA – over policy came through their crafting of policies, but that 
they were dependent on support within the political system to see those policies enacted. In 
contrast to the pluralist approach, this thesis places a strong emphasis on the role of political 
and bureaucratic actors within the Commonwealth. It does not present the 1922 agreement as 
the triumph of sustained interest group pressure, but as a result of a dynamic policymaking 
process with a range of inputs. It also rejects the pluralist characterisation of bureaucratic 
actors as either ‘weathervanes’ or neutral, instead demonstrating that the early history of the 
field saw the establishment of bureaucratic control, the steady erosion of which was a vital 
factor in the 1922 outcome. Unlike Curnow’s, this study also places a greater emphasis on the 
importance of context, and portrays the policymaking process as contextually-embedded. 
Policymaking does not – cannot – proceed in isolation and according to its own dynamics. 
Instead, it is enmeshed with, and irremovable from, a larger context.  
 
The study is a re-examination of the area covered by Curnow in his pioneering work on early 
Australian wireless. Like Curnow’s, it covers the evolution of Commonwealth policy towards 
wireless telegraphy prior to the emergence of broadcasting. However, unlike Curnow’s, its 
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19 
 
primary focus is the subject of international wireless and it does not broach the subject of 
broadcasting.  
 
 
Jock Given 
After an extended absence of new offerings, Jock Given has re-opened research into the 
history of Australian wireless telegraphy with a number of publications in the early twenty-first 
century. These include a history Ph.D. thesis submitted in 2007, and a range of other articles. 
Given’s thesis covers the life and career of Ernest Fisk, the Managing Director of AWA for more 
than two decades and one of the central figures in the early history of Australian wireless. It is 
a wide-ranging study based largely upon primary documents, including Fisk’s personal papers, 
dealing with aspects of “technology, law, economics, culture, politics and public policy” as it 
explores his stewardship of AWA, and other organisations.49 Because of Fisk’s heavy 
involvement in the establishment of the wireless industry in Australia, Given covers many of 
the events and developments that had previously featured in Curnow’s study and are also 
central to this one. It differs from Curnow’s, and this, study by placing a much greater 
emphasis on industry and business history. It is by far the most thorough analysis of these 
aspects of the medium’s history in Australia that has been written.  
 
Given’s thesis is highly relevant to this study because of common content, but it contains a 
different primary focus and analytical approach. His work places a greater emphasis on the 
industrial and commercial aspects of early Australian wireless, exploring government policy 
insofar as it intersected with the expansion of AWA as a business under Fisk’s leadership. 
Government is one of the four major themes around which Given organises his study, along 
with distance, empire, and industry.50 However, unlike this study, Given’s focus on government 
is principally on policy assessment rather than policymaking. His major research questions in 
this area are concerned with the outcomes, rather than the origins, of policy decisions.51 This 
thesis, in contrast, is concerned with explaining the origins of policy. It also inverts Given’s 
                                                          
49 J. Given, Transit of Empires: Ernest Fisk and the World Wide Wireless, Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 2007, p. 1. 
50 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 17. 
51 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 27-29. 
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focal balance between business and government, examining AWA’s activities insofar as they 
came to influence government policy.  
 
Given’s description of his thesis as “a trans-national business biography” encapsulates the 
major thrust of his work.52 As a biography it places a greater emphasis on the importance of 
individuals to the industry’s development.  This is most obvious in the case of his subject, Fisk, 
but also with regard to other major figures featured in his narrative. For example, he pays a 
good deal of attention to the relationship between Fisk and Hughes during the latter’s tenure 
as Prime Minister, a relationship he describes as “close though wary” and also “decisive in 
Australian communications history”.53 His research highlights, and ascribes importance to, the 
particular qualities of individual actors to a much greater degree than Curnow, and identifies 
such qualities as important factors that influenced the industry’s development.54 A corollary of 
Given’s individualist focus is the importance of leadership, and the difference that a leadership 
change in an organisation can make to the direction of that organisation. This is evident, for 
instance, in his treatment of Fisk’s acquisition of AWA’s Managing Director role in 1917 and 
the subsequent change in the company’s direction that this spurred.55 The trans-national 
aspect of Given’s analysis is also prominent. Because “AWA was closely linked to overseas 
companies” he investigates the connections between the industry’s development in Australia 
and the international context.56 This is featured in his discussion of the connection between 
AWA and its British parent, the Marconi Company, and also through his analysis of the 
relationship between wireless development and Australia’s place in the British Empire.57 The 
international dimensions of the subject provide an important background to the individual 
actions at the centre of his thesis. This study concurs with Given’s conclusion that it is vital to 
appreciate the international context surrounding the early development of Australian wireless.  
 
Though it is not his principal focus, Given’s approach adds an extra dimension to our 
understanding of policymaking in the area by assessing the motivations of those actors in the 
Commonwealth government with whom Fisk engaged in his career. In contrast to Curnow’s 
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portrayal of the government as a mediator between the competing demands of interest 
groups, Given depicts the Commonwealth officials as possessing policy goals of their own, and 
a greater capability of implementing them. In his analysis, AWA was less able to steer 
Commonwealth policy than its leadership was able to capitalise on specific opportunities 
presented by a convergence of interests between the two organisations.58 This study’s findings 
support this view, and situate it within an understanding of policymaking based upon Multiple 
Streams Analysis wherein policies can originate from inside or outside the government 
apparatus. It adds further weight and depth to Given’s conclusion that “the timing of the 
initiative, and the unusual political circumstances, were critical” factors in the execution of the 
1922 agreement.59  
 
Given has also published a range of articles addressing various aspects of early Australian 
wireless. These include accounts of those prominent early industry leaders besides Fisk; the 
opening of Australia’s first wireless telephone service with Britain; the history of the 
partnership between AWA and the Commonwealth government from 1922; AWA’s attempts 
to establish an Australian system of international shortwave broadcasting; the first public 
demonstration of wireless telegraphy in 1906; and AWA’s transition to a national enterprise 
from its multi-national roots.60 The last of these is of particular importance because of its 
description of AWA’s transformation into a national company in the years after its formation – 
one of the developments at the centre of this study.  
 
Given’s contribution to the field is substantial. Foremost of his achievements is providing the 
most detailed account of the industry’s early history that is available. In relation to the subject 
of the following study – the origins of the 1922 agreement – his account stresses the 
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partnership between Fisk and Hughes as pivotal to the outcome.61 Distinct from Curnow’s 
analysis, he does not portray the activities of interest groups as the chief determinant of policy 
changes but notes the degree to which Commonwealth preferences shaped policy, often in 
opposition to the objectives of interest groups such as AWA. His analyses, therefore, depict 
government as having its own interests rather than simply being a mediator between 
commercial groups. He also emphasises the qualities of individuals, their relationships and 
beliefs, as important determinants of policymaking. 
 
This study complements Given’s by focusing on different aspects of the early history of 
wireless in Australia. Though each is concerned with the same broad subject, there are 
substantial differences between them. The emphases Given places on the technological and 
commercial dimensions of early Australian wireless are not replicated in this study. Instead, it 
places a stronger emphasis on the subject’s political dimensions, examining the passage of the 
1922 agreement through the lens of public policy, and the manner in which the policymaking 
process that produced the decision was influenced by the surrounding political context. As a 
result of its primary focus on the determinants of policy, the study outlines a number of key 
developments in early Australian wireless history that either only receive passing reference in 
Given’s work, or are neglected entirely.   
  
This thesis also demonstrates the importance of developments during the Great War, both 
within the wireless sector and in its wider impact on the aforementioned political context, to 
explaining the pivot in policy brought about by the 1922 agreement. Wartime developments, 
though covered by Given in relation to AWA’s operations, do not represent a major emphasis 
of his work.62 In contrast, Chapters Two and Four of this study demonstrate the crucial 
importance of the conflict to the 1922 outcome. This study also places a greater weight upon 
the inability of individuals and groups to control the policymaking process, because of the 
multiplicity of factors that contribute to policy outcomes.  
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Other Research 
In addition to the detailed works of Curnow and Given, a number of general histories provide 
important background to the study. Edgar Harcourt’s 1987 book Taming the Tyrant, a history 
of the first century of Australia’s international communications services between 1872 and 
1972, dedicates a chapter to covering the early development of Australian wireless telegraphy 
up to the enactment of the 1922 agreement.63 Harcourt’s account is distinguished by its 
incorporation of structural influences over Australian wireless policy, principally the influence 
of the international environment upon domestic decision-making, and the challenge that the 
appearance of the new medium posed to the pre-existing technology of submarine cables. 
Though his account is more descriptive than analytical, Harcourt interprets the 1922 
agreement as reflecting “Hughes’s enthralment by wireless”, and his desire to free the 
medium from the bureaucratic control it had been under since its first appearance in Australia 
for the purpose of encouraging the sector’s further development.64 This thesis similarly 
emphasises the importance of this motivation behind the Prime Minister’s actions, 
incorporating it within a larger context of Australian economic nationalism in the early 1920s.   
 
Ann Moyal’s history of Australian communications, Clear Across Australia, integrates the 
history of wireless telegraphy into the larger story of Australia’s communications services from 
the establishment of the first mail service in 1788 to the launch of satellites in the 1980s.65 Like 
Harcourt’s, however, her work is largely descriptive, though it provides important background 
detailing the history of government control over communications from the colonial period and 
notes the degree to which the 1922 agreement marked a departure from this tradition.66 
Graeme Osborne and Glen Lewis’ Communication Traditions in 20th-century Australia is largely 
focused on the cultural dimensions of Australian communications, but outlines essential 
information on communications as a means of “building an economic infrastructure and 
bolstering national defence” in the first decades of the twentieth century – another major 
theme in this study.67 In addition, Lawrence Durrant’s The Seawatchers is a history of 
Australia’s coastal wireless network, an important early element of the development of 
                                                          
63 Chapter 8 in E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant: The first one hundred years of Australia’s international 
communication services, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987. 
64 E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant, p. 201. 
65 A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia. 
66 A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia, p. 132. 
67 G. Osborne and G. Lewis, Communication Traditions in 20th-century Australia, p. 5.  
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wireless telegraphy covered in Chapter Three.68 Denis Cryle has also written on Australia’s 
international wireless service in relation to the Empire Press Union.69 
 
Finally, the study is influenced by a number of authors with a more prominent international 
focus. Aitor Anduaga’s Wireless and Empire is a strong conceptual influence. Though principally 
focused on scientific research on the ionosphere throughout the British Empire in the interwar 
period – including two chapters dedicated to Australia – its analysis is predicated on the 
rejection of “direct causal effects” and “simple causal relationships”, instead situating 
causation within a wide range of complex and interlinking areas.70 This study, though 
containing a different primary focus, similarly seeks causation within a range of 
“interconnected categories”, each of which has “a limited explanatory scope when analysed 
separately”.71 In addition, Daniel Headrick’s scholarship on the relationship between 
communications and geopolitics from the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries 
informs the study’s understanding of this fundamental influence on Australian wireless 
development.72 The works of Jill Hills, Peter McMahon, Peter Hugill, and Dwayne Winseck and 
Robert Pike also provide important background on the international political economic 
dimensions of communications development during this period of time.73 W.J. Baker’s A 
History of the Marconi Company, focused on AWA’s British parent company, contains 
important background that informs the study, as do the works of S.G. Sturmey and Hugh 
Aitken.74   
                                                          
68 L. Durrant, The Seawatchers: The Story of Australia’s Coast Radio Service, Angus and Robertson, North 
Ryde, NSW, 1986. 
69 D. Cryle, “’Reciprocal and Universal’: Robert Donald, the Press Union and Empire Wireless 1920-1933” 
in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2010. 
70 A. Anduaga, Wireless and Empire: geopolitics, radio industry, and ionosphere in the British Empire, 
1918-1939, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. xvii. 
71 A. Anduaga, Wireless and Empire, p. xix. 
72 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon; D. Headrick and P. Griset, “Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business 
and Politics, 1838-1939” in The Business History Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2001. 
73 J. Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global Communication: The Formative Century, University of Illinois 
Press, Chicago, 2002; P. McMahon, “Early Electrical Communications Technology and Structural Change 
in the International Political Economy – The Cases of Telegraphy and Radio” in Prometheus, Vol. 20, No. 
4, 2002; P. McMahon, Global Control: Information Technology and Globalization since 1845, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002; P. Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999; D. Winseck and R. Pike, Communication and Empire: 
Media, Markets and Globalization, 1860-1930, Duke University Press, Durham, 2007.  
74 W.J. Baker, A History of the Marconi Company, Methuen and Co, London, 1970; S.G. Sturmey, The 
Economic Development of Radio, Gerald Duckworth and Co., London, 1958; H. Aitken, Syntony and 
Spark; H. Aitken, The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1985. 
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Materials 
 
This study is based upon primary research, with a particular focus on the records of those 
Commonwealth departments that exercised responsibility over wireless during the early 
twentieth century: the collections of the Postmaster-General’s Department and the Navy 
Department, both held by the Melbourne office of the National Archives of Australia. 
Additional research in the collections of the National Archives was undertaken in Canberra 
involving the materials of the Prime Minister’s Department. Taken as a whole, these 
collections contain a large amount of contemporary material dealing with many aspects of 
wireless administration. While, to varying degrees, those works covering the area referred to 
above have engaged with these records, none have done so to the same extent as this study. 
Most of the fresh insights contained within this thesis come from a more rigorous perusal of 
these collections.  
 
In addition to the Commonwealth’s records, permission was given to the author to examine 
AWA’s collection held by the Mitchell Library in Sydney. The nature of this collection, 
consisting of those records that have survived up to the present (the company not being as 
assiduous about record keeping as the Commonwealth government), rendered it less useful to 
the study. As Phillip Geeves, a former AWA employee-cum-historian, described in a 1974 
memorandum, “for a national company of AWA’s stature, the Firm’s archives are in a 
lamentable condition”.75 Presumably a good number of documents of historical significance 
were lost forever prior to Geeves’ efforts to archive the company’s records. However a 
number of primary documents containing valuable insights into the company’s early activities 
do survive within the collection and have informed the study. 
 
The thesis also draws upon other primary sources such as Hansard and contemporary 
newspapers. These often add valuable context to events otherwise obliquely covered in the 
other primary documents. To a lesser degree, the Hughes collection within the National Library 
of Australia, covering the former Prime Minister’s tenure as a member of the AWA Board of 
                                                          
75 Memorandum to D. Craig from Geeves, 25th August 1972. Mitchell Library: Amalgamated Wireless 
(Australasia) Ltd Records, 1896-1985; ML MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 26, GEEVES, P. L. (Staff Member), 
1913-1979, Correspondence, 1968-1979. 
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Directors, was also consulted. In addition to these primary sources, the study also refers to a 
wide variety of secondary literature, much of which was covered above.  
 
Outline 
 
The study is divided into four parts. Part I, consisting of this introduction and Chapter One, 
establishes the analytical framework for the remainder of the thesis. Part II, composed of 
Chapter Two, covers elements of the international and domestic context which would prove 
significant to the developments covered in the remainder of the thesis. Part III, consisting of 
Chapters Three and Four, begins the archival study by examining the emergence of wireless in 
Australia between 1901 and 1918, providing essential background to the material covered in 
subsequent chapters. Part IV, Chapters Five and Six, uses Multiple Streams Analysis to survey 
the process by which the idea of commissioning AWA to establish Australia’s international 
wireless service was transformed from a proposal into policy. The study then concludes with a 
survey of the major themes surrounding policymaking in this case study. 
  
Chapter One establishes the study’s conceptual approach, designed to be able to explain the 
influence of both underlying structural factors and short-term, immediate factors on 
policymaking. It presents the need for any explanation of political outcomes to be grounded in 
an understanding of the relevant context, and the manner in which structural factors influence 
policymaking. It then outlines Multiple Streams Analysis as a general theory of policymaking 
that provides a suitable basis for identifying those factors that have bearing over policy 
outcomes.  
 
Part II 
Chapter Two provides a survey of three relevant pieces of structural context that proved 
influential to the constitution of Australia’s international wireless service: the development of 
wireless internationally, Prime Ministerial power, and the rise of economic nationalism in post-
war Australia. Each of these factors would come to influence the 1922 agreement in its own 
way. Because of its strategic implications, the international environment exerted strong 
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pressures on Australian policymakers to develop wireless for geopolitical reasons. The power 
of Hughes as Prime Minister and the rise of economic nationalism, on the other hand, help to 
explain the decision to jettison the existing paradigm of government enterprise and rely on 
AWA to construct the international service.  
 
Part III 
Chapter Three launches the archival study. It covers the period from the first appearance of 
wireless in Australia shortly after Federation to the outbreak of war in 1914. It demonstrates 
the emphasis on wireless as a means of international communication that was evident from 
the first appearance of the medium in Australia, and details the Commonwealth’s aspiration 
for monopoly control of the new medium, along with the formation of AWA in 1913. As a 
prelude to the rest of the study, it covers the extension of the paradigm of government 
enterprise into wireless that would be overthrown in 1922.  
 
Chapter Four deals with Australian wireless during the Great War. It documents the 
dismantling of the pre-war status quo in response to the crisis, such as through the emergence 
of cooperation between the Commonwealth and AWA in support of the war effort. It also 
reveals failed efforts from within the bureaucracy to bring AWA’s activities under government 
control, the expansion of domestic wireless manufacturing operations, and the exceptions to 
the otherwise tight Commonwealth control over the medium granted to AWA executives. It 
demonstrates that the war years were a pivotal turning point that led to a recasting of the 
hitherto uneasy relationship between AWA and the Commonwealth, which would later 
contribute to the 1922 partnership between the two organisations.  
 
Part IV 
Chapter Five is the first of two chapters examining the policymaking process surrounding the 
establishment of an international wireless link between Australia and Britain through the lens 
of Multiple Streams Analysis. It documents the struggle to influence the direction of future 
policy that erupted shortly after the Armistice, and the emergence of two alternative 
conceptions of an ‘Imperial scheme’ of wireless – one the initiative of the British government 
and the other of private enterprise. It argues that AWA’s activities during this period, 
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developing policy proposals, honing the arguments supporting them, and identifying the Prime 
Minister as a crucial supporter of its plans, would prove crucial when the subject later 
appeared on the agenda.  
 
Chapter Six follows the subject of international wireless up to the enactment of a partnership 
between the Commonwealth and AWA to provide a direct wireless link with Britain. It follows 
the passage of AWA’s scheme through the formal decision-making processes of Parliament, 
and demonstrates the importance of framing, timing, and immediate political circumstances to 
the agreement’s enactment.   
 
Finally, the study concludes by discussing its major findings, arguing that the 1922 agreement 
between AWA and the Commonwealth represented a combination of structural factors and 
short-term proximate factors brought together within a dynamic policymaking process. 
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Chapter 1 – Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework for the remainder of the study. The study 
presents a contextual analysis that relates the small-scale actions of individuals and groups to 
the wider environment in which they took place. Its examination of this field of policy places 
the actions of individuals and groups within a structural context. It does not seek to diminish 
the importance of individual and group actions to policymaking, but instead to establish the 
context within which individual actions took on significance through their relationship with an 
endogenous environment. It is not solely interested in how the 1922 agreement was brought 
about by individual initiative, but also in the creation of the conditions under which it became 
possible.1 The study therefore assigns explanatory importance to both structural and agential 
factors.  
 
The chapter begins by discussing the rationale for contextual analysis in political science. It 
then turns its attention towards Multiple Streams Analysis (hereafter MSA). MSA is presented 
as a generalisable means of conceptualising the process of policymaking, with a focus on the 
short-term and small-scale, which nevertheless retains a sensitivity to context and structural 
influences. The combination of contextual analysis with MSA enables the study to identify the 
interaction of underlying structural factors and short-term proximate factors in the 
constitution of Australia’s international wireless service in the early 1920s. 
 
Contextual Analysis 
 
To engage in political analysis is, in essence, to provide explanations of political phenomena. 
For an explanation to be convincing, however, it must take the relevant context into 
consideration. Context is taken here to simply mean, in the words of Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 
“that which environs the object of our interest and helps by its relevance to explain it”.2 Of 
                                                          
1 See C. Hay, Political Analysis, pp. 100-101. 
2 B. Scharfstein, The Dilemma of Context, New York University Press, New York, 1989, p. 1.  
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course, the question of which pieces of context are most relevant is dependent upon which 
particular phenomenon, out of the multitude that receive the attention of political scientists, is 
under investigation. The different segments within the Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political 
Analysis illustrate some of the range of contexts that can bear influence over political 
phenomena: philosophy, psychology, ideas, culture, history, place, population, and 
technology.3 Because all of these ‘matter’ in their own way, the handbook’s editors, Charles 
Tilly and Robert Goodin, are sceptical about the aspiration to formulate universal laws of 
politics that “hold good across time and place” associated with the positivist tradition.4 Instead 
of pursuing universality, they argue that case studies must account for context to offer valid 
explanations: 
 
Inquiries into democratization and de-democratization, civil and international war, 
revolution and rebellion, nationalism, ethnic mobilization, political participation, 
parliamentary behaviour, and effective government all raise contextual questions: 
when, where, in what settings, on what premises, with what understandings of the 
processes under investigation? Viable answers to questions of this sort require serious 
attention to the contexts in which the crucial political processes operate…In response 
to each big question of political science, we reply ‘It depends’. Valid answers depend 
on the context in which the political processes under study occur.5   
   
Tilly and Goodin portray attempts to explain political developments divorced from their 
context as incomplete, employing the metaphor of context as pieces of a puzzle. Much as 
solving a puzzle is made easier by finding the right piece, identifying the right piece of 
contextual information can aid the task of political explanation.6 
 
Tilly and Goodin are not alone in emphasising the importance of context for convincing 
explanation of political phenomena. Tulia Falleti and Julia Lynch argue that causation cannot 
                                                          
3 R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008. 
4 S. Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative Critique” in 
Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2008, p. 585. 
5 C. Tilly and R.E. Goodin, “It Depends” in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, p. 6. 
6 C. Tilly and R.E. Goodin, “It Depends”, pp. 20-21. 
31 
 
be demonstrated without reference to the context in which it is located.7 In relation to 
historical context, Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi caution that “politics is influenced by the 
contingencies of time and space that scholars ignore at their peril”.8 Similarly, Tilly urges those 
seeking to understand political phenomena to take history seriously, writing that “every 
significant political phenomenon lives in history, and requires historically grounded analysis for 
its explanation”.9 These claims are all manifestations of what Stephanie Lawson has dubbed 
the ‘contextual turn’ in political science; a pivot “away from an ahistorical, objectivist and 
materialist positivism towards more nuanced approaches to political studies” that stress 
contextual specificity.10  
 
The question of context relates to the structure-agency debate, which represents one of the 
most challenging theoretical puzzles in social science.11 At the heart of this debate is the extent 
to which political actors are free to exercise their own agency within the larger structures 
(context) they inhabit. Colin Hay describes the debate as centred on “the extent to which 
political conduct shapes and is shaped by political context”.12 On one side of the debate are 
those who advocate highly agential accounts which endow actors with considerable scope to 
determine the trajectory of events. On the other side are those thinkers who regard political 
actors as effectively without agency; their actions determined by structural constraints.13 
Neither of these extremes, whether structural or agential, can provide a realistic portrayal of 
politics. The most convincing expositions are those that grant the potential for agents to act 
autonomously, while acknowledging that context can place considerable constraints upon 
their actions by making some actions inconceivable or prohibitively costly.14 As Karl Marx 
famously distilled the concept, “men make their own history, but not just as they please. They 
                                                          
7 T. Falleti and J. Lynch, “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis” in Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 9, 2009. 
8 I. Shapiro and S. Bedi, “Introduction: Contingency’s Challenge to Political Science” in I. Shapiro and S. 
Bedi (eds), Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforeseen, New 
York University Press, New York, 2007, p. 12. 
9 C. Tilly, “Why and How History Matters” in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, p. 433. 
10 S. Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn”, p. 585. 
11 D. Marsh, “Meta-Theoretical Issues” in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 212. 
12 C. Hay, Political Analysis, p. 89. 
13 C. Hay, Political Analysis, p. 89. 
14 H. Ward, “Structural Power – A Contradiction in Terms?” in Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1987.  
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do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they 
find them”.15  
 
John Gaddis, a historian interested in the difficult question of explaining causation, draws a 
distinction between necessary and sufficient causes.16 When examining the cause of a 
particular outcome, the context is all that was necessary for it to happen – a potentially 
limitless number of things. He gives the example, borrowed from the French historian Marc 
Bloch, of a man falling off a cliff to his death. For this to have happened,  
 
The man had to have slipped; the path he was walking along had to have been built 
along the edge of a cliff; geological process had to have uplifted the mountain from 
the plain; the law of gravity had to have been in effect; and, Bloch might have added, 
the Big Bang had to have occurred.17    
 
In this example, all but the first item in the list represent things that were necessary causes of 
the outcome under examination – the context. Had the man in question slipped and fallen in a 
lush meadow instead of from a cliffside path, it would not have had the same fatal result. 
Contextual factors – the location of the path, the existence of the cliff – were thereby 
necessary, but not sufficient, to produce the outcome. “For while context does not directly 
cause what happens”, Gaddis writes, “it can certainly determine consequences”.18 The 
misstep, on the other hand, is sufficient to explain the man’s fall, but, in isolation from the 
context in which the fall happened, cannot explain its consequences. A valid explanation of an 
event thereby must refer to a combination of what Gaddis labels necessary and sufficient 
causes. 
 
However, one complication is immediately apparent in this conceptualisation. As the 
aforementioned list of necessary causes of the cliffside fatality reveals, the elements of context 
                                                          
15 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1943, p. 23. 
16 J. Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002, p. 97.  
17 J. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 94.  
18 J. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 97. Emphasis in original. 
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that go into producing a given outcome are potentially infinite. It is therefore necessary for a 
scholar to identify those pieces of context that are of greatest relevance to the phenomenon 
at the centre of analysis.19 This will vary in accordance with the subject at hand; an answer to 
the question of which pieces of context will be relevant is itself contextual.        
 
The analysis presented in this thesis endorses the view associated with the ‘contextual turn’ 
that context is an indispensable element of explanation in the realm of politics. It places a 
strong emphasis on context providing the setting for individual and group action. As Paul 
Cairney describes, this is a prominent theme in public policy literature. Those involved in 
policymaking are not endowed with complete autonomy, but operate within an environment 
that may “represent a source of pressure or a direct influence” on their actions.20 Policymaking 
can be influenced by a wide range of contextual factors – historic-geographic, demographic, 
economic, social, technological, institutional – depending on the policy area in question.21 Akin 
to Gaddis’ notion of necessary causes, such pieces of structural context represent the opening 
of a “funnel of causality” that feeds into policymaking; creating the conditions under which 
individual and group action takes place.22 
 
This thesis concentrates on two particular structural influences that would influence Australian 
wireless policy in the early 1920s: the international environment and the domestic impact of 
the Great War. In relation to the former, there are compelling reasons to examine 
international conditions in order to understand policy decisions made within a given country. 
In a famous 1978 article, Peter Gourevitch stresses the considerable effects that international 
circumstances – particularly the global state system and the global economy – can have on 
domestic policy choices, along with other aspects of domestic politics.23 Because no country 
exists in isolation from others, and is instead one component of a larger international system, 
restricting analysis to internal factors threatens to overlook the ways in which domestic politics 
                                                          
19 J. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 95-96. 
20 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy, p. 111. 
21 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 113-114. 
22 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 114-115; R.I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy, The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, New York, 1974, pp. 228-230. 
23 P. Gourevitch, “The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics” in 
International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1978. 
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are influenced by that “country’s position in the global military and economic orders”.24 
Furthermore, though he emphasises the importance of geopolitics and the world economy – 
“war and trade” – as the principal international forces, Gourevitch also notes the capacity for 
ideas and ideologies to cross national boundaries and affect a country’s domestic politics.25 
The influence of the international system is therefore not limited to the material, but also 
encompasses the ideational.   
 
The influence of the international system has been of particular importance in relation to 
Australia. Australia’s very origin, from the beginning of British colonisation in the late 
eighteenth century, came from the decision of a major international power to increase its 
territorial possessions. From that point, and for most of its subsequent history, Australia’s 
domestic circumstances were greatly influenced by its place within the British Empire, and the 
Empire’s place within the wider international system. In the area of political economy this 
point has been well-established by scholars. For instance, though the continent was endowed 
with substantial natural resources, Australia’s ability to exploit that endowment for the 
purpose of economic development was shaped by overseas demand for its resources, as well 
as the importation of the technology, capital and labour required to extract them. As a result, 
Australia’s economic fortunes were “tied closely to the resource interests of [the international] 
system, whether through financing development or providing markets”.26 Although the 
relative importance of different overseas countries has shifted over time, with Britain 
becoming less important than the United States and East Asia, the Australian economy’s 
dependence on global economic forces has remained a persistent theme.27 This has led Stuart 
Harris to conclude that while “Australia’s influence on the international system, though not 
negligible, has been small”, the influence of the international system upon Australia has been 
“overwhelming”.28 Supporting Gourevitch’s observations, the global economy’s importance to 
Australia influenced policy decisions in a range of areas, such as tariffs, wages and 
                                                          
24 I. Katznelson, “Rewriting the Epic of America” in I. Katznelson and M. Shefter (eds), Shaped by War 
and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2002, p. 4. The collection of essays in this book explores Gourevitch’s ideas concerning the 
impact of international factors on domestic politics in the United States.  
25 P. Gourevitch, “The second image reversed”, p. 883. 
26 S. Harris, “Resources, development and the international system” in B. Head (ed.), The Politics of 
Development in Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986, p. 72. 
27 B. Head, “The Australian political economy: introduction” in B. Head (ed.), State and Economy in 
Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 4-5.   
28 S. Harris, “Resources, development and the international system”, p. 73. 
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immigration, for the purpose of shaping “the integration of Australia in the international 
economy”.29  
 
The capacity for international developments to influence domestic policy decisions informs the 
following study. There are a number of respects in which the development of Australian 
wireless was shaped by international factors. Most fundamental of these was with regard to 
the scientific and technological breakthroughs that led to the medium’s invention in the first 
place. As a country in the early throes of industrialisation, far removed from the centres of 
innovation in Europe and the United States, Australia’s adoption of wireless was conditioned 
by developments overseas from the first moment in which the medium appeared on its 
shores. Along with the initial creation of wireless, other dimensions of international influence 
included the commercial and defence implications of the medium, which in turn fed into 
competition between great powers to control international communications. As Headrick 
describes, wireless was born into a world characterised by great power rivalry over 
communication networks, and its early development was inseparable from this fact.30 It was 
within this global context, with Australia as an isolated outpost of the British Empire, that the 
formative policy decisions of the Commonwealth government concerning wireless under 
consideration in this study were made. The empirical study demonstrates that international 
considerations were a constant influence on the policy decisions made by Australian actors.      
 
One implication stemming from the influence of the international environment is that war can 
make a strong impact on the contents of domestic policy. “War is the greatest of all agents of 
change”, George Orwell declared, “it speeds up all processes, wipes out minor distinctions, 
brings realities to the surface”.31 Though public policy literature is replete with mention of the 
capacity for events to influence policymaking, “wars may offer the best case imaginable” for 
international events that can have tremendous consequences on the shape of domestic 
policy.32 David Mayhew’s research has uncovered strong connections between American 
participation in wars and the enactment of “major policy innovations” in fields as far-removed 
                                                          
29 B. Dyster and D. Meredith, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change, Second Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2012, p. 19. 
30 Chapter 7 in D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon. 
31 G. Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 
1982, p. 102. 
32 D. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2005, p. 473. 
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as taxes, suffrage, and race relations.33 Referring to a series of American conflicts from the War 
of 1812 to the Second World War, Mayhew collates a lengthy list of significant policy changes 
that were caused by war-related circumstances.34  
 
Just as significant for the purposes of this study is the capacity for war to alter the balance of 
power within the domestic political system. A wide literature exists on the impact of major 
wars on the increasing power of the American presidency in the early twentieth century.35 It is 
“an axiom of political science”, declared Clinton Rossiter in 1956, that “great 
emergencies…bring an increase in executive power and prestige”.36 In a similar vein, Robert 
Higgs’ Crisis and Leviathan documents the great influence that wars had upon the expansion of 
American government in the twentieth century.37 
 
Adopting these insights, the study highlights the considerable impact of the Great War upon 
policymaking in relation to Australian wireless communications, and demonstrates that the 
conflict was a major structural influence on the development of policy in the early 1920s. 
Chapter Four outlines the direct impact of the conflict upon the development of the sector. 
Preceding this, Chapter Two documents the tremendous impact that the Great War had on the 
domestic policymaking environment, through the expansion of Prime Ministerial power, and 
the emergence of economic nationalism. These proved to be vital contextual factors 
contributing to the passage and shape of the 1922 agreement. Through the combination of its 
impact on the wider policymaking environment, and its specific effects on the Australian 
wireless sector, the thesis demonstrates that the Great War was an instrumental influence 
over the Commonwealth government decision to partner with AWA for the purposes of 
establishing Australia’s international wireless service.   
                                                          
33 D. Mayhew, “Events as Causes: The Case of American Politics” in I. Shapiro and S. Bedi (eds), Political 
Contingency, pp. 113-115. 
34 D. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics”, pp. 475-482. 
35 See the literature surveyed in W.G. Howell and T. Johnson, “War’s Contributions to Presidential 
Power” in G.C. Edwards III and W.G. Howell (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; W.G. Howell, “Presidential Power in War” in Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 14, 2011. 
36 C. Rossiter, The American Presidency, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1956, p. 64.  
37 R. Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1987. 
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Multiple Streams Analysis and the Policymaking Process 
 
The study utilises MSA as a means to conceptualise the process of policymaking in a manner 
compatible with contextual analysis. An investigation of the establishment of a new 
communications sector, such as this study, must grapple with the concept of policymaking. 
Because the emergence of new forms of technology raises questions about how they will be 
used, “whether, for example, they will primarily be military or civilian, governmental or 
private, or non-profit or commercial”, the constitutive decisions relating to new industries are 
resolved in the arena of public policy.38 In order to explain why some choices prevail over 
others, it is necessary to understand how policy decisions are made. 
 
This represents a significant theoretical challenge. In opposition to the pluralist conception 
that underpins Curnow’s study, which links the content of policy decisions to the advocacy of 
interest groups, it is now generally accepted that the formation of public policy is 
characterised by great complexity, with interest group pressure representing only one 
explanatory factor.39 Recent theoretical advances have cut through the “bewildering 
complexity” of surrounding phenomena to identify “a smaller set of critical relationships” 
which can be generalised into abstract theories of a policymaking process.40  
 
MSA – first developed in John Kingdon’s 1984 book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies – 
presents a generalisable theory of policymaking which was based upon a detailed study of 
policymaking in the American federal health and transportation sectors in the late 1970s.41 
Since its initial development, the model has been widely adopted by public policy scholars to 
examine policymaking in other national, subnational and international contexts. This has been 
possible because of MSA’s ‘universal’ elements that have relevance to any consideration of 
                                                          
38 P. Starr, The Creation of the Media, p. 6. 
39 P. Sabatier, “The Need for Better Theories” in P. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Second 
Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, 2007, pp. 3-5.  
40 P. Sabatier, “The Need for Better Theories”, p. 5. 
41 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Second Edition, Longman, New York, 2003. 
38 
 
policymaking.42 MSA was chosen for this study because of this flexibility and suitability for 
analyses of policymaking in a variety of contexts.  
 
MSA presents a systemic conception of policymaking, modelling the way in which policy 
decisions emerge from complex systems.43 Its ‘universal’ features are derived from 
organisation theory’s ‘garbage can’ model of choice, wherein decisions are made in neither a 
rational nor linear manner.44 Instead, “choice is conceptualized as a garbage can into which 
participants, who drift in and out of decisions, dump largely unrelated problems and solutions. 
No one person controls the process of choice, and fluctuating attendance, opportunities, and 
attention give the process highly dynamic and interactive qualities”.45 As a consequence of the 
system’s opacity and uncertainty, policymaking occurs under conditions of ambiguity. The 
prevalence of ambiguity leaves considerable scope for actors to frame policy questions in 
different ways, because in regard to any field of policy there are many ways that an issue can 
be understood. The framing of policy questions is a political endeavour wherein actors exercise 
power to manipulate the ways in which the matter is principally understood for the purpose of 
influencing decisions.46  
 
There are five key features of MSA: the problem stream, the policy stream, the politics stream, 
policy windows, and policy entrepreneurs. The three streams of problems, policies, and politics 
– from which the name of the approach is derived – are each depicted as flowing 
independently of the other two. Each has “a life of its own”, and they are “largely governed by 
different forces, different considerations, and different styles”.47 When these streams 
converge, usually with the assistance of policy entrepreneurs, a policy window opens and 
creates the potential for policy change to be enacted. 
                                                          
42 P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What Is the Empirical Impact of 
this Universal Theory?” in The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2016. 
43 N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects” in P. Sabatier 
(ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, pp. 65-66.  
44 P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach”, p. 39; J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 84-89. 
45 N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, p. 66. 
46 P. Cairney and N. Zahariadis, “Multiple streams analysis: A flexible metaphor presents an opportunity 
to operationalize agenda setting processes” in N. Zahariadis (ed.), Handbook of Public Policy Agenda-
Setting, Edward Elgar, Forthcoming, p. 4; N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, pp. 66-70. 
47 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 86-88. 
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The Problem Stream 
The problem stream refers to those questions of policy which draw the attention of actors 
within the system.48 The importance of this stems from another ‘universal’ aspect of MSA: the 
fact that policymakers’ attention is finite and that at any time they could potentially consider 
an almost innumerable number of subjects. As a result there is competition between problems 
for the attention of policymakers, and their attention can abruptly shift to new and different 
subjects.49 Problems can be highlighted because of statistical indicators or other types of 
feedback that demonstrate problems with existing policy, or by highly-visible ‘focusing events’ 
that concentrate the attention of policymakers upon them and “bowl over everything standing 
in the way of prominence on the agenda”.50 However, a focusing event may need to be seen as 
indicative of a widespread problem, or presaging future troubles, to receive attention in a 
crowded field.51 The problem stream also contains a prominent “perceptual, interpretive 
element” relating to how problems are defined by participants in the policymaking process.52 
Because of the pervasive ambiguity of the policymaking process, problems can be framed by 
actors in a variety of ways. The framing of problems, which involves the values, priorities, and 
goals of those involved, is a political exercise. This will often involve framing a problem in such 
a way as to promote a ‘solution’ that already exists. In some cases, problems may not receive 
the attention of decision-makers unless there is a ready-made policy ‘solution’ available.53 
Those involved in framing problems are not always reacting to external forces, but can play a 
proactive role by taking up the mantle of an issue and framing it as a problem which requires a 
particular policy response.   
 
The Policy Stream 
The policy stream refers to the development of policy proposals.54 It is the domain of ‘policy 
communities’ – agglomerations of specialists in the field either within the government, such as 
                                                          
48 In addition to chapter 5 in J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, the problem 
stream is summarised in N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, pp. 70-72; P. Cairney, 
Understanding Public Policy, pp. 233-234; P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams 
Approach”, p. 40; P. Cairney and N. Zahariadis, “Multiple streams analysis”, p. 5. 
49 P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach”, pp. 39-40. 
50 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 96. 
51 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 98-100. 
52 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 110. 
53 P. Cairney and N. Zahariadis, “Multiple streams analysis”, p. 5 
54 In addition to chapter 6 in J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, the policy stream is 
summarised in N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, pp. 72-73; P. Cairney, Understanding 
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bureaucrats, or without, such as those attached to interest groups.55 It is within these 
communities that policy ideas are developed, discussed, and debated. Over time the number 
of proposals within a given community will be winnowed down through criteria such as the 
opinions of other specialists and their compatibility with prevailing values. This leads to a 
shortlist of policy ideas that may receive the attention of decision-makers.56 However, the 
structure of policy communities is an important factor influencing the proposals that will 
emerge from them. Fractured policy communities – those in which specialists in a field of 
policy are not in close contact – are more likely to produce radical revisions to existing policies. 
In contrast, integrated communities are more likely to hold on to existing paradigms.57 Unlike 
the problem stream, which is characterised by sudden shifts in the attention of actors, the 
policy stream is typically slow-moving. It also proceeds independently from the other streams. 
As a result of these factors, policy proposals – though they will often be touted as the 
‘solution’ to problems that come to the attention of policymakers – are often designed to 
achieve separate goals. While some are sincere attempts to solve a problem, values or 
personal advantages, such as pecuniary or career interests, can also serve as powerful 
motivators for those involved.58 At any given time in a policy community there would be 
proposals formulated and ready for enactment. Policy entrepreneurs, discussed below, use 
developments in the problem stream to advocate their preferred ‘solutions’ in a given field of 
policy. MSA highlights the notion of “solutions chasing problems”, whereby policy 
communities will have developed policy proposals and seek problems for which their 
proposals can be presented as solutions.59   
 
The Politics Stream 
The politics stream refers to the political environment within which formal decisions over 
policy are made.60 Like the others, the politics stream operates independently, and is in a 
                                                          
Public Policy, pp. 234-236; P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach”, p. 40; P. 
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55 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 117-121. 
56 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 127-139. 
57 N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, pp. 76-77. 
58 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pp. 122-124. 
59 P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach”, p. 40; P. Cairney and N. 
Zahariadis, “Multiple streams analysis”, p. 6. 
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constant state of flux as its different components shift.  It concerns the receptivity of actors 
within the political system to policy proposals, based on such factors as the ‘national mood’, 
the advocacy of pressure groups, and turnover such as through the election of a new 
government. The ‘national mood’, referring to the ephemeral array of sentiments prevalent at 
the time – “the notion that a rather large number of people out in the country are thinking 
along common lines” – can be a significant influence on the behaviour of elected officials, with 
the result that policies aligned with the prevailing mood are more likely to receive political 
support than ideas which are at odds with it.61 The activities of pressure groups can also be a 
strong current in the political stream, as politicians consider the strength of opposition or 
support for a proposal in their approach to the policy in question.62 Finally, turnover in the 
political system can create opportunities for some proposals while quashing others – “in many 
cases, a change of government provides both motive and opportunity”.63 New politicians 
coming to power may bring their own motivations to achieve a particular change in policy, 
while the replacement of old politicians may remove obstacles to a ‘solution’ that had 
previously been stymied. 
 
Policy Windows 
Policy windows are short-lived opportunities to enact policy change.64 They open when the 
three streams converge: a problem is receiving attention, a ‘solution’ to it is available, and 
political circumstances are favourable.65 A window can open as a result of changes in any of 
the streams. For instance, a new problem may manifest to which a ready-made ‘solution’ can 
be attached, development of a new policy may be a remedy for an already-existing problem, 
or the election of a new government can provide opportunities to secure the passage of 
certain policies opposed by the previous one. In Kingdon’s words, “advocates lie in wait in and 
around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which 
they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use 
to their advantage”.66 Windows are usually only open for short periods, as conditions in one of 
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the streams – particularly the swift-moving problem stream – can shift and thereby end the 
opportunity that had existed. Furthermore, the opening of a window does not guarantee any 
change. The final outcome depends upon the specific array and interaction of elements in that 
particular policy field at that particular point in time. As a consequence, policy change 
“requires a degree of, if not serendipity, at least a confluence of events and actions in a short 
space of time”.67  
 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
Policy entrepreneurs are actors within the system who play the critical role of joining the 
streams to promote a change in policy.68 When a policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs 
must capitalise on the opportunity before it disappears. As advocates of given ‘solutions’, they 
act to frame their preferred proposals as remedies to problems, and to secure political support 
for them; “they hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political 
events to policy problems...thus linking problem, policy, and politics”.69 The ability of a policy 
entrepreneur to accomplish their goal is increased by factors such as their access to political 
decision-makers, the resources they can dedicate to advocacy, and their capacity to 
persuasively frame the discussion in their preferred terms.70 ‘Softening up’ is another 
important task performed by policy entrepreneurs. This refers to efforts to build support for a 
preferred proposal in anticipation of a future opportunity to push for its adoption – “without 
this preliminary work, a proposal sprung even at a propitious time is likely to fall on deaf 
ears”.71 Through these roles, policy entrepreneurs are vital to the policymaking process. 
Though they operate as individuals within complex systems under conditions of ambiguity, and 
therefore cannot exercise complete control over the policy outcome, in any given case study 
“one can nearly always pinpoint a particular person, or at most a few persons, who were 
central in moving a subject up on the agenda and into position for enactment”.72 
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MSA depicts policymaking as a process characterised by the fluid interaction of different 
elements within a complex system. Its emphasis on the importance of timing to outcomes, 
incorporated within the notion of policy windows, differentiates it from more straightforward 
understandings of policymaking that seek to locate the origins of policy in the actions of 
individuals and groups. Though individual actions retain an importance in MSA, through the 
vital role played by policy entrepreneurs, they take place within a system marked by 
complexity, flux, and “residual randomness”.73 Because of these factors, no actor can be said 
to control the policymaking process. MSA also eschews tidy notions of linear progression in 
favour of messiness and contingency, with a strong emphasis on the importance of timing to 
outcomes. “Events do not proceed neatly in stages, steps or phases”, Kingdon concludes, 
“instead [they are the product of] independent streams that flow through the system all at 
once, each with a life of its own…many things happen separately in each case, and become 
coupled at critical points”.74     
 
As a result MSA places a strong emphasis on the contingent nature of policymaking. Policy 
windows often open in response to unpredictable events, and typically only remain open for 
brief periods before closing again. For this reason they only provide short-lived opportunities 
for policy entrepreneurs to push their preferred ‘solutions’ onto the government’s agenda.75 In 
this sense, MSA is a general model of policymaking that incorporates contingency into its 
systematic approach through the notion of probability.76 Opportunities to enact changes in 
policy are not always capitalised upon, and changes in policy are never inevitable, but the 
probability that a change will be implemented increases when “people pay high attention to a 
problem, a viable solution exists, and policymakers have the motive and opportunity to select 
it”.77 Nevertheless, the enactment of a change still requires the skills of policy entrepreneurs to 
connect the streams.78 
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As a conceptual approach MSA is, to a large degree, concerned with the small-scale. It focuses 
on the actions of a small number of individual policy entrepreneurs, operating on short time 
horizons, as important explanatory factors in how policy decisions emerge from a system. In 
this sense there are strong agential elements to the approach. However, through its 
incorporation of “long term, continuous processes going on behind the scenes” of individual 
actions, within the independent streams, it situates its understanding of individual agency 
within the context of a wider system of decision-making.79 Its conceptualisation of 
policymaking is one in which no individual actor has the capacity to control the process, and in 
which policymaking in a particular sector can bear the influence of external developments. A 
sector’s policies are therefore seen as not only the product of its own particular characteristics, 
but also broader influences.80 MSA’s approach is one of structured agency, in which individual 
actions are irremovable from a surrounding structural context.81        
 
MSA provides the analytical foundation upon which Part IV of this study is based. Its 
identification of generalisable regularities in the policymaking process, and its proven utility for 
case studies in other contexts, make it well-suited for those chapters’ contents.82 This 
approach is in keeping with the urging of Tilly and Goodin for the adoption of a “mixed 
strategy” that retains the possibility of generalisable explanations of political phenomena that 
are tempered and “sensitized to the effects of context”.83 It is based on the notion that the 
formulation of public policy is an identifiable process, within which it is possible to discern 
patterns and regularities, influenced by its location within a structural context. The structural 
context has the capacity to influence policy outcomes through its effects on the inputs that 
feed into the process, including upon the cast and relative power of the actors involved, and 
the national traditions they inhabit.   
 
The study’s use of MSA is restricted to the specific subject of the constitution of Australia’s 
international wireless service in the post-war period, covered in Part IV. In keeping with the 
approach laid out in this chapter, it is preceded by an outline of the relevant international and 
domestic structural contexts in Part II, and an examination of Commonwealth government 
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wireless policy from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end of the Great War in Part 
III. In tandem, these provide vital background to the analysis of policymaking between 1919 
and 1922 that is presented through the lens of MSA in Part IV.  
 
The contents of Part IV demonstrate the usefulness of the problem, policy, and politics 
streams, policy windows, and policy entrepreneurs as analytical concepts that help to explain 
why the 1922 agreement between AWA and the Commonwealth government came about in 
the way that it did. This suggests that along with applications in other national, subnational, 
and international contexts, MSA’s generalisability is strong enough to warrant its further 
application to other historical case studies.   
 
The Task Ahead 
 
This chapter has outlined the analytical approach that informs the remainder of the study. Part 
II of the study, which follows, uses the insights of contextual analysis to consider some of the 
international and domestic structural considerations that came to influence the development 
of Australian international wireless communications policy in the early 1920s. Part III then 
examines the prior history of Australian wireless policy between 1901 and 1918, 
demonstrating the manner in which the Great War proved a vital episode in the development 
of the sector preceding the paradigmatic shift embodied within the 1922 agreement.  
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Chapter 2 – International and Domestic Context 
 
It is not possible to understand the initial history of wireless in Australia purely by reference to 
domestic circumstances, nor without understanding critical developments external to the 
sector that came to influence the policymaking process in the early 1920s. Australian wireless 
did not develop in isolation, but was inextricably linked to the global expansion of the medium. 
It is therefore necessary to situate the evolution of wireless in Australia within the context of 
the medium’s adoption around the world. Similarly, policymaking in the field was affected by 
broader changes in the domestic political environment that had no meaningful connection 
with wireless communication, but would come to exert influence over policymaking in the 
period covered in Part IV of the study. These were an expansion in Prime Ministerial power, 
and changes in the Australian tradition of development. The task of this chapter is to outline 
these major pieces of structural context that would, in their own ways, come to influence the 
course of wireless development in Australia.  
 
The Nature of International Influence on Australian Wireless 
 
There were continuous international influences on the development of wireless, and the 
formation of government policy towards wireless, in Australia. Australian developments were 
inseparable from the international environment, and the decisions of Australian policymakers 
were, to a great degree, influenced by Australia’s position in the British Empire, and the 
Empire’s place in the wider geopolitical setting. This influence came in different forms. Most 
fundamentally, Australia, a small and isolated country far from the centres of technological 
innovation in Europe and North America, was dependent upon the transfer of technology first 
invented overseas.1 Related to this was the means by which Australians were pressured to 
adopt wireless: through the advocacy of large foreign organisations which had already 
embraced the medium for their own purposes, and which sought Australian adoption of 
wireless in alignment with those purposes. The earliest years of wireless saw Australian 
policymakers responding to policy proposals of international origin, though the years covered 
by this study saw a steady increase in domestic organisation and policy development. 
                                                          
1 See J. Todd, Colonial Technology: Science and the Transfer of Innovation to Australia, Cambridge 
University Press, Melbourne, 1995.  
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Nevertheless, both policymaking and the development of the industry in Australia were 
reactive to international circumstances throughout the entire period covered by this study.  
 
The international environment was also an important influence over Australian wireless policy 
because of the medium’s weighty implications for geopolitics. As covered below, the initial 
development of wireless at the dawn of the twentieth century quickly led to tension between 
different applications of the medium. The most fundamental cleavage was between wireless 
as a commercial asset – a means of profiting through the provision of point-to-point messaging 
services – and as a strategic asset – a means of coordinating hitherto uncontactable naval 
forces and a ‘tool of empire’.2 The early history of wireless was marked by a conflict between 
commercial and political priorities for the medium.  
 
In this conflict, Australian policymakers, like their overseas brethren, decisively favoured the 
medium’s strategic applications. This was tied to Australia’s position in the British Empire, and 
her reliance upon Britain for the vitals of trade and defence. At the beginning of the wireless 
age, Australia’s existing “lines of communication were uniformly to Britain, whether through 
the cable or the shipping routes”.3 The coming of wireless presented the opportunity to 
strengthen Australia’s communicative bonds with the Imperial centre, and to improve 
communicability with the Royal Navy, upon which Australia depended for the defence of its 
vulnerable sea lanes.4 In the words of one contemporary journalist shortly after the coming of 
war in 1914: “the British fleet is our all in all. Its destruction means Australia’s destruction, the 
ruin of our trade and institutions”.5 This fundamental concern, of highest priority for national 
survival in a potentially hostile region, exerted a powerful and constant influence over 
Australian policymaking in relation to wireless. 
 
                                                          
2 See D. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. 
3 S. Alomes, A Nation at Last? The changing character of Australian nationalism 1880-1988, Angus and 
Robertson, North Ryde, NSW, 1988, p. 76. 
4 G. Osborne and G. Lewis, Communication Traditions in 20th-century Australia, p. 15. 
5 Quoted in W. Gammage, The Broken Years: Soldiers in the Great War, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 
1975, p. 5. 
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Because of Australia’s position in the British Empire, and the need to keep abreast of British 
plans for wireless as a component of its global communications network, the autonomy of 
Australian policymakers in relation to international wireless was restricted. Australia did not 
have the option of ‘going it alone’ in the area – it was necessary to account for British plans 
and preferences. As a result of this structural imperative, wireless telegraphy’s emergence as 
an element of geopolitical rivalry between great powers was a critical influence over the 
development of the medium in Australia.  
 
International Communications and Australian Security 
 
Much as Australian wireless was tied to developments elsewhere in the world, so was the 
general history of the medium irremovable from geopolitics. The potential that wireless 
offered for improving long-distance communication, with resultant effects upon trade and 
colonial administration, in addition to the military benefits it offered, first for naval vessels and 
later for armies and air forces, made it a medium of global importance. As Headrick explains, 
this entwined the development of wireless with international politics from its very inception, 
making rivalries between great powers a central influence on its development.6 As a result, the 
development of wireless in particular countries was bound up with those countries’ foreign 
relations and positions in the world – a subject of great interest for governments in an age of 
great power rivalries.  
 
Wireless was not the first form of long-distance electrical communication – it was born into a 
world wherein rapid trans-oceanic communication was available by way of submarine 
telegraph cables. Submarine cables represented the first truly global communications network, 
which had two prominent features: the preponderance of private enterprise, and British 
dominance.7 The initial development of the cable network was spearheaded by entrepreneurs 
relying on private investment who intended to establish cable services as for-profit ventures, 
with demand for services concentrated in the news and trading businesses.8 Cable-laying was 
therefore largely driven by commercial priorities; along those routes which offered the 
                                                          
6 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 116. 
7 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 38; P. McMahon, “Early Electrical Communications Technology 
and Structural Change in the International Political Economy”, pp. 381-382. 
8 D. Headrick and P. Griset, “Submarine Telegraph Cables”, p. 551. 
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greatest potential return on investment. The speed and regularity of cable communication 
brought considerable economic benefits to the regions it connected, smoothing the operation 
of financial markets, and promoting long-distance trade and investment.9 In 1892, by which 
time all inhabited regions of the globe had been connected to the cable network, 90 percent of 
the world’s cables were controlled by private enterprise, with nearly half owned by the Eastern 
and Associated Companies.10 
 
The world’s cables were also overwhelmingly British-owned. This was, to a great degree, a 
product of Britain’s advantages in maritime strength, combined with its financial, 
technological, and industrial sophistication. It also reflected the fact that during the period of 
cable expansion in the mid/late nineteenth century, Britain remained at peace. In contrast, its 
great power rivals – France, Germany, and the United States – were preoccupied with major 
wars. By the time that other powers began to concern themselves with the field, the British 
cable network already spanned the globe “and had more than enough capacity to handle 
whatever traffic other nations’ traders, shippers, and colonial officials could generate. Hence, 
Britain had the field to itself in the crucial formative years”.11   
 
However, the last two decades of the nineteenth century saw a gradual, yet vital, shift in 
governments’ perception of, and policy towards, cables. The report of a British Royal 
Commission on the subject of Imperial defence in 1881 was a critical development in this 
transition. The report identified cables as vital strategic assets in the event of any future war.12 
From this point commercial considerations were relegated to secondary concerns in relation to 
cables, which increasingly became the focus of “those who were concerned with the unity and 
security of the empire, who could perceive advantages in it entirely unconnected with business 
and commerce”.13 The British government’s realisation of cables’ strategic importance was 
followed by other great powers. Whereas rival European powers had previously relied upon 
British cables for their international communication services, a series of incidents in the late 
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1890s confirmed the geopolitical significance of cables, and the associated risks of their 
continued dependence on Britain. The Spanish-American War of 1898 saw the United States 
cut a number of British-owned cables connecting Cuba with the outside world. This confirmed 
that, despite British neutrality in the conflict, cables would be a target in any future war 
between great powers. In the same year, a dispute between British and French colonial forces 
in East Africa – the ‘Fashoda Incident’ – saw Britain refuse to give permission for French 
officials to use its cable to communicate with Paris, while its own were able to contact London 
within a few hours. Most significantly, the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 saw Britain 
institute restrictions on all foreign traffic on its cables connecting South Africa, despite the 
complaints of the French and Germans that this damaged their commercial interests in 
adjacent colonies.14 As Headrick and Griset summarise, “by the turn of the century, it had 
become clear that all other countries’ vital communications were at risk as long as Britain ruled 
the waves and owned the cables”.15 
 
As a result, the first years of the twentieth century saw a considerable expansion of the world’s 
cable network as rival powers began laying their own cables to communicate with their 
overseas colonies and end their reliance upon Britain. This was driven by geopolitical 
imperatives; commercial profit was a subsidiary concern compared to the potential strategic 
benefits from escaping British control.16 Despite newfound competition from France, Germany 
and the United States, by the coming of war in 1914 Britain remained the dominant nation in 
the field of cable communication thanks to its pioneering efforts decades earlier.17 This 
competition, entwined with increased awareness of the strategic implications of trans-oceanic 
communication, had also led Britain to pivot away from private enterprise and towards 
“government priorities about colonial possessions, wars, and strategic interests” in its 
stewardship of the medium.18 New cables were laid along routes that were unremunerative, 
but offered strategic benefits. By the eve of the Great War in 1914, submarine cables had 
become enmeshed with geopolitics, “no longer just a business or a public utility” but instead 
“one of the pillars of national security”.19 
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When wireless was born in the 1890s, it was into a world in which governments had 
established strong interests in controlling communications. Because of this, the development 
of wireless quickly became embroiled with great power rivalries – a factor which exercised a 
considerable influence over the course of the medium’s development. The conclusions that 
governments had drawn about the strategic utility of cables in the late nineteenth century 
carried over to wireless telegraphy, which saw government priorities obstruct the unfettered 
exploitation of the new medium by private enterprise.  
 
The Italian inventor and entrepreneur Guglielmo Marconi was the central figure in the early 
history of wireless, and the eponymous company he founded became one of the most 
important organisations in the new field.20 Having constructed a prototype wireless apparatus 
at his family home in Italy, the young Marconi initially offered his device to the Italian 
government but was turned down.21 This was to have far-reaching consequences. In 1896 
Marconi sailed to his mother’s home country, Britain, for the purpose of further developing his 
invention.22 As a result of this decision, the infant medium first took root in the country that 
was already dominant in the field of communications. Shortly after arriving in London, Marconi 
applied for the first patent covering wireless telegraphy, and, using connections on his 
mother’s side of the family, arranged to meet with the Chief Engineer of the British 
Postmaster-General’s Department, William Preece.23 
 
Preece’s willingness to meet the young inventor reveals an interest in wireless within the 
British government from the outset. Preece, who was in charge of Britain’s land telegraph 
system, had a keen interest in the development of the new technology and had been 
experimenting himself, though less successfully than Marconi, with a form of wireless 
telegraphy.24 After a small-scale demonstration of Marconi’s device before departmental 
officials, Preece became a strong advocate for the new invention and arranged for 
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governmental support for its further development.25 Officers of the Royal Navy were also 
experimenting with wireless in this era. Beginning in 1895, Captain Henry Jackson, interested 
in enabling warships to communicate with each other during night time operations, had 
conducted a number of experiments in wireless signalling.26  
 
Within months of arriving in Britain Marconi had cultivated powerful supporters within the 
British government. Officials from the Postmaster-General’s Department and the British 
defence establishment, including Preece and Jackson, were present for a large-scale 
demonstration of Marconi’s invention on the Salisbury Plain conducted in September 1896. 
The demonstration convinced those in attendance of wireless’ viability as a new medium of 
communication. Later in 1896 Preece endorsed Marconi and his invention at a public lecture 
on the subject of wireless, resulting in widespread publicity for the new medium.27 Jackson 
was also impressed by the capabilities of Marconi’s device, reporting that “for military 
purposes…its adoption would be almost invaluable”.28 
 
However, events in 1897 transformed the relationship between the British Postmaster-
General’s Department and Marconi into an adversarial one. In April Marconi was approached 
by a private investor with an offer to form a company based around the commercial 
exploitation of his invention. After correspondence with Preece on the subject, which led to 
the Chief Engineer attempting, unsuccessfully, to convince the Treasury to offer Marconi 
£10,000 for his patent, the inventor accepted the investor’s offer and formed a new company, 
the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company (hereafter the Marconi Company) in July. 
Marconi’s decision soured his hitherto good relationship with Preece, who had been an 
enthusiastic early supporter of the invention.29 This was the first sign of tension between the 
different priorities for wireless communication.  
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The Marconi Company was formed to capitalise on the commercial opportunities presented by 
wireless’ unique potential to communicate with ships at sea. The Royal Navy, which, unlike the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, had not turned against the company, became its first 
customer. After large-scale manoeuvres in 1899, which demonstrated the usefulness of 
wireless to naval operations, Jackson – in charge of overseeing the use of wireless in the trial – 
recommended that the Royal Navy adopt the medium.30 Soon after, during the Boer War, the 
Navy found use for a number of Marconi apparatuses in a real conflict for the first time. In 
1900 the Admiralty ordered thirty Marconi sets for its vessels, followed by an additional fifty in 
the following year. Then, in 1903, the two organisations signed a long-term contract wherein 
the company became the Royal Navy’s exclusive supplier of wireless equipment for eleven 
years.31  
 
The company also moved into providing commercial maritime communication services, with 
the aspiration to achieve a monopoly in the field. Coupled with its contracts with the Royal 
Navy, the Marconi Company’s commercial service provided a steady source of revenue that 
allowed it to dominate the field of wireless in its first years.32 In 1901 the company secured a 
contract with the maritime insurance giant Lloyd’s on the basis of wireless’ new capabilities: 
 
Lloyd’s had at this time, in all the major seaports of the world and most of the minor 
ones, a network of more than 1000 agents who…were especially charged with 
transmitting to London from their districts the latest news of ship arrivals and ship 
movements. Radio held out significant prospects for a vast improvement in the 
efficiency of this global information network, most notably perhaps in the new facility 
it afforded for communicating with ships on the high seas – a facility that submarine 
cables could never provide.33 
 
The Marconi Company’s contract with Lloyd’s was followed by other agreements with major 
commercial shipping lines such as P&O and the White Star Line.34 By December 1902 the 
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company had fitted seventy ships and erected over two dozen shore stations for 
communicating with them.35 Five years later, “all the large transatlantic liners carried radio 
installations, and all of these were Marconi”.36 As the first organisation to enter the field, the 
Marconi Company was able to secure deals with maritime organisations without the need to 
worry about competition. The company’s quest for monopoly was also aided by a policy 
against intercommunication. Under this, Marconi operators were forbidden from exchanging 
messages (with the exception of distress calls) with any wireless systems other than their 
company’s own. This practice, combined with the company’s commanding share of the 
maritime market, created strong pressures for organisations to adopt the Marconi system 
rather than that of any of the rival companies which were beginning to emerge.37  
 
The most powerful resistance to the Marconi Company’s initial strides towards a global 
wireless monopoly came from governments, led by Germany and the United States, rather 
than commercial competitors.38 Britain’s great power rivals were wary of the company’s 
increasing power over the new medium, perceiving it as a tool through which the British 
government could secure a stranglehold over wireless communication similar to that which it 
already held over submarine cables.39 This suspicion led Britain’s great power rivals to reject 
offers from the Marconi Company to provide equipment to their navies.40 In addition, two 
international conferences on wireless, held in Berlin in 1903 and 1906, resulted in an 
international agreement to prohibit the Marconi Company’s policy of non-
intercommunication, which was narrowly ratified by the British Parliament.41 Furthermore, in 
1903 Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered the formation of a national wireless company, Telefunken, for 
the purpose of advancing the medium’s development in Germany.42 Telefunken would become 
the Marconi Company’s principal rival in the field. 
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The differences between the Marconi Company and Telefunken symbolised the conflict 
between commercial and governmental priorities for the medium. Whereas the Marconi 
Company functioned as a commercial enterprise, funded by private investors and driven by 
commercial priorities, Telefunken was scarcely concerned with profits. From its very inception 
it functioned as an instrument of the German government, which was concerned with the 
strategic, rather than the commercial, utility of wireless.43 The German government undertook 
a number of measures to aid Telefunken’s expansion, including guaranteed military orders, the 
subsidisation of its tenders in other countries, and, from 1910, a prohibition on the use of 
foreign wireless equipment aboard German ships. Up until this point two of the larger German 
shipping lines had carried Marconi equipment.44     
 
Underwritten by the German government, Telefunken sought to roll-back the established 
power of the Marconi Company around the globe. The primary arena of confrontation 
between the two companies was in Europe. The Marconi Company had some difficulties 
establishing relationships with continental governments due to competition from Telefunken 
which, backed by German banks and diplomacy, could offer more attractive terms to potential 
buyers.45 Much to the chagrin of the Marconi Company, Telefunken had secured maritime 
wireless agreements across a wide swathe of Europe by 1910.46 By this time Germany had 
emerged as a notable competitor to Britain in the field of wireless.  
 
The early history of maritime wireless reflected the attentiveness of governments to its 
potential military implications. From the 1890s, there was considerable interest from naval 
authorities in in its adoption, because wireless “could do things of military importance that no 
other technology could do. Price competition was of small importance in this market; what 
counted were the completely new capabilities”.47 This explains why, despite the hostility 
towards the Marconi Company within the British Postmaster-General’s Department, the Royal 
Navy relied on the company to supply it with equipment. It also explains why the German 
government was willing to underwrite Telefunken’s finances; the costs involved were 
outweighed by the strategic benefits of developing a national wireless organisation free from 
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British control. The advantages of integrating wireless into naval operations were further 
underscored in 1905, as the effective use of the medium made an important contribution to 
the Japanese naval victory in the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War.48 
 
Unlike its major competitor, which was supported by the German government, the Marconi 
Company was hamstrung by British government policy that prioritised defence and strategic 
considerations over the firm’s profitability. In 1904 Parliament passed the Wireless Telegraphy 
Act to make wireless, in the words of the Postmaster-General, “more useful for purposes of 
defence and general communication, and to provide against the growth of a monopoly in the 
hands of any one Company”.49 This was followed by the ratification, in 1907, of the 
aforementioned international agreement obliging intercommunication, which ended the 
company’s effective monopoly over the field of maritime wireless. Then, in 1909 the 
Postmaster-General’s Department decreed that under the Wireless Telegraphy Act the 
company would no longer be permitted to renew its licences for shore stations in Britain, 
effectively forcing the company to sell these facilities to the government. These actions of 
government combined with high capital costs to threaten the firm’s financial viability.50  
 
The Marconi Company responded to these challenges in 1910 by reforming its business 
strategy and appointing Godfrey Isaacs as its new Managing Director. To shore up the 
company’s viability Isaacs launched an aggressive campaign of litigation against those parties it 
claimed had infringed its patents.51 Though the company had been acquisitive regarding 
wireless patents since its inception, it had previously been reluctant to launch expensive legal 
challenges in relation to patent rights because of its poor financial position.52 Under Isaacs’ 
leadership the company prioritised the legal defence of its patents. This proved a windfall for 
the company, with its most important result being the penetration of the growing American 
market from 1912.53  
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However, Isaacs was less successful in improving his company’s position against Telefunken. 
The German government’s support of its national firm meant that the Marconi Company was 
forced to abandon its foothold in German shipping and, effectively, any activity in Germany at 
all. Instead, the British company sought to confront Telefunken by instigating patent 
infringement suits in other countries where the two firms were competing for contracts.54 
After months of costly ‘war’ between them, centred on the control of wireless on the German 
mercantile marine, the rival companies turned to negotiation. These negotiations culminated 
in 1912 with the formation of an international cartel wherein each firm agreed to cease 
litigation, divide the world into spheres of influence, and form a patent pool.55    
 
Another key change that came from Isaacs’ leadership of the Marconi Company was a greater 
emphasis on the formation of commercial relationships with governments through the 
provision of international wireless services. This marked a recognition that, in relation to 
communications, governments were less interested in “unfettered commerce” than in 
geopolitics, and that the company’s operations needed to be tailored towards this reality.56  
 
The centrepiece of the Marconi Company’s bid to establish profitable international services in 
collaboration with the British government were ambitious plans, first emerging in 1910, for an 
‘Imperial scheme’ of wireless connecting the territories of the British Empire – one of the 
major focuses of this study. This was not the company’s first foray into international wireless. 
It had already established a trans-Atlantic international service in 1907, but this was a 
commercial service reliant on private investment.57 Prior to this, in 1906, the company had 
proposed to construct a series of long-distance stations for the purpose of connecting British 
possessions through wireless. However, this proposal had been stymied by resistance from the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, concerned about the prospect of the company attaining a 
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monopoly over long-distance wireless within the Empire and deeming the proposal “too 
radical”.58  
 
After Isaacs had assumed the role of Managing Director of the Marconi Company in 1910, he 
presented the British government with a comprehensive proposal to construct an Imperial 
scheme of wireless. The proposal, which received greater consideration from the Imperial 
government than had been the case in 1906, placed a stronger emphasis on wireless’ strategic 
dimensions. As the following chapter details, after two years of negotiations an agreement was 
reached wherein the Marconi Company was contracted to build a series of six stations 
throughout the Empire that would be operated by the Post Office. However, because of delays 
the company had only commenced the construction of one of these stations by the outbreak 
of the Great War in August 1914, and in early 1915 further work on the Imperial scheme was 
abandoned for the duration.59 Because of this interruption, the subject of an Imperial wireless 
scheme was not revisited until the after the return of peace. 
 
Britain remained the leading power in international communications at the time of the war’s 
outbreak. Despite delays to the Imperial scheme, the Royal Navy and British shipping 
companies could communicate with seafaring vessels everywhere but the Pacific through 
wireless. Vitally, Britain also continued to dominate the field of cables: “for Great Britain 
radiotelegraphy was not a substitute for cables, but a complement, part of an integrated 
system of communications” – as a result “Britain had what no other nation could boast: a 
choice” between different means of international communication in times of crisis.60   
 
In contrast, adopting wireless was a way for Britain’s great power rivals – principally Germany 
and the United States – to challenge British hegemony over global communications.61 In 1906, 
the German government embarked upon the construction of long-distance wireless stations to 
supplement its limited number of submarine cables. Its aspiration was to construct a global 
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communications network, free from British control, pieced together from a combination of 
cables and wireless stations.62 The centrepiece of this network was a powerful station at 
Nauen, on Berlin’s outskirts, which Telefunken began constructing – with strong financial 
support from the German government – in 1906. Heavy investment from the government was 
seen as justified because of the geopolitical necessity of being able to communicate overseas 
without the cooperation of Britain. By 1914, thanks to technological improvements, the Nauen 
station’s effective range was eight thousand kilometres, enabling direct signalling to the 
United States’ eastern seaboard.63 This year also saw an American subsidiary of Telefunken 
erect a long-distance station in Sayville, New York that was itself capable of direct transmission 
to Germany.64 By the eve of war in 1914 Germany had completed a rudimentary 
communications network linking its colonies around the world, with a combination of wireless 
and submarine cable relays connecting the Nauen and Sayville stations with its possessions in 
Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific.65 Though the United States had been slow to embrace 
wireless, between 1911 and 1914 it emerged as another rival to British communications 
supremacy. The Radio Act, passed by Congress in 1912, placed wireless under the control of 
the US Navy, which began constructing a series of long-distance stations at its bases around 
the world.66 The American stations, which could communicate with vessels in both the Atlantic 
and Pacific, “far surpassed in coverage anything the British or any other government could 
claim”.67 
 
The German and American challenges were based on technological innovations that allowed 
for the propagation of continuous waves.68 Continuous waves, which would later enable the 
transmission of voice and music through the airwaves, allowed for a considerably more 
efficient means of signalling – increasing the effective range of wireless transmission. The 
Marconi Company, on the other hand, was deeply invested in the original ‘spark gap’ design of 
wireless telegraphy. This design produced damped waves, which restricted signals to Morse 
code, and its range was linked to the electrical charge that could be held by the device’s aerial. 
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Larger aerials, to provide more power, were therefore required for longer distances.69 Though 
the Marconi Company had utilised spark telegraphy for its trans-Atlantic service that opened in 
1907, by this stage the spark gap “had little potential for further development”.70 The 
development of continuous wave apparatuses foreshadowed the obsolescence of spark 
equipment, but the Marconi Company was slow to embrace them because of its heavy 
investment in spark. Although the company remained the world’s most important wireless 
organisation, by 1914 it had lost its position at the forefront of the medium’s technological 
development.71 
 
The outbreak of the Great War saw the strategic value of trans-oceanic communication 
networks laid bare. Operations against the communications infrastructure of their adversaries 
were crucial elements in the grand strategies of both sides.72 Since the late 1890s British war 
plans had called for severing the cables of its enemies in the event of war.73 A later report from 
the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1911 outlined that, in the case of war against Germany, 
the British would isolate Germany from the rest of the world by attacking its cables and 
wireless stations.74  This would limit Germany’s “access to allies and neutral sources of supply 
and finances”, as well as its ability to interdict the sea lanes upon which British imports 
depended.75 Consequently, one of Britain’s first military actions in August 1914 was to sever 
Germany’s cables in the English Channel. This was accomplished within hours of the British 
declaration of war and effectively isolated Germany from the global cable network.76  
 
The British-controlled cable network proved instrumental to the Allied victory, but by the 
November 1918 Armistice three problems with cables were evident. The first, as had been 
anticipated in pre-war plans, was that cables were vulnerable to interdiction. It was only British 
control of the oceans that guaranteed the survival of its own cable network. “The real weapon 
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was not the ability to cut cables”, Headrick describes, “but to repair them. Germany’s cables, 
once cut, were lost for good”, whereas “Allied cables did not remain out of commission for 
more than a few weeks”.77 Nevertheless, as Sturmey writes, “many legends died in the 1914-
18 war, among them that cables could be relied upon because of the invincibility of the British 
Navy”.78 A number of German raids on British cables, discussed below, had confirmed their 
vulnerability. The second problem with cables revealed during the conflict was that their 
capacity had been stretched by the pressures of war, which had seen a doubling of cable traffic 
without any additional cables being laid.79 This led to considerable delays in the transmission 
of messages, sometimes to the point where postal confirmation of a cable message being 
dispatched reached the destination before the cable message itself.80  
 
Finally, the considerable advances in wireless during the conflict made cables appear 
outmoded. Due to technological upgrades, by 1918 the German station at Nauen could 
transmit over a distance of 18,000 kilometres, sufficient to reach New Zealand directly.81 The 
Allied belligerents also improved their trans-oceanic wireless capacity in different ways in the 
war years. The United States used its neutrality prior to 1917 to improve the series of long-
distance stations first commenced by the US Navy in 1912, resulting in “the most modern and 
extensive radio-communications network in the world”, and signifying the lead it had achieved 
in the field by this point.82 Then, after its entry into the conflict, American wireless was 
thoroughly reorganised by government action, leading to the purging of Marconi influence 
from that country, and the eventual formation of the Radio Corporation of America.83 The 
British also bolstered their number of wireless stations during the conflict. Though the original 
plans for the Imperial scheme were abandoned in early 1915, the Marconi Company was 
contracted to erect thirteen new long-distance stations around the world so as to increase the 
wireless coverage available to British vessels.84 There remained complications associated with 
the use of wireless for long-distance communication, namely that its signals could be 
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intercepted, necessitating the adoption of codes and secrecy,85 yet by the Armistice it 
appeared to represent the future of international communication.  
 
Australia, which had not established wireless communication with the outside world by the 
time of the war’s outbreak, remained dependent upon cables, and the capacity to protect 
them from enemy action, for its international communication during the conflict. However, the 
perils of an exclusive reliance on cables were underscored by two incidents in late 1914. In 
September, a German cruiser landed a raiding party on Fanning Island in the Pacific, severing 
the Pacific cable connecting Australia with North America. Despite a heroic repair effort, the 
cable’s operations were not completely restored until the following month.86 Then, in 
November, a similar incident saw another German cruiser attack the cable station on Cocos 
Island in the Indian Ocean. This raid, interrupted by the HMAS Sydney – which had received a 
wireless message alerting it to the German vessel’s presence – was comparatively 
unsuccessful, with the damage repaired within a day.87 By the end of 1914, with the remainder 
of the German surface fleet confined in port and the Royal Navy dominant over the world’s 
oceans, “Australia’s cable connections with the rest of the world remained uninterrupted by 
enemy action”.88 Nevertheless, the German raids had revealed the vulnerability of cables to 
attack. In a future war there was no guarantee that their safety could be maintained. And yet, 
in the absence of an alternative, it remained the fact that, in the words of one contemporary 
strategist, “the ultimate fate of Australia is dependent upon the security of the Empire’s sea 
communications”.89 
 
The vulnerability of the only lines of rapid communication to Britain coupled with other 
security challenges Australia faced in the post-war years. These were related to the future of 
British policy in the Pacific, and what Neville Meaney has labelled Australia’s ‘cold war’ against 
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Japan.90 Though it had been on the victorious side, the war left the British Empire drained and 
in a perilous position: 
 
The British Empire, it seemed, would claim for itself a major place in the twentieth-
century world as a self-sustaining and self-legitimating strategic unit. After 1919 that 
complacent scenario collapsed. London found itself struggling both to overcome 
resistance to its imperial rule and to mobilize the internal resources necessary to 
uphold its power. The international legitimacy and the strategic rationale of the 
empire were both in doubt as never before.91 
 
In light of these challenges, the end of the war portended a relative decline in British naval 
power in the Pacific. Exhausted and financially strained by war, the Admiralty, following the 
Armistice, began downsizing the fleet by scrapping a number of capital ships without 
commissioning replacements for them. It also abandoned the ‘two power standard’, which, 
since the 1890s, had obliged the Royal Navy to maintain as many capital ships as those 
possessed by the next two largest fleets. This was a symbolic recognition that it was no longer 
possible for the Royal Navy to single-handedly control the world’s oceans in the face of future 
challenges from the rising naval powers of Japan and, particularly, the United States. As a 
result, the Royal Navy would prioritise the seas closer to Britain, ceding influence in the Pacific 
to the United States and Japan .92 
 
For Australia, the potential implications of Britain’s reorientation were dire because of the 
ongoing ‘cold war’ with Japan. Since the Russo-Japanese war, Australian officials had cast 
nervous eyes towards Japan’s growing power in the Pacific. This had been exacerbated during 
the Great War, when, as part of Allied operations against Germany’s colonial possessions, 
Japanese forces had seized all German territories in the Pacific north of the equator while 
                                                          
90 N. Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923, Volume 2 of A History of Australian Defence and 
Foreign Policy 1901-23, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 2009. 
91 A. Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916-1931, Penguin, London, 
2014, p. 375. 
92 M. Toll, Australia in the Evolution of the British Commonwealth, 1919-1939: The Impact of the 
International Environment, Ph.D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1979, pp. 73-74; A. Tooze, The 
Deluge, pp. 364-365. 
65 
 
Australian and New Zealand troops had done the same in the South Pacific.93 Neither the fact 
that Australia and Japan fought against a common foe, nor the existence of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, could allay Australian apprehension about Japan’s territorial ambitions in 
the Pacific. In analyses that would be vindicated two decades later upon the onset of the next 
world war, Australian policymakers in the post-war period viewed Japan as a potent threat 
that could come to dominate the Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile, “Britain was economically and 
psychologically exhausted and unable to maintain a two ocean navy, and it was unclear what 
assistance Britain would be able to offer in the case of a Japanese move against Australia”.94    
 
In the early 1920s Australian defence planners began to prepare for a future confrontation 
with Japan. In an influential report from 1920, military officials noted that Australia’s security 
rested on two foundations: membership of the British Empire, and the ability to withstand an 
attack for long enough to allow outside assistance to arrive. As Maynard Toll describes, the 
report emphasised the pivotal importance of external reinforcements to Australia’s ability to 
repel an attack: 
 
It must be assumed that the Empire would aid Australia in the event of aggression 
against her. This being so, Australia was in a particularly dangerous position since that 
aid must come from overseas, and without sufficient naval strength deployed in the 
Pacific to deter the Japanese, it was likely that Japan could gain command of the seas 
at the outset.95  
 
This report, commissioned by Cabinet two years before the AWA agreement, reveals an 
important consideration that Australian policymakers had to face in relation to the subject of 
international communications. The next major conflict Australia faced was likely to see a 
hostile power in control of the surrounding oceans, underneath which Australia’s only lines of 
international communication ran. Yet the external support Australia would require in a future 
war would depend on being able to communicate with the outside world. As a result, there 
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was a strong security imperative for Australia to escape its dependence on submarine cables 
for its ability to communicate with the heart of the Empire.    
 
Wireless’ geopolitical dimensions were of great importance to Australia because of their 
implications for her relationship with the outside world within the context of the British 
Empire. As the next chapter demonstrates, the strategic implications of wireless were evident 
from the very beginning of Australian policymakers’ interest in the subject. 
 
Although the strategic dimensions of wireless were present from the very beginning, and had 
been a strong influence over the medium’s development internationally, the experience of 
1914-1918 underscored their vital importance. The war demonstrated that twentieth century 
conflict was greatly dependent on the maintenance of communications links, with Germany’s 
isolation from the outside world being an important element in her defeat in 1918. Of more 
concrete importance to Australian policymakers, however, was the war’s demonstration of the 
shortcomings of cables, upon which the country still relied for its international 
communications. One concern was the heavy congestion, and associated delays, in cable 
communication with the heart of the Empire. With Australia so distant from Britain, meaning 
that cable messages had to pass through several relay points between the two countries, it 
was slow for messages to travel between them. Furthermore, the raids of German cruisers in 
late 1914 had revealed the vulnerability of cables to attack, and the possibility, in the case of a 
future war, that Australia’s communications with the Imperial centre could be severed by a 
hostile power. With the Royal Navy’s reorientation away from the Pacific, and the potential of 
Australia facing a conflict with Japan, whose navy could quickly establish control over the 
surrounding seas, continuing to exclusively rely upon cables for trans-oceanic communication 
was fraught with risk.  
 
The geopolitical context therefore placed strong pressures upon Australia in relation to 
international wireless development. However, it did not itself determine domestic policy 
decisions. To return to Gourevitch’s conceptualisation of the relationship between the 
international system and domestic policies, although the global “environment may exert 
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strong pulls…some leeway in the response to that environment remains”.96 In other words, 
domestic decision-makers face choices, albeit from among a constrained range of possibilities, 
in how to respond to international circumstances. Even after considering the powerful 
influence of international factors, there remains a need to examine domestic political 
circumstances in order to explain policy outcomes. The remainder of this chapter outlines two 
pieces of domestic context that would prove influential over policymaking in relation to 
international wireless in the early 1920s. 
 
Prime Ministerial Power 
 
One of the major dynamics revealed in Part IV of this study is the central role of Prime Minister 
Hughes in the policymaking process culminating in the 1922 agreement. This was, however, 
only one dimension of Hughes’ tenure in office.97 Between his ascension in 1915 and his 
downfall in 1923 – a longevity not exceeded until the Menzies era – Hughes exercised a level of 
Prime Ministerial power unequalled in Australian history. In the assessment of R.A.W. Rhodes, 
John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, no other Australian Prime Minister has been “more powerful, 
more idiosyncratic, more individualistic” than Hughes.98 These authors also attribute the 
Hughes years as the beginning of the “prime ministerial dominance” that has since come to 
characterise the Australian Westminster system.99  
 
A number of factors prevented the emergence of a strong Prime Minister prior to 1910. One 
was the instability associated with the three party system of Free Trade, Protectionist, and 
Labor, during which time Alfred Deakin was the only figure to hold the office for the full length 
of a Parliamentary term. The parties also saw a number of leadership changes during this 
period.100 Furthermore, during this period the functions of the Commonwealth government 
were comparatively few. The architects of Federation had agreed upon a specific list of powers 
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for the Commonwealth government – aiming to limit its activity to a few prescribed areas – 
while leaving state powers as general.101 As an indication of this, the Commonwealth Public 
Service was a relatively small organisation, with 90 percent of its officials employed by the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, owing to the fact that many government functions 
remained the domain of the states.102  
 
Andrew Fisher’s second term as Prime Minister, beginning in 1910, marked the first notable 
deviation from this pattern.  With the aid of Australia’s first Parliamentary majority, he set 
about expanding Commonwealth responsibilities in a range of areas, such as social welfare, 
expanding postal services and regulating coastal shipping.103 Fisher also presided over the 
creation of the Prime Minister’s Department in 1911. The first new Commonwealth 
department since Federation, it was created to preside over “matters upon which the Prime 
Minister’s opinion is sought by other Departments, or in connection with which expression is 
required to be given to the general views of the Government as determined by Cabinet”.104 
Initially its functions remained modest, however the creation of a new department to serve 
the Prime Minister alone foreshadowed greater changes in the years to come.105 
 
Though the Fisher Prime Ministership saw the appropriation of new responsibilities and the 
creation of a new institutional support, there remained multiple checks upon his power in the 
office. One of these was the relationship between Cabinet and the Labor caucus. The latter 
body had asserted its control over the selection of ministers in 1905, and ministers were 
regular attendees at the party’s weekly caucus meetings.106 From that point the responsibility 
of Cabinet to the party caucus became “a defining principle for Labor” in government.107 In 
addition, Fisher’s personal qualities were not conducive to aggrandising power. His style of 
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leadership was oriented towards consultation and delegation. As Peter Bastian describes, in his 
relationship with the rest of the Cabinet Fisher “gave his ministers a free hand while he set 
priorities and maintained a general oversight of the administration”.108 His aversion to direct 
intervention in policymaking is also highlighted by John Murdoch in a description of Fisher’s 
relationship with the bureaucracy: he “never claimed to have the detailed knowledge of a 
specialist…He trusted completely his permanent officials and other advisers to show him how 
to carry [his] ideas into effect, and he was good at delegating responsibility on to them”.109 The 
following chapter demonstrates the pertinence of Murdoch’s observation with regard to 
Fisher’s approach towards the development of wireless. It was during his Prime Ministership 
that the Commonwealth bureaucracy, with political support, attained its highest level of 
control over the medium. 
 
Little is known about this dimension of Cook’s brief period in power in 1913-1914; Murdoch’s 
account portrays this period as characterised by the government devoting its energies towards 
undoing a number of the Fisher government’s reforms.110 The coming of war in 1914, however, 
augured a vast and unprecedented increase in Prime Ministerial power. Hughes’ rise to the 
office in 1915 led to the augmentation of that position relative to the rest of the political 
system. As Sol Encel observes, “strong central government is an historic consequence of the 
need for defence”.111 The Great War prompted a large expansion in the Commonwealth’s 
sphere of activities, as it grappled with mobilising the Australian economy for war, and a 
resultant increase in executive power. This was further accelerated as Hughes progressively 
broke free from the usual constraints upon Prime Ministerial power. 
 
Australia was in an election campaign when the Great War broke out in August 1914. The Cook 
caretaker government, once it had received notification from British authorities that war was 
unavoidable, took the first steps towards preparing the Commonwealth for the conflict. These 
included mobilising the armed forces and creating an office for the purpose of instituting a 
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censorship regime on means of communication such as cables, wireless, telephones, 
newspapers, and post. Military authorities also began to monitor those of whom there were 
reasons to be suspicious, such as German subjects living in Australia.112 The most notable 
increases in executive power, however, came shortly after the re-election of Fisher in 
September 1914. This was the passage of the War Precautions Act. This Act formed the legal 
cornerstone of the Commonwealth’s expanded wartime powers, with the effect of 
marginalising Parliament for the duration of the conflict because the powers it conferred were 
exercisable by regulation. The War Precautions Act, supplemented by the Trading With the 
Enemy Act and Crimes Act, provided the legal basis for the Commonwealth prosecution of the 
war and also increased the importance of Hughes, serving as Attorney-General at the time.113 
 
Following Fisher’s retirement in October 1915, Hughes, who had already established himself at 
the centre of decision-making, attained the Prime Ministership without relinquishing the 
Attorney-General portfolio. By the end of the war, Hughes held the offices of Prime Minister, 
Attorney-General and External Affairs Minister; the dominant figure within the executive.114 
Throughout the conflict he wielded regulations under the War Precautions Act readily, 
facilitating his personal intervention in a wide range of areas. Joan Beaumont’s assessment of 
this pattern of behaviour is stark, describing the War Precautions Act as “used in an essentially 
dictatorial manner by Hughes” from 1916 onwards.115 Hughes’ attitude towards governing 
during this time is best illustrated in a wry joke he is said to have made that “the best way to 
govern Australia was to have [the Solicitor-General] Sir Robert Garran at his elbow, with a 
fountain pen and a blank sheet of paper, and the War Precautions Act”.116  
 
Hughes’ preferred approach to administration during the war was to delegate broad powers to 
others and charge them with executing particular tasks with a minimum of oversight while his 
attention was focused elsewhere: “this was so in the case of R.R. Garran, the Solicitor-General; 
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J.M. Higgins, the man he chose to organise the metal industry and later the wool industry; F.W. 
Hagelthorn, in whose hands he placed control of the wheat industry; and W.S. Robinson, who 
in effect was plenipotentiary between the government and Australian industry”.117 Such 
arrangements were typically complemented by the creation of new organisations through 
which the Prime Ministerial appointees worked on their tasks. This may seem at odds with the 
view of Hughes as a grand centraliser, but it is not. None of these men personally appointed by 
Hughes to manage certain tasks were politicians. George Pearce, who had served as Defence 
Minister since September 1914, was the only other politician whose competence Hughes 
trusted sufficiently to delegate power to in such a manner. Hughes’ style was characterised by 
reliance upon advice from figures outside the official organs of government, and from only a 
trusted few within.118 
 
By removing responsibilities from ministers in favour of appointees that were, in effect, 
personally accountable to him, Hughes circumvented the traditional operation of Cabinet. As a 
result Cabinet ceased to be a body within which important decisions were made. Interpreting 
this, Malcolm Booker writes that:  
 
It has been said that Hughes did not delegate authority to his other cabinet colleagues 
because he was suspicious of them; but this is not the true explanation…The truth was 
he had a poor opinion of the ability of most of the members of his ministry…He 
assumed almost all authority himself because he believed that he was the only one 
capable of exercising it.119  
 
There is merit in Booker’s explanation of Hughes’ marginalisation of Cabinet as driven by his 
personal idiosyncrasies, rather than being driven solely by wartime exigency. Sol Encel also 
describes Hughes’ ascendancy over his Cabinet as a result of his “qualities of personality”, such 
as his “considerable intellect…mental agility and a political flair unrivalled among his 
contemporaries”.120 However, the point is best illustrated through counter-example. Weller’s 
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history of Australian Cabinet government illustrates that the degree to which Cabinet was 
involved in wartime decision-making was largely a function of who was serving as Prime 
Minister at the time. For instance, he describes Fisher’s steerage of Cabinet in 1914-1915 as 
being frantic, with frequent meetings and the consideration of many war-related questions by 
the body as a whole. Despite an increase in activity, Fisher adhered to conventional Cabinet 
processes during his tenure as wartime Prime Minister. In contrast, once Hughes replaced 
Fisher as Prime Minister, there were very few Cabinet meetings before the Labor split of 
1916.121 Nor was this the simple result of an escalation of the war effort from late 1915 
onwards; Pearce’s tenure as Acting Prime Minister during Hughes’ first overseas trip in 1916 
saw a partial restoration of orderly Cabinet processes, with a resumption of regular meetings 
and a greater degree of input from other ministers. Similarly, Hughes’ second trip abroad in 
1918-1919 – during which, as Chapter Five documents, wireless policy was prominent on the 
government’s agenda – saw the reinstatement of traditional Cabinet convention under the 
Acting Prime Ministership of William Watt. Even more than Pearce, Watt’s tenure leading 
Cabinet represented a return to pre-Hughes norms. Using techniques learned as Premier of 
Victoria, Watt’s approach to Cabinet was consultative and orderly. In addition to a greater 
openness towards the input of other ministers, he also assigned regular times in which to meet 
with departmental secretaries. In this vein, formal agendas were created for Cabinet meetings 
and notes were kept of decisions. In contrast, the records of Cabinet meetings under Hughes 
are notoriously threadbare – an indication of the reduced stature of the body during his Prime 
Ministership.122      
 
Similar themes are evident in those accounts that deal with Hughes’ relationship with the 
bureaucracy while Prime Minister. Hughes was the first to wield the Prime Minister’s 
Department as an instrument “to reflect the enthusiasms of its political master”.123 Whereas 
its initial operations under Fisher were modest and largely ceremonial, this began to change 
after the outbreak of war and particularly after Hughes became Prime Minister. The 
department acquired a new and incongruent range of responsibilities, such as handling foreign 
affairs after the 1916 closure of the External Affairs Department, managing the sale of 
Australia’s wool clip to the British government, and steerage of newly-created government 
bodies such as the Commonwealth Advisory Council of Science and Industry and the 
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Commonwealth Line of Steamers.124 However, while Hughes placed himself, and by extension 
those departments under him, at the centre of decision-making, various accounts suggest that 
this tended towards dysfunction due to his suspicions. As Governor-General Ronald Munro 
Ferguson wrote at the time, “my little man does not trust the Secretary at the head of his 
department, which I can well understand, but the consequences are that he…carries through a 
great many things ‘on his own’ of which no record is made – consequently it happens at times 
that no one knows how business stands”.125 Elsewhere, he wrote that during Hughes’ time in 
power “the Prime Minister’s Department became greatly enlarged and it has become 
something of a maelstrom into which business from all departments is sucked and continues 
to swirl round and round”.126  
 
One consequence of Hughes’ style of leadership during the war years was that many actions of 
the Commonwealth government were linked to the Prime Minister’s personal attention. Given 
the rolling series of crises that the war unleashed, his attention was often stretched between 
many competing demands. The result was that policymaking was often ad hoc and influenced 
by Hughes’ whims. Donald Horne describes “his liking for jumping from one obsession to the 
next…if he could find someone to take over before he lost interest”.127 This portrayal is 
uncharitable, but nevertheless illustrates Hughes’ susceptibility to short-lived bouts of 
personal intervention in various policy areas. Perhaps the greatest example of Hughes’ 
personal influence over policy came with the ‘Warwick incident’. This saw the Prime Minister 
pelted with an egg while addressing a crowd in the Queensland town of Warwick in late 1917. 
In reaction to this, and what Hughes saw as the timid response of local police, who insisted on 
prosecuting the assailant under state, rather than Commonwealth, law, he took steps to 
establish Australia’s first Commonwealth Police Force.128 L.F. Fitzhardinge assesses Hughes’ 
characteristic administrative methods in his description of the creation of the Commonwealth 
Advisory Council of Science and Industry, another organisational body created in response to 
direct Prime Ministerial intervention: “an idea coming from outside happened to chime with 
his preoccupation of the moment. He seized it, put his stamp on it, and pushed it through to 
the point of realisation. Then, having established the machinery, he expected it to run itself 
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while he turned his full energies elsewhere”.129 As Part IV of this study demonstrates, Hughes’ 
intervention in the formation of wireless policy conformed to this pattern: a short-lived bout of 
Prime Ministerial intervention was critical to enacting the policy that came to constitute the 
international service.  
  
Following the Labor split of 1916, which represented a failed attempt by the party caucus to 
rein in Hughes’ autonomy from the party machine, Hughes’ inauguration as Prime Minister at 
the head of the newly-formed Nationalist Party saw a strengthening of these patterns.130 His 
suspicions about other politicians were magnified as the head of a party whose membership 
was dominated by long-time political rivals. As L.F. Fitzhardinge describes, “he did not trust his 
new associates, and knew that they did not trust him. Except in their attitude to the war, he 
had nothing in common with them, and in most cases he did not think highly of their 
ability”.131 The new political circumstances thus further increased Hughes’ impulses towards 
autocratic leadership. In the assessment of some contemporary observers, writing after 
Hughes’ attainment of the Nationalist leadership, “he will be a successful head of his Ministry 
if he will check a tendency to monopolise all administrative control in his own hands which, 
however natural in a man of outstanding ability, is fatal to the efficiency of the department 
and the harmony of the Cabinet”.132 These words appear to have been written in hope more 
than expectation; Hughes continued to run the executive in his customary manner throughout 
1917 and 1918, until departing for Britain to join the deliberations of the Imperial War 
Cabinet.133 
 
With the exceptions of the months in which Pearce and Watt served as Acting Prime Minister 
in Hughes’ absence, the war years were characterised by a breakdown in formal processes and 
their replacement by comparatively arbitrary and autocratic rule. By 1918 Hughes was solidly 
entrenched as the focal point of government decision-making. As another biographer 
describes, “l’etat c’est moi. To the average Australian citizen of 1918, the State and the Prime 
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Minister were one and the same thing”.134 Though hyperbolic, this observation demonstrates 
the prominence that the Prime Minister had assumed during the conflict.  
 
Following the end of the war, administrative changes for the remainder of Hughes’ tenure as 
Prime Minister were only slight. Though the crisis had passed, he remained surrounded by 
wary colleagues and men he saw as less talented than himself. Furthermore, the end of the 
war, by dissolving the major bond that had brought the Nationalists together, only served to 
increase the mistrust within the party. In addition, the aftermath of the war presented many 
challenges that were easier addressed with the retention of wartime powers, as described in 
Garran’s memoir:  
 
[The initial] winding-up [of the war effort] had been a long and complicated process. 
And the unwinding too was inevitably slow…There was a wide range of post-war 
conditions – called by Hughes the ‘aftermath’ of the war – which had to be dealt with 
in restoring a peace-time economy, but which went beyond the negative concept of 
‘unwinding’…making good the wastage of war, disposing of vast quantities of war 
materials, marketing accumulations of produce, unblocking the channels of 
commerce, and many ramifications connected with these. I suggested to Hughes that 
the War Precautions Act had served us so well that we might follow it up with a Peace 
Precautions Act. He appreciated the jest, but clearly things were not as simple as 
that.135 
 
There were numerous examples of the Prime Minister’s deployment of wartime powers 
following the Armistice. The records of the Prime Minister’s Department suggest that its staff 
stayed occupied managing various ‘pet projects’ undertaken at Hughes’ discretion in the 
immediate post-war years.136 Most flagrant was an incident said to have shocked fellow 
Nationalists as much as it did members of the Opposition, where, in late 1919, Hughes used his 
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powers under the War Precautions Act to break a strike of maritime engineers by issuing a 
regulation to freeze the funds of the union involved.137  
 
Other aspects of Hughes’ characteristic style of executive management persisted in the post-
war years. While Cabinet began to meet more frequently, it remained a body dominated by 
the Prime Minister in relation to the matters given consideration and the decisions reached. 
The functioning of the Hughes Cabinet during this period was later described in a colourful 
manner by Stanley Bruce, who became Treasurer in late 1921: 
 
When I joined the Government, I discovered that Cabinet meetings were strange and 
mysterious affairs, where really nothing was seriously discussed. I believed this was 
felt by all ministers other than the prime minister, but no one moved…[Hughes’] usual 
practice [was] arriving anything up to half an hour late and then producing some new, 
and generally wild, scheme. Cabinet would then proceed to discuss his new scheme 
before going anywhere near the agenda and, generally speaking, the whole of the 
meeting was devoted to the attempts to dissuade the prime minister from his latest 
brainwave. Or he would approach the agenda like a hen picking corn. He would dart at 
the subjects that interested him, regardless of their position on the agenda, and the 
other items would be neglected or held over…I came to the conclusion that with an 
eccentric genius like Billy Hughes it was impossible to have any well-regulated 
procedure for the Cabinet.138     
 
As this description suggests, Cabinet continued to exert little authority in comparison to the 
Prime Minister for the remainder of Hughes’ term. Despite a number of changes that reduced 
his power – the repeal of the War Precautions Act in 1920; his relinquishment of the portfolios 
of Attorney-General and External Affairs Minister in a Cabinet reshuffle in 1921 – Hughes 
continued to govern in his distinctive heavy-handed manner until his party’s loss of its 
Parliamentary majority at the 1922 election, and his subsequent replacement as Prime 
Minister by Bruce.    
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Whereas his immediate predecessor and successor maintained traditional Westminster 
governments – responsible to Parliament and party, and working in consultation with Cabinet 
and the bureaucracy – these restraints were greatly eroded during Hughes’ tenure as Prime 
Minister. The consequence was Hughes’ primacy over political decision-making. As P.G. 
Edwards summarises, “throughout this time, the political history of Australia…was virtually 
congruent with Hughes’s biography. His personality, judgement and character lay at the heart 
of all the major events of this crisis-filled period”.139 However, because of the heavy demands 
on his attention stemming from his centrality in decision-making, Hughes also relied on 
partnerships with trusted people to execute his wishes, though these were often figures 
outside the Parliament or bureaucracy. As a result “policy-making under Hughes generally 
seemed totally autocratic and could certainly not be described as a well-coordinated team 
effort, but it often resembled a series of partnerships in which Hughes’s energy, determination 
and oratorical skills were complemented by the less spectacular but more consistent qualities” 
of others.140 Part IV of the study demonstrates the relevance of all of these factors – Hughes’ 
dominance and marginalisation of Cabinet, his disregarding of departmental advice, and his 
proclivity for forming partnerships with figures outside the government to work towards 
particular goals – to the development of Australian wireless communications. In his 
intervention in the matter he dismissed the concerns of Cabinet colleagues opposed to AWA’s 
participation in the field. Rather than acceding to the advice of departmental officials, he relied 
on the recommendations of Ernest Fisk. Without the dominant presence of Hughes as Prime 
Minister, who acted against the explicit preferences of most of the political system, it is 
inconceivable that AWA could have attained such a position of prominence in Australia’s 
international wireless service. The enactment of the 1922 agreement was only possible within 
this context of a dominant Prime Minister who was sympathetic to the idea, and the process 
by which it was enacted conformed to the hallmarks of his period in office.    
 
Development and Economic Nationalism 
 
The decision to upend established Commonwealth government policy towards wireless in the 
1922 agreement was also influenced by broader changes in the relationship between 
government and other sectors of the economy taking place at the time. These changes came 
                                                          
139 P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 29. 
140 P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 29-30. 
78 
 
as a response to the massive disruption of established patterns of economic activity resulting 
from the Great War, and led to an embrace of economic nationalism – a drive towards national 
self-sufficiency – within Australia in the post-war years. Wireless communication was merely 
one industry wherein the respective roles of government and private enterprise were recast 
during this period; the ‘national mood’ was one of restructuring economic arrangements in the 
wake of a disruptive event.     
 
‘Development’, an omnipresent concern of governments from the colonial era into the 
twentieth century, had two principal characteristics in Australia.141 One was pragmatism. 
Rather than strong philosophical commitment, the priorities of governance in Australia were 
shaped by practicality. The Australian tradition emphasised finding practical uses for ideas, and 
those ideas that took hold were those which melded with practice.142 The other was what 
Geoffrey Stokes has identified as “state developmentalism”: the crucial role played by 
government in facilitating the country’s development.143 This reliance on government reflected 
a pragmatic response to the challenges involved in establishing viable communities in a large 
and sparsely-populated land.144 Dubbed ‘colonial socialism’ by Noel Butlin, state 
developmentalism featured a large-scale embrace of government enterprise, although this was 
largely confined to particular areas such as “public business undertakings primarily in transport 
and communications”.145 Another characteristic was a separation of activities between the 
public and private sectors, with the former handling ‘macro’ concerns such as capital 
formation, population management (through immigration) and establishing public enterprise 
in areas conducive to the formation of monopolies. In contrast to widespread government 
involvement in these particular areas, there was comparatively little intervention at the ‘micro’ 
level through such measures as the regulation of particular industries.146 Such arrangements 
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sought to facilitate private sector growth through the provision of infrastructure, and to 
establish enterprise in areas that were too risky to attract private investment.147  
 
In the early twentieth century state developmentalism had a particular emphasis on the 
development of primary industries such as agriculture and mining. These industries, 
dependent on foreign markets, were at the centre of Australia’s prosperity, and governments 
focused their support on promoting further growth therein.148 Though early moves towards 
industrialisation through the encouragement of secondary industry were underway – such as 
in the Parliament’s passage of the Australian Industries Preservation Act in 1906, and the 
opening of the BHP steel works in Newcastle in 1912 with government backing – Australia had 
not industrialised by the outbreak of the Great War. In 1914 only a small percentage of its 
gross domestic product came from manufactured goods, and those secondary industries which 
had emerged focused on producing products from the raw material supplied by domestic 
primary industries, such as woollen textiles.149 
  
The coming of the Great War threatened to wreck the Australian economy geared towards the 
export of primary goods. By 1914 the world economy had evolved to a point of complex 
interdependency with a strong emphasis on openness to trade, and Australia’s primary 
industries had benefitted from access to overseas markets. However, the conflict led to the 
disintegration of these established global patterns and the collapse of international trade.150  
 
                                                          
147 B. Head, “Economic development in state and federal politics”, p. 3; G. Stokes, “The ‘Australian 
Settlement’ and Australian Political Thought”, p. 15. 
148 A.T. Ross, Armed and Ready: The Industrial Development and Defence of Australia, 1900-1945, Turton 
and Armstrong, Wahroonga, NSW, 1995, p. 1; A.L. Lougheed, Australia and the World Economy, McPhee 
Gribble, Fitzroy, Victoria, 1988, p. 15.  
149 M. Haig-Muir, “The economy at war” in J. Beaumont (ed.), Australia’s War, pp. 93-94; R.W. Connell 
and T.H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History: Documents, Narrative and Argument, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1980, pp. 216-218; D. Pope, “Australia’s Development Strategy in the Early 
Twentieth Century: Semantics and Politics” in Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 31, No. 2, 
1985, p. 224;  N.G. Butlin, A. Barnard and J.J. Pincus, Government and Capitalism, pp. 60-63; A.T. Ross, 
Armed and Ready, p. 1. 
150 See M. Thomas (ed.), The Disintegration of the World Economy Between the World Wars, Volumes 1 
and 2, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1996. 
80 
 
This had acute implications for Australia, with its comparative openness to foreign investment 
and dependence upon exports.151 Following the declaration of war, the British government 
began to assert control over trade throughout the Empire. On 5th August 1914 London ordered 
the suspension of direct trade with enemy nations and, in certain industries, with neutral 
countries as well. In accordance with this direction, trade restrictions were instituted by the 
Australian government. The first area in which these restrictions were introduced was the beef 
industry, the produce of which had been deemed “a vital ration for the British Army”.152 
Though exporters could have received a higher price for their beef in the United States at the 
time, the Commonwealth government enacted rules prohibiting the export of meat outside of 
the Empire without approval from the Trade and Customs Minister. As the conflict dragged on, 
restrictions of this kind became more prevalent, applying to a wider range of industries and to 
imports as well as exports. Thus, Australia’s trade flows came to be restricted by the priorities 
of the British government in service of the war effort.153  
 
In addition to formal restrictions, Australia’s wartime trade capacity was also constrained by a 
severe shortage of shipping. In comparison to the pre-war years, Australia’s freight capacity 
was halved. This had a great impact upon Australian exports through preventing the timely 
transportation of goods to their destinations, and was of particular concern for the marketers 
of perishable goods such as wheat – one of the pillars of the economy at the time.154 As the 
shipping crisis worsened in 1916, the British government established a committee to centrally 
organise the allocation of merchant vessels throughout the Empire. One of the main objectives 
of this reorganisation was to withdraw as many ships as possible from the long antipodean 
route to prioritise the shorter route to the Americas. This was despite the pleading of Hughes, 
who was trying to secure as many ships as possible for the Australian line so as to alleviate the 
problems caused by domestic shortages.155 In order to augment Australia’s shipping capacity, 
the Prime Minister acted, against British protestations and without any consultation with his 
Cabinet colleagues, by purchasing fifteen old steamers from private brokers while in London 
on his first overseas trip.156 These ships, along with a number of German ships captured in 
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Australian ports at the outbreak of war, formed the backbone of a new organisation created at 
Hughes’ behest: the Commonwealth Line of Steamers. Some authors have interpreted this 
action as motivated by ideology and reflecting the Prime Minister’s belief in “state 
socialism”.157 Another interpretation is that it was an expedient decision with a view towards 
safeguarding Australian interests within the larger framework of the Empire; an example of 
Hughes’ penchant for “constructive improvisation”.158 Further weight is added to the latter 
interpretation by Hughes’ later leverage of the Commonwealth Line to extract concessions 
from the British government in negotiations over the disposal of the Australian wheat crop.159 
 
This example illustrates the direct Prime Ministerial intervention in key industries that became 
ubiquitous as the war escalated. Enabled by the powers of the War Precautions Act, Hughes 
intervened to shore up Australia’s wheat and wool industries by creating new administrative 
bodies responsible for the centralised coordination of finances and marketing.160 As a result, 
these primary industries, previously left to their own devices and threatened with ruin by the 
disruption of pre-war trade and shipping patterns, were saved by political intervention leading 
to organisational restructuring in response to wartime circumstances.161   
 
Developments surrounding the Australian base metals industry during the war provide another 
example of direct political intervention in a vital industry, and also illustrate the purging of 
enemy influence from strategic industries. Prior to 1914, the Australian base metals industry, 
centred upon Broken Hill, was dominated by a consortium of German companies. The 
importance of these minerals, particularly lead and zinc, to the production of munitions made 
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them vital resources upon the outbreak of war. As with other industries, the base metals trade 
was upset with the coming of the conflict. The first weeks of war saw the various commercial 
operations centred on Broken Hill reorganise their affairs in response to the new 
circumstances, but these changes did not reduce the substantial German stake in Broken Hill’s 
base metal deposits.162     
 
This changed in November 1914, as the matter caught the attention of Hughes in his position 
as Attorney-General. Using newfound authority under the Trading with the Enemy Act, he 
ordered police raids upon the offices of German-connected base metal firms. Garran’s account 
of this episode describes Hughes’ motivation as twofold. The most immediate goal was to 
cease exports of material to countries other than Britain. In addition to this, “Hughes was 
determined that [German control] should not be re-established after the war” and undertook 
steps to prevent this.163 In conjunction with domestic interests, Hughes worked to reorganise 
the industry so as to bring it under Anglo-Australian control and redirect its operations 
towards supporting the war effort. In May 1915 the Enemy Contracts Annulment Act passed 
through Parliament, requiring the termination of contracts identified by the Attorney-General 
as involving any enemy subject.164 This legislation was used to sever the ties between 
Australian-based firms and any German interests. As a result, German interests in the domestic 
base metals industry were displaced by Anglo-Australian interests.165  
 
As Chapter Four of this study documents, the emerging Australian wireless sector – another 
industry of strategic significance – experienced similar changes during the war years, as the 
German stake in AWA was purged at the instigation of Commonwealth authorities and brought 
under the control of Australians. This change, prompted by the exigencies of war, would prove 
decisive for the direction of policy in the post-war years as the company came to be seen as a 
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national asset, rather than a foreign enterprise. In each case, the crisis of war provided the 
impetus to establish national control over strategic industries. 
 
The disruption of trade and shipping during the war years also contributed to an expansion of 
domestic manufacturing into new fields of production.166 There were two dimensions to this. 
The first was a marked decline in the importation of foreign goods, owing to the shipping 
shortage and the disruption of pre-war trade patterns. This provided “natural protective 
barriers behind which Australian manufacturing sheltered and grew”.167 The second was an 
increase in government contracts related to the provision of goods for the war effort. These 
causes combined to encourage the domestic production of many goods that had previously 
been imported.168  
 
The war years were transformative for the Australian economy. By the time of the 1918 
Armistice, the administrative arrangements for key sectors bore little resemblance to those of 
1914. In addition to the new manufacturing concerns that had emerged in response to 
wartime circumstances, industries that had been important components of the pre-war 
economy, such as wool, wheat, and mining, had been thoroughly rearranged so as to 
contribute to the Allied war effort.  
 
The war years had also permanently altered the contours of the global economy. After more 
than four years of conflict “channels of trade, disrupted and disoriented by battle and 
blockade, [had] atrophied” and advanced countries were embracing protectionism.169 The 
immense disruption and destruction of the war had made a return to pre-1914 conditions 
inconceivable. As a result, Australia could no longer rely on a strong primary sector with access 
to international markets for her prosperity. It was necessary for the Australian government to 
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chart a course of development suitable for navigating the post-war years.170 Like other 
countries, the Australian response to post-war conditions was protectionist. Protection for the 
new secondary industries that had grown during the war was institutionalised through the 
creation of the Tariff Board and the adoption of the Greene tariff in 1920/21.171 This tariff 
represented a significant increase upon pre-war levels, applying to 71 percent of imports and 
doubling the average duty payable.172  
 
The post-war pivot in Australia’s approach to development was prompted by Hughes’ desire to 
create “a more balanced and self-sufficient economy” for Australia with the resumption of 
peace.173 As Geoffrey Bolton summarises, this was a pragmatic response to post-war 
circumstances: 
 
The war completed a major change in his economic thinking. Once a Free Trader, he 
was now convinced that the security of the British Empire, and of Australia in 
particular, lay in the development and control of its own industries and in the orderly 
marketing, under government influence, of its major export commodities…Working 
neither on overseas precedents nor on a predetermined plan, Hughes sought 
remedies that might prove efficient enough to carry on into peacetime. In a world 
where competition could be expected in peace or war, Hughes was steering Australia 
neither to a free market economy nor to socialism, but to pragmatic methods 
designed for Australian conditions.174 
 
These pragmatic methods included the creation of new forms of hybrid enterprises, such as a 
1920 partnership between the Commonwealth and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to erect 
refineries in Australia. The Commonwealth took a bare majority stake in the company formed 
under this arrangement, with its operations overseen by a seven member Board of Directors, 
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of which three represented the Commonwealth and the remaining four the oil company.175 
This initiative is described by Fitzhardinge as “distinctive of Hughes, both in its imaginative 
vision of future developments and in its bold marriage of government and private 
enterprise”.176 It would also be an important influence over decisions made in relation to 
wireless, as will be covered in Part IV of this study. 
 
As well as a means to break Australia’s dependence on foreign suppliers for advanced goods, 
the adoption of protection for secondary industries was also undertaken for strategic reasons. 
Following the war, the idea of industrial development became linked to national defence. 
Throughout the 1920s, Australian policymakers adopted measures to support the growth of 
industries of strategic significance in anticipation of another conflict.177 These included the 
refining, textiles and chemical industries, as well as emerging high-technology fields such as 
motor vehicles, armaments, aircraft, electronics, and communications.178 With varying degrees 
of success in relation to foreign competition, new domestic industries had been established in 
all of these areas by the mid-1920s.179 The explicit connection between industrial development 
and defence was later summarised by Stanley Bruce: 
 
Our first problem was that we had this continent; how were we going to make sure we 
held it? We were very sure that our only defence must be linked with Britain as part of 
the Empire, with the protection of the British Navy…Then, we had to develop what 
we’d got. That meant that everything must be done to ensure the prosperity of the 
export industries…We were also very insistent on the secondary industries being 
developed.180   
 
In this respect, Bruce’s attitude also reflected that of his predecessor.181  
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The changes in the direction of Australian development in the post-war years were imbued 
with a new spirit of economic nationalism. This was keenly felt by contemporaries. According 
to one description from 1929, the prevailing sentiments in favour of protectionism were not 
exclusively economic: 
 
(i.) It is felt that a country is inferior in status if it does not have the industries of 
advanced countries, and that for Australia to be mainly dependent on primary 
industries would be to place its people in the position of “hewers of wood 
and drawers of water” for the people of more favoured countries. 
(ii.) A diversity of industry and employment is a social advantage, making for 
greater versatility and the development of various aptitudes in the 
population, and generally promoting a fuller and richer national life. 
(iii.) A country should be as independent and as self-contained as possible in order 
that it may be less vulnerable to the effects of any war which might disturb 
markets abroad. 
(iv.) Certain industries are especially desirable directly for armaments, or in case 
essential supplies are cut off.182 
 
Or, as another observer, writing in 1933, described the pith of things: “one of the features of 
the post-war period has been the growth of the idea of National self-sufficiency”.183  
 
The post-war changes in Australia’s pattern of development intersected with the paradigmatic 
change in the field of wireless communications under consideration in this study in a number 
of ways. Principally, the change ushered in by the 1922 agreement was consistent with the 
promotion of national industries – especially those of strategic significance – characteristic of 
Hughes’ steerage of the Australian economy at the time, and which was subsequently 
continued by Bruce. Furthermore, it came at a time in which the Great War had greatly 
disrupted the Australian economy, such as through the shipping crisis and consequent inability 
                                                          
182 J.B. Brigden, D.B. Copland, E.C. Dyason, L.F. Giblin and C.H. Wickens, The Australian Tariff: An 
Economic Enquiry, Second Edition, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1929, pp. 18-19. 
183 D.A.S. Campbell, “Australia and Economic Nationalism” in The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 20, 
1933, p. 54. 
87 
 
of Australian industry to function as it had earlier. This wide-scale disruption, taking place 
across many aspects of the economy, provided the impetus – and opportunity – for reshaping 
sectors of the economy in alignment with new priorities. The change in Australian wireless that 
was embodied within the 1922 agreement did not occur in isolation, but as one element in a 
broader reshaping of the role of government in the Australian economy. It coincided with a 
‘national mood’ for altering the arrangements which had characterised Australian 
development up to that point, for the purpose of navigating the uncertainties of the post-war 
years. 
 
Placing Wireless Policy in Context 
 
This chapter has presented three dimensions of the structural context within which Australian 
wireless policy was determined in the period of time covered in this study. Each would, in its 
own way, influence the development of policy in the early 1920s. The emergence of wireless 
internationally, and the new medium’s place in the geopolitical environment, would provide a 
strong impetus for Australia to adopt wireless for the purpose of trans-oceanic 
communication. Domestically, the power of Hughes as Prime Minister would prove important 
because he would prove the only supporter of AWA’s aspirations for international wireless 
within the Commonwealth government. Finally, the rise of economic nationalism would 
contribute to the ‘national mood’ surrounding the decision to reshape Australian wireless 
policy in the post-war years.  
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Chapter 3 – The First Years of Australian 
Wireless, 1901-1914 
 
Part III of the thesis, consisting of this and the following chapter, begins the archival study with 
a focus on the origins of Australian wireless telegraphy. This chapter examines the first 
appearance of wireless in Australia, covering the years between Federation in 1901 and the 
beginning of the Great War in 1914. This period saw the first appearance of the medium on 
Australian shores, and its gradual uptake by government and commercial interests. The 
potential applications of wireless, and the desire for its adoption in different quarters, raised a 
number of constitutive questions surrounding how it would be used. The answers given to 
such questions – what was the primary purpose of wireless; how should it be adopted; who 
would control it – birthed a number of distinctive features of Australian wireless policy in the 
years preceding the Great War. One is that policy decisions were largely reactive to 
international pressures, with little initiative displayed by domestic actors. In this respect 
Australian policy developments were largely made in response to British proposals, whether 
from the Imperial government or the Marconi Company. Another was that the sector was 
initially constituted, like other forms of Australian communications, as a government 
monopoly. This saw the establishment of strong bureaucratic control over wireless, 
antagonism between Commonwealth officials and private firms vying to enter the Australian 
market, and the adoption of wireless schemes tailored towards government priorities. This 
period also saw the emergence of certain developments, the long-term implications of which 
would not become fully apparent until years into the future. Principal of these was the 
formation of AWA as an Australian firm with access to the world’s major wireless patents, and 
its attainment of a small commercial foothold in the field of maritime wireless.   
 
Though it identifies those of significance, Part III of the thesis does not offer a detailed analysis 
of individual policy decisions through the lens of MSA. MSA’s utilisation in the study is confined 
to that which it is best suited for: analysis of a major individual policy decision – the 1922 
agreement – in Part IV. This and the following chapter are concerned with providing vital 
background to the policymaking process covered in detail in Part IV. Part III of the study does 
not talk in the language of streams, windows, or entrepreneurs. Instead, its task is to describe 
the establishment of particular features of the early Australian wireless industry, with an eye 
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towards illustrating how different the industry’s early history was from the changes that were 
brought in in the 1922 agreement. In order to understand the magnitude of the changes of 
1922, and the resistance surrounding them, it is necessary to understand what came 
beforehand.  
 
Foundations 
 
From its advent in the closing years of the nineteenth century, there was an interest in wireless 
telegraphy in Australia. The first recorded evidence of this dates from 1888, when in a 
laboratory at the University of Sydney Professor Richard Threlfall was able to replicate Hertz’s 
1886 experiments with electromagnetic waves.1 By the turn of the century a number of 
people, principally colonial government telegraph officials, had crafted and begun to operate 
crude wireless sets.2 However, notwithstanding these individual enthusiasts, the development 
of wireless in Australia was spearheaded by organisations – governmental and commercial – 
from the very beginning. 
 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, in effect from 1st January 1901, vested 
control over “postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services” in the new 
Commonwealth government.3 It was not until 1905, though, that the Commonwealth took any 
action in the field of wireless. At the dawn of the twentieth century it was state governments 
that were most concerned with the new medium. As Curnow’s study details, the Tasmanian 
state government first began advocating for the adoption of wireless in 1901 as a means of 
improving its communication with the mainland.4 By 1903, both the Victorian and Tasmanian 
governments had contacted the Commonwealth regarding the establishment of a wireless 
service across Bass Strait, but the Commonwealth took no action in response.5  
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As would become characteristic in the pre-war years, it was an overture from the British 
government, not the states, that first prompted the Commonwealth to consider policies 
covering wireless. In November 1904 the Governor-General received a memorandum from the 
officer in command of the Royal Navy’s Australian Station, noting that the ongoing Russo-
Japanese War demonstrated the military importance of the new technology. In response, the 
Admiralty had ordered a number of wireless sets to outfit the warships under his command 
and he urged the Commonwealth to erect coastal stations for the purpose of communicating 
with these vessels.6 The idea received the enthusiastic endorsement of the Defence Minister,7 
and also raised a number of constitutive questions for the first time, including whether 
wireless would primarily be a commercial or a military medium, which Commonwealth 
department should administer it, which system should be adopted, and what – if any – degree 
of private involvement was desirable. Regarding the latter two questions, the Commonwealth 
had so far avoided engaging with any commercial interests. It had already received requests 
from the Marconi Company in 1902 to construct a wireless service between Australia and New 
Zealand, and earlier in 1904 to establish stations on islands in the Torres Strait. Nor was the 
Marconi Company the only commercial organisation aspiring to do business in Australia. It, 
Telefunken, and a number of smaller ventures had also submitted proposals to establish a 
service traversing Bass Strait.8 From the very beginning, the pressures applied to the 
Commonwealth government to determine its future approach towards wireless were 
originating overseas. However, those organisations applying the pressure were working 
towards different ends. While the Marconi Company, along with other firms, sought to 
establish a commercial service, the Royal Navy’s representative was emphasising wireless as a 
means to safeguard Australia’s vital sea lanes.9   
 
The first concrete decision made in response to these international pressures was the Deakin 
government’s passage of the Wireless Telegraphy Act in October 1905. This Act, which served 
as the legislative means through which the Commonwealth exerted control over wireless 
communications for decades to come, appeared to settle the question of whether any private 
                                                          
6 Memorandum to the Governor-General from the Commander in Chief of the Australian Station, 15th 
November 1904. National Archives of Australia: Postmaster-General’s Department, Central 
Administration; MP341/1, General correspondence ‘G’ files, annual single number series, 1872-1940; 
1906/362, Confidential Dispatches from Admiralty and Defence, 1904-1906. 
7 Note from the Minister of State for Defence, 29th November 1904. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/362. 
8 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, pp. 51-52. 
9 Memorandum to the Governor-General from the Commander in Chief of the Australian Station, 15th 
November 1904. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/362. 
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participation in the field would be accepted. “Its main object”, in the words of one supporting 
Senator, was “to make a Government monopoly of wireless telegraphy in the 
Commonwealth”.10 The Act established the Postmaster-General’s Department as responsible 
for wireless, much as it already exercised monopoly control over the telegraph network. The 
department was vested with the authority to control the use of wireless in Australia through a 
system establishing “licences to establish, erect, maintain, or use stations and appliances for 
the purpose of transmitting or receiving messages by means of wireless” and barring any other 
(non-military) usage.11 Designed to prevent any use of the medium that did not have 
governmental approval, the Wireless Telegraphy Act was the first step towards resolving some 
of the constitutive questions raised by the introduction of wireless in Australia.  
 
Early International Wireless 
 
The principal subject of this study – wireless as a means to connect Australia with the outside 
world – first arose soon after Parliament’s passage of the Wireless Telegraphy Act. It remained 
a prominent, though unresolved, matter for eight years, before the outbreak of war forced 
policymakers to shift their attention elsewhere. From 1906 onwards, Commonwealth officials 
considered different schemes for international wireless services. From 1910, in response to 
British initiatives, the chief focus in this area became a grand plan to connect the British 
Empire through a chain of wireless stations – the Marconi Company’s Imperial scheme.  
 
Owing to its isolated position in the South Pacific, the Australian government took an early 
interest in the prospect of trans-oceanic wireless for the purpose of connecting British 
territories in the region. However, the subject was first placed on the agenda by British 
prompting. The aforementioned letter from the Royal Navy’s antipodean commander to the 
Governor-General in 1904 referred to a recommendation he had given to the New Zealand 
government for the establishment of a long-distance station on that country’s western coast.12 
By January 1906 officials in the Postmaster-General’s and Defence departments had taken up 
the idea and expressed their shared desire for Australia to establish its own long-distance 
                                                          
10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 2nd August 1905, p. 464.  
11 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1905. 
12 Memorandum to the Governor-General from the Commander in Chief of the Australian Station, 15th 
November 1904. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/362. 
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wireless station near Sydney to enable direct communication with New Zealand.13 Nearly four 
years later, in 1909, Prime Minister Deakin was in correspondence with his New Zealand 
counterpart on the subject, with both agreeing to erect high-power wireless stations “so that 
reliable communication may at all times be possible between the two Dominions”.14 An 
exchange in Parliament revealed that the primary motivation for this proposed scheme was 
strategic, “to insure the maintenance of communication in time of war, should the cables be 
cut”.15  
 
The correspondence between Deakin and the Prime Minister of New Zealand was connected 
to larger aspirations for a scheme of high-power wireless stations connecting the various 
British possessions in the South Pacific, of which the proposed Australia-New Zealand link 
would form one component. In December 1909 the Australian government hosted a 
conference on the subject in Melbourne, inviting representatives of the New Zealand 
government, the British High Commission for the West Pacific, the Admiralty, and cable 
interests. At the time most of the British territories in the region – including Papua, Tonga and 
the Solomon Islands – were not connected by submarine cables and thus depended on 
seaborne communications with the outside world. The conference’s report emphasised the 
“paramount importance” of developing a regional wireless scheme for strategic reasons 
related to the defence of the Empire.16 Wireless would enable communication with naval 
vessels in the region, and also bring ancillary economic benefits by facilitating the processes of 
trade and investment. The conference’s attendees were in unanimous agreement that the 
scheme should be a government monopoly, noting that “to permit private control of this 
important national undertaking would be inexpedient”.17   
 
Ultimately, nothing resulted from this proposal for a South Pacific wireless scheme. According 
to a July 1918 opinion piece in The Age, the 1909 conference represented just one of a number 
                                                          
13 See memorandum to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from the Chief Electrical 
Engineer, 25th January 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/362. 
14 Letter to the Prime Minister of New Zealand from Deakin, 9th December 1909. NAA: MP341/1, 
1909/8900, Pacific Islands wireless Telegraphy scheme, 1909. 
15 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14th September 1909, p. 3357. 
16 ‘Report of Radio-Telegraphic Conference held at Parliament House, Melbourne, 15th to 21st December, 
1909’, p. 6. NAA: MP341/1, 1910/1415, Wireless Telegraphy Pacific Installation conference, 1909-1910. 
17 ‘Report of Radio-Telegraphic Conference held at Parliament House, Melbourne, 15th to 21st December, 
1909’, p. 9. NAA: MP341/1, 1910/1415. 
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of “fruitless suggestions” characteristic of Australian wireless policy up to that point. In the 
author’s description, the proposal “apparently died a natural death” and was “probably long 
ago forgotten in Government circles”.18 The task of leading the development of wireless in the 
South Pacific was taken up by Germany, which had erected a number of stations in the region 
by 1914.19 Upon the outbreak of the Great War the German stations quickly became the target 
of Australian military action, discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Nevertheless, the proceedings of the Melbourne conference reveal a number of key 
characteristics of the prevailing attitudes towards wireless within the Commonwealth 
government in the pre-war years.20 One was the early acceptance of the idea – before any 
wireless stations were in regular operation in Australia – that wireless would ultimately be a 
means of long-distance trans-oceanic communication in a similar manner to cables. Another 
was the conception of wireless as, principally, a strategic asset. Related to this view of the 
medium’s purpose, was the strength of the principle of government monopoly. Though the 
conference had heard proposals for private enterprise to develop a regional scheme, these 
had been unanimously rejected by attendees.21 
 
In 1910, the year after the Melbourne conference, international wireless became an issue of 
greater prominence when plans for the Imperial scheme of wireless were first presented to the 
British government by the Marconi Company. In March 1910, Godfrey Isaacs, the company’s 
Managing Director, sent a letter to the British Colonial Office outlining a proposal to connect 
the territories of the Empire through wireless. The proposal was for the Marconi Company to 
erect and operate a chain of high-power stations stretching out from Britain in several 
directions, with terminuses in the West Indies, South Africa and Australia. Isaacs’ letter 
emphasised the strategic benefits that his scheme would provide to the Empire. These 
                                                          
18 Untitled cutting from The Age, 23rd July 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1917/832, Advising that 203 copies of 
the Radio Telegraph conference held at Melbourne in Dec. 1909 and 19 copies of the Radio telegraph 
conference London 1908 are on hand in the PMG Dept’s and asking whether they are of use to Navy 
Dept., 1908-1918.  
19 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 130; H. J. Hiery, The Neglected War: The German South Pacific 
and the Influence of World War I, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 1995. p. 12. 
20 These attitudes are also evident in internal correspondence in anticipation of the conference: see 
minute to the Postmaster-General from the Chief Electrical Engineer, 9th December 1909. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1910/1415.  
21 ‘Report of Radio-Telegraphic Conference held at Parliament House, Melbourne, 15th to 21st December, 
1909’, p. 9. NAA: MP341/1, 1910/1415. 
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included the ability for the Admiralty to maintain continuous contact with ships of the Royal 
Navy regardless of their location, a reduction in the cost of international communications, and, 
as a result, stronger ties between the Empire’s far-flung lands. While the stations would be 
owned by the company, Isaacs pledged control over them to the government in times of war. 
Furthermore, he stressed that his company sought no subsidy and was “prepared to erect, 
maintain, and operate the stations entirely at its own expense”.22  
 
Isaacs also emphasised an important strategic dimension of his proposal: its implications for 
the future control of global communications. He began by noting that “other countries fully 
realise the advantages that would accrue…were a comprehensive network of wireless 
telegraph stations erected on their own territories”, and claimed that implementing his 
proposal would reduce “the danger of the German Company [Telefunken] being able to 
arrange for a similar system”.23 It is not just that Telefunken represented a commercial rival to 
the British company, though it did. The prospect of Germany constructing a worldwide 
network of wireless stations was a threat to the dominance Britain had held over global 
communications since the mid-nineteenth century by virtue of its control over the major 
submarine cable routes, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
The British government was initially slow to respond to the Marconi Company’s proposal, but 
after continued overtures eventually agreed to raise the subject at the 1911 Imperial 
Conference: a meeting of senior ministers from Britain and the self-governing Dominions held 
in London. The conference unanimously passed a resolution endorsing the creation of an 
Imperial scheme of wireless, but on the condition that it would be government-owned and -
operated.24 This nevertheless necessitated cooperation with the Marconi Company because of 
its technical expertise and control over the patents involved in long-distance signalling. The 
resolution of the Imperial Conference led to a shift in the company’s strategy compared to its 
initial proposal. Since it could not expect to own and operate the stations comprising the 
scheme, as Isaacs had wanted, the company instead sought to profit by erecting the stations 
on behalf of the various governments involved in the scheme. After a drawn-out period of 
                                                          
22 ‘Imperial Wireless Installation – Copies of Correspondence’, p. 3. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/10512, 
Correspondence Relating to contract for Imperial Wireless station, 1912. 
23 ‘Imperial Wireless Installation – Copies of Correspondence’, pp. 2-3. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/10512. 
24 ‘Imperial Wireless Installation – Copies of Correspondence’, p. 7. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/10512. 
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negotiations, an agreement to proceed with a privately-built, government-operated Imperial 
scheme was made between the British government, the Marconi Company and all but one of 
the Dominions. Subsequently, terms were agreed whereby the company was contracted to 
erect the scheme’s high-power stations and allow for the use of its patented equipment, in 
exchange for the payment of a lump sum and a percentage of the receipts for each station.25   
 
Australia was the lone hold-out against this agreement. While it supported the Imperial 
scheme in principle, there was substantial uneasiness within the Commonwealth about the 
prospect of involving the Marconi Company in its construction, owing to domestic 
circumstances discussed below. After the resolution of the Imperial Conference, the Australian 
High Commissioner in London, former Prime Minister George Reid, participated in the 
negotiations over the form of the scheme which began in December 1911. During the 
negotiations, Reid emphasised his government’s reservations about dealing with the Marconi 
Company.26 Throughout the first half of 1912 the British placed some mild diplomatic pressure 
upon Commonwealth officials to accept a deal with the Marconi Company, to no avail.27 By 
July 1912, when the contract between the British government and the Marconi Company was 
signed, a note attached to the agreement stated that “the Australian Government finally 
decided not to take part in this Agreement, but to proceed independently with the erection of 
a station in connexion with the Imperial Wireless chain”.28 Thus, the Commonwealth would 
still participate in the scheme, but on its own terms. These terms did not include scope for the 
participation of private enterprise.  
 
Yet, because of the intrusion of external events and delays, no station for the purpose of 
participating in the Imperial scheme was ever erected in Australia in the pre-war period. The 
contract to construct the stations of the Imperial scheme was signed in July 1912, but there 
were considerable delays before construction commenced. Before the contract could be 
                                                          
25 ‘Copy of Agreement between Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited, Commendatore 
Guglielmo Marconi, and the Postmaster General, with regard to the Establishment of a Chain of Imperial 
Wireless Stations’, 19th July 1912. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/10512. 
26 See the minutes from meetings of the Committee on Imperial Wireless Telegraphy, 15th December 
1911; 17th January 1912.  NAA: MP341/1, 1912/4563, Wireless Empire Scheme, 1911-1912.  
27 See correspondence from the British government to Reid and the Governor-General in NAA: 
MP341/1, 1912/4563. 
28 Treasury Minute attached to ‘Copy of Agreement between Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company, 
Limited, Commendatore Guglielmo Marconi, and the Postmaster General, with regard to the 
Establishment of a Chain of Imperial Wireless Stations’, 19th July 1912. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/10512. 
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placed before the British Parliament for formal approval, a scandal emerged involving 
allegations of insider trading in Marconi Company shares by senior ministers.29 The ‘Marconi 
scandal’ caused a year-long delay in formal approval for the Imperial scheme, which was not 
approved by Parliament until July 1913. The delay proved critical to the development of 
wireless throughout the British Empire. By the time of the Great War’s outbreak a year later – 
which forced the scheme’s cancellation – only one of the six stations slated to comprise the 
scheme was under construction. When the subject of the Imperial wireless scheme was 
resurrected by the Marconi Company after the Armistice in late 1918, it was in a world that 
had been utterly transformed by the conflict. This is covered in Chapter Five of the study.    
 
The pre-war history of Australian participation in discussions over international wireless 
schemes reveals three important themes. One was the realisation of wireless’ potential as a 
means of trans-oceanic communication from a very early point in the medium’s history, which 
would remain a major consideration throughout the period covered by this study. Though it 
would take until 1922 for the enactment of a definite scheme, and another five years until the 
service was inaugurated, the subject had been on the agenda for many years prior to concrete 
action being taken. Another important theme was reactivity to external circumstances. For 
reasons related to Australia’s strategic dependence on Britain and the Royal Navy, and the lack 
of a domestic wireless industry, the issue was placed on the agenda of Australian policymakers 
by way of international initiatives. As a consequence, decisions in Australia were made in 
response to initiatives originating elsewhere in the Empire. This validates Gourevitch’s insights 
about the international sources of domestic politics. It was not solely the fact that policy 
proposals originated overseas, but also that Australia’s response had to be made with 
reference to the possible ramifications for Australia’s security in the global order. This 
fundamental consideration compelled the Australian government to acquiesce with British 
ambitions, first to consider developing the medium in the immediate region, and then to 
participate in larger plans for an Imperial scheme of wireless. Though Australian decision-
makers possessed the autonomy to craft their response to the scheme, the geopolitical 
environment made it inconceivable that participation in the scheme could be rejected 
outright. In the early negotiations over the Imperial scheme Australian policymakers had 
demonstrated a willingness to participate in a wireless network linking the territories of the 
                                                          
29 See F. Donaldson, The Marconi Scandal, Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1962; chapter 17 in W.J. Baker, A 
History of the Marconi Company. 
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British Empire. Importantly, though, they wanted to enter this arrangement on their own 
terms rather than meekly accepting the dictates of the Imperial government. This would 
remain a persistent feature of Australia’s approach to this field of policy in the years to come. 
 
The third prominent theme was the consensus surrounding the principle of government 
monopoly over wireless. On all three occasions in which the subject was brought to the 
attention of Commonwealth government officials in the pre-war years, the necessity of 
government control of international wireless was an ever-present theme. This commitment 
was so firm that even the limited participation of the Marconi Company in the Imperial scheme 
– restricted to contracts to build the stations – was deemed too much to be acceptable to 
Australian interests. During this period, the paradigm of government enterprise in the field of 
wireless was well-established. 
 
Developments in this area also reveal the importance of timing and external events to policy 
outcomes. If the construction of the Imperial scheme had followed the course planned in the 
1912 agreement between the British government and the Marconi Company – without the 
disruption of the Marconi scandal, and then the Great War – Australia’s international wireless 
service would have been constituted as part of a relay system planned in Britain, without any 
scope for private participation. Yet a decade later, when a formal decision was made on the 
subject, the policy which was adopted was of Australian origin, rejected a relay service in 
favour of one that embraced direct communication between Australia and Britain, and 
featured a central role for private enterprise. 
 
The Establishment of Bureaucratic Control 
 
Australia’s opposition to collaborating with the Marconi Company in relation to the Imperial 
scheme was a result of the domestic situation relating to wireless that had arisen by the time 
of negotiations. This was characterised by two interwoven issues: poor relations between the 
company and Commonwealth decision-makers, and the establishment of bureaucratic control 
over the sector. 
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Mistrust of the Marconi Company within the Commonwealth government was an ever-present 
theme of this period. From as early as 1902, the company sought to establish commercial 
operations in Australia, and by 1905 its pleas for permission to do so had intensified.30 There 
was little appetite for this within the government. Although the company was granted 
permission to erect wireless stations for the purpose of conducting a demonstrative 
transmission between Victoria and Tasmania in July 1906, it was only permitted to do so under 
strict conditions. The licence granted to the company under the Wireless Telegraphy Act was 
only a temporary one, lasting for a three-month period, and provided “solely for the purpose 
of conducting demonstrations in wireless telegraphy and for no other purpose whatever”.31 
Despite the fanfare generated by the demonstration, the company was unable to parlay its 
successful test into permission to establish permanent stations.32 A number of weeks after the 
demonstration the Australian representative of the company wrote a letter to the Postmaster-
General’s Department, complaining of an inspection of the Tasmanian station by the state-
based deputy, on the grounds that “it is understood that the Licence does not provide for the 
right of official inspection”.33 The purpose of the inspection, according to a memorandum from 
the Tasmanian Deputy Postmaster-General, was to compile a technical report, which “might 
be of interest to the Postmaster-General or staff at this or some future date”.34  
 
The potential for legal disputes concerning patent rights was one of the major sources of 
mistrust between the Marconi Company and the Postmaster-General’s Department. The 
company’s letter to the department complaining about the inspection of the Tasmanian 
station included a separate document emphasising the strength of the Marconi Company’s 
legal position over the major wireless patents, and claiming that “it would not be in 
accordance with established views of equity and fair play for any Government to deprive an 
Individual or a Company of those rights by using machinery which is an infringement 
                                                          
30 See the letter to the Postmaster-General from the Marconi Company’s Managing Director, 30th June 
1905. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/2849, Wireless Telegraphy licence to Marconi Coy. to conduct experiments 
in Australia, 1906.  
31 A copy of the licence is in NAA: MP341/1, 1906/4510, Wireless Telegraphy Demonstration at 
Queenscliff – Report on (June-May 1906), 1906. 
32 See J. Given, “Wireless Politics”.  
33 Letter to the Acting Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from Marconi’s Wireless 
Telegraph Company, 22nd August 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/2849. 
34 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from the Tasmanian Deputy 
Postmaster-General, 13th August 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/2849. 
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thereof”.35 The implication of this document was clear: the company was willing to launch a 
legal challenge if the Commonwealth adopted any system of wireless besides Marconi’s.   
 
While the Marconi Company had been unsuccessfully seeking permission to establish 
commercial wireless stations in Australia for years, it was bureaucratic initiative – divorced 
from the company’s overtures – that led to the first developments in this area. At the end of 
1906 the first policy blueprint for a scheme of wireless stations around the Australian coastline 
was put together by John Hesketh, the Chief Electrical Engineer of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department. Anticipating that the spread of shipborne wireless overseas would soon see 
wireless-equipped vessels operating in Australian waters, Hesketh called for a conference to 
discuss the potential scheme between representatives of the Royal Navy, the Defence 
Department, and commercial shipping lines. This was predicated on the notion that whatever 
scheme would be put in place would be controlled by the Commonwealth, in the same manner 
as the Postmaster-General’s Department administered the overland telegraph.36 While 
Hesketh’s report referred to a desire amongst Navy officers that Australia adopt the Marconi 
system, which supplied all of the Royal Navy’s equipment, he objected that “there is no need 
to consider that one Company only can furnish equipment to meet all the requirements” of 
the proposed scheme, and that “there are several Companies with whom the contract to equip 
Stations might safely be placed”.37  
 
This document further demonstrates some of the key characteristics of this period. One was 
the degree to which the Commonwealth was compelled to develop a policy response to the 
external environment. This was not only through the anticipation of mercantile vessels fitted 
with wireless operating in Australian waters, but also the need for Australian stations to be 
able to communicate with ships of the Royal Navy. It also reveals that the notion of 
government monopoly over the field was unquestioned – there was no scope for private 
involvement beyond the possibility of being contracted to erect stations. The adoption of 
                                                          
35 Untitled letter, 6th August 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/2849. 
36 ‘Wireless Telegraphy – Report on general question of erection of stations by the Commonwealth”, 
27th December 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1907/1472, Conference on Wireless Telegraphy, 1906-1907.  
37 ‘Wireless Telegraphy – Report on general question of erection of stations by the Commonwealth”, 
27th December 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1907/1472. 
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wireless was to proceed along the same organisational lines as the established telegraph 
network.  
 
The conference was held in June 1907 between Hesketh, two representatives of the Australian 
military and a British naval officer representing the Admiralty.38 Its proceedings emphasised 
the defence applications of a coastal wireless network, but also noted its potential for saving 
lives at sea by allowing stricken vessels to transmit distress signals. The participants also 
compiled a list of suitable station locations, though they offered no definite opinion on the 
subject of what wireless system should be employed by the Commonwealth. Instead, the 
conference’s report called for a competitive tender process open to any commercial 
organisations capable of erecting stations fitting the Commonwealth’s requirements.39 
 
The outline for a coastal scheme of wireless put together by departmental officials at the 
conference provided the blueprint for Commonwealth action in the field, although, as Curnow 
describes, the development of wireless in this period was hampered by “procrastination”.40 In 
1909, however, the Deakin government was spurred into action by the loss of the passenger 
ship Waratah off the Western Australian coast, and by “reports of German intentions to 
establish wireless stations in its Pacific territories”.41 In September 1909 the government 
resolved “that wireless telegraphic stations should be immediately established...round the 
coasts of Australia, and that our merchant marine should be equipped with wireless 
installations”.42 To facilitate this, £10,000 was allocated for tenders to erect two wireless 
stations, one near Sydney and one near Perth.43 A number of offers to construct the two 
stations were presented, including one from the Marconi Company, and in August 1910 the 
Postmaster-General’s Department accepted the cheapest of them from a newly-created firm 
called the Australasian Wireless Company.  
                                                          
38 See NAA: MP341/1, 1907/2871, Wireless Telegraphy Conference – Representatives of Defence and 
Navy, 1907. 
39 ‘Wireless Telegraphy: Report of Conference’, 13th June, 1907. NAA: MP341/1, 1907/4373, Report of 
Wireless Telegraphy conference, 1907. 
40 See the abortive tender processes described in R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 
55. 
41 E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant, p. 187. 
42 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9th September 1909, p. 3271. 
43 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9th September 1909, pp. 3272-
3273. 
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The Australasian Wireless Company’s offer was roughly one-fifth of the price quoted by the 
Marconi Company. It was able to offer such a competitive price because it was a Telefunken 
subsidiary receiving indirect financial support from the German government. When the 
company was registered in December 1909, Telefunken was allocated ninety percent of the 
firm’s shares in exchange for the use of its patents in Australia.44 Furthermore, all of the 
equipment used in the erection of the two stations was imported from Germany.45 
 
The decision of the Postmaster-General’s Department to accept the offer of the Australasian 
Wireless Company, rather than that of the Marconi Company, worsened the relationship 
between the British company and the Commonwealth. The Marconi Company’s 
aforementioned 1906 letter had cautioned the Commonwealth against signing contracts with 
other companies, even if those companies could offer lower prices. The threat was made on 
the basis of the Marconi Company’s contention, supported by “the most expert Counsel in 
England”, that all competing wireless systems “have copied and annexed Marconi’s 
invention”.46 Therefore, any adoption of a rival system would be treated as an infringement of 
the Marconi Company’s patent rights. Several months after the government accepted the 
Australasian Wireless Company’s tender, in March 1911, Godfrey Isaacs wrote to Defence 
Minister George Pearce claiming that the Telefunken system “is an infringement of the 
Marconi Patent” and stating an intention to take legal action against the Commonwealth “to 
obtain due compensation for the past, and to prevent any further infringement in the 
future”.47 However, due to delays associated with the construction of the stations, and a legal 
technicality wherein litigation could not be launched until the stations in question were 
operational,48 no action was ever taken on this point. This was because of other changes that 
took place in the intervening time. 
 
                                                          
44 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 84. 
45 See letter to Geeves from J. Murray Johnson in ML MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 29, Material created 
and acquired by P.L. Geeves, 1. Staff, 1913-1976. 
46 Untitled letter, 6th August 1906. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/2849. 
47 Letter to Pearce from Isaacs, 10th March 1911. NAA: MP341/1, 1910/2752, Wireless Telegraphy 
licence to Marconi Company to conduct experiments in Australia, 1909-1910; NAA: MP341/1, 
1911/1503, Wireless – Fremantle & Pennant Hills – Patents Rights – Lipel, 1910-1911. 
48 See memorandum to Hughes from Hesketh, 28th March 1911. NAA: MP341/1, 1911/2513, Wireless – 
Fremantle and Pennant Hills Patent Rights Marconi Co., 1911.  
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The election of Andrew Fisher’s Labor government in April 1910 was a watershed moment, 
marking Australia’s first majority government.49 While it held power between 1910 and 1913, 
the Fisher government embarked upon an ambitious programme of national development led 
by the Commonwealth government.50 This change in political circumstances would prove 
consequential for the development of wireless in Australia through the establishment of a 
dedicated wireless branch within the Postmaster-General’s Department – leading to the 
further consolidation of bureaucratic control over the medium – and worsening relations 
between the Commonwealth and commercial wireless interests. 
 
One of the Fisher government’s early initiatives was to invite Admiral Reginald Henderson of 
the Royal Navy to visit Australia to make recommendations for the naval defence of the 
Commonwealth under the newly-created Royal Australian Navy. The report presented by 
Henderson, which included recommendations for wireless policy, provided the foundation for 
the Fisher government’s policy towards the medium.51 Henderson’s report, delivered in March 
1911, stressed the importance of wireless for communication with the fleet. It urged the 
construction of a series of stations, to be integrated with the telegraph network, around the 
Australian coastline under the control of the Postmaster-General’s Department but “at the 
disposal of the Naval authorities in times of national emergency”.52 It also recommended the 
proposed coastal wireless network be under government control in order to consolidate 
wireless under a central organisation, which “will provide great advantages for the collection 
and dissemination of Intelligence in time of National emergency”.53 
 
With this object in view it is recommended that the Commonwealth Government 
should take the whole matter of Wireless Telegraphy in Australian waters firmly into 
its own hands from the first making it a Commonwealth monopoly similar to the land 
telegraphic systems…The Commonwealth should erect, maintain, control, and operate 
all Wireless Telegraph Stations that may be required for either public or private 
services. It should be independent of all established companies, undertaking the 
manufacture of its own instruments and the training and control of its own 
                                                          
49 G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, p. 89. 
50 See chapters 15 and 16 in P. Bastian, Andrew Fisher; J. Murdoch, A Million to One Against. 
51 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 61. 
52 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Naval Forces – Recommendations by Admiral Sir 
Reginald Henderson, K.C.B., 1st March 1911, p. 61. 
53 Naval Forces – Recommendations by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, p. 61. 
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operators...The Government should also require that all ships registered in Australian 
ports and fitted with wireless apparatus should carry apparatus manufactured and 
operated by the Commonwealth.54 
 
To achieve these goals, the Henderson report also recommended the creation of a separate 
branch of the Postmaster-General’s Department to administer wireless, under the control of 
an expert who “must be personally responsible for the design and construction of all 
instruments, the erection and proper equipment of all stations, and for the training and 
discipline of all operators”.55 With its recommendations for the assertion of complete 
governmental control over the medium, the Henderson report represented a policy blueprint 
aligned with the doctrine embraced by the Fisher government in other areas. It also reflected 
the centrality of military priorities in the area, with the rationale for total government control 
of the medium being the ease of transition to military administration in the case of war.   
 
Later in 1911, the Wireless Telegraphy Branch of the Postmaster-General’s Department was 
established under the stewardship of John Graeme Balsillie.56 Balsillie, who would become the 
most important figure in Australian wireless for the next few years, was personally selected for 
the role by Fisher while the Prime Minister was in Britain for the 1911 Imperial Conference. He 
had prior experience in the field of wireless, having erected a number of government stations 
in Britain and continental Europe.57 Notably, he had also been at the centre of a patent dispute 
with the Marconi Company while in Britain. In March 1910 the Marconi Company took legal 
action against the British Radio Telegraphy Company, which had been using a wireless system 
of Balsillie’s design.58 In February 1911, prior to Balsillie’s appointment as the 
Commonwealth’s wireless expert, the British judge found in favour of the plaintiff, ruling that 
the system in question was an infringement of one of the Marconi patents.  
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Given the Marconi Company’s successful case against Balsillie’s company in Britain, the Prime 
Minister’s decision to employ him in the role was provocative. Once in position, Balsillie 
wasted no time asserting control over the sector and working towards implementing the 
recommendations of the Henderson report. In one of his first actions, using the justification of 
a worldwide legal battle over wireless patents taking place at the time,59 Balsillie 
recommended suspending the tender process for any new wireless stations “pending the 
solution of the legal situation”.60 In the following month he urged “that radio-telegraphy be 
recognised as a Government monopoly” and, more importantly, “that all apparatus necessary 
for a scheme of wireless communication for Australia be manufactured, where possible, in 
Australia”.61  
 
Towards this end, and at the behest of Postmaster-General Charles Frazer, letters were sent to 
the Australasian Wireless Company and the Marconi Company’s Sydney office asking for the 
terms under which those firms would permit the Commonwealth to manufacture and use their 
patented equipment.62 In response, the Telefunken subsidiary asked for £25,000 while the 
Marconi Company wanted £50,000, and both companies expected the payment of royalties in 
addition to these sums. While Balsillie thought the former offer preferable to that of the 
Marconi Company, which he declared “impossible”, he nevertheless considered that neither 
was a good deal for the Commonwealth to make.63 
 
As an alternative to arrangements with international firms to secure the use of their patents, 
Balsillie offered the use of another system of his own design. Based upon cobbling together “a 
certain combination of parts”, this was a different design to that which had been found in 
breach of a Marconi patent earlier in the year.64 Prior to applying for the patent, he had 
received assurance from the Patent Attorney and Attorney-General Hughes that the design 
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“was novel and patentable”.65 He assigned full patent rights to the ‘Balsillie system’ of wireless 
to the Postmaster-General’s Department without charge, and it was this system that was 
installed in the Commonwealth’s shore stations subsequent to the two that had already been 
contracted to Telefunken’s subsidiary.  
 
The government’s decision to reject the Marconi and Telefunken offers and instead embrace 
the Balsillie system was announced by the Postmaster-General in Parliament on 7th December 
1911. Frazer described the decision as a risk that was justified by the need to commence 
construction of the coastal network immediately:  
 
After protracted negotiations with the Marconi and the Telefunken Companies, the 
Government have been unable to arrive at a position that would warrant them in 
accepting the responsibility of buying the patent rights of either of these 
companies…the Government have now decided that the urgency of wireless 
telegraphy does not justify any longer delay; and we intend to proceed with the 
erection of stations round the coast of Australia…we are following the advice of the 
expert that was engaged by the Prime Minister when he was in London, as to the 
system we are about to adopt…we may, at some future time, as a Commonwealth, 
have to defend parts of the apparatus comprising the system… I cannot guarantee that 
we will be clear, but if we infringe rights in any way the Government will accept the 
responsibility of paying reasonable compensation for the infringement.66 
 
This extract reveals that the government had accepted the inevitability of a legal challenge to 
the Balsillie system by the established firms, but was willing to push ahead with its policy 
decision regardless. The government was correct to assume that legal action would be 
forthcoming. Soon after the opening of the first station using the Balsillie system in February 
1912, the Marconi Company initiated legal proceedings against the Commonwealth. Balsillie 
was confident about the validity of his invention, however, and wrote in a March 1912 
memorandum that “there is…small likelihood of any real trouble arising from this”.67 
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Nevertheless, the Marconi Company’s legal challenge would drag on for over a year before its 
resolution. 
 
It was because of this hostility from the Marconi Company that the Commonwealth refused to 
countenance engaging the services of the British firm in relation to its plans for participation in 
the Imperial scheme. In an internal memorandum from May 1912, Balsillie urged delaying any 
Australian accession to the agreement that was under negotiation. He claimed that it would be 
“a sign of weakness” to enter into any arrangement with the Marconi Company when the firm 
had just commenced legal action against the government, and noted that the offer of a 
contract was a potential bargaining chip that the Commonwealth could use “to force a 
satisfactory conclusion to all this litigation”.68 Rather than contracting with private enterprise, 
Balsillie aimed to use his position to extend the principles underpinning the Henderson report 
to international wireless as well, recommending that the Commonwealth construct a high-
power station for the Imperial scheme itself. In January 1913, several months after the British 
government had acquiesced to Australia determining the terms under which it would 
participate in the scheme, he presented detailed plans for this. The plans insisted that “the 
gear for such a scheme be manufactured within the Commonwealth of Australia in order that 
absolute independence from the outside world could be maintained” – a clear rejection of any 
engagement with the Marconi Company.69   
 
The eventual resolution to the Marconi Company’s legal challenge came as a result of political 
developments. In May 1913 the Fisher government was defeated in its bid for re-election and 
replaced by a Liberal government under Joseph Cook.70 While in opposition, Cook’s party had 
been critical of the Fisher government’s stridency in the field of wireless policy, particularly its 
decision to adopt the Balsillie system for the stations of the coastal network.71 Once in power, 
the Cook government sought to settle the dispute with the Marconi Company. It transported 
James Swinburne – a British wireless expert involved in Marconi’s earlier litigation against the 
British Radio Telegraphy Company – to Australia to investigate the question of whether the 
                                                          
68 ‘Wireless. Empire Scheme’, 14th May 1912. NAA: MP341/1, 1912/4563. 
69 ‘Wireless. General Scheme’, 20th January 1913. NAA: MP341/1, 1913/12096. 
70 G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, p. 112. 
71 See the extended exchange in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18th 
December 1912. 
108 
 
Balsillie system was an infringement of the Marconi patent.72 In April 1914 Swinburne 
submitted a report to the Marconi Company in London and the Postmaster-General’s 
Department.73 This report concluded that the Balsillie system was not an infringement of any 
of the Marconi Company’s patents, and that the company’s legal challenge against it would 
fail. After he returned to Britain, Swinburne was able to dissuade Isaacs from pursuing the case 
against the Commonwealth any further.74 In July 1914 the two parties settled the matter out of 
court, thus avoiding any further costly litigation.75 The terms of settlement saw the 
Commonwealth gain the rights to use all of the Marconi Company’s patents in exchange for a 
payment of £5000. This represented “an excellent settlement”, according to Balsillie, and 
represented a dramatic decrease in price compared to the Marconi Company’s price of 
£50,000 offered to the Commonwealth in 1911.76 
 
Meanwhile, the stations of the coastal network were erected by the Postmaster-General’s 
Department at great speed. With the exception of the first two constructed near Sydney and 
Perth, which used Telefunken equipment, the network’s stations utilised the Balsillie system. 
The hardware was produced by a small Australian firm named the Maritime Wireless 
Company, covered below. By December 1912 – a year after the scheme was announced – 
there were stations operating in all of the state capitals.77 A year later, eleven more stations 
were in operation around the Australian coastline.78 Construction of further stations continued 
apace, with nineteen in operation at the outbreak of war in August 1914.79 At this time the 
attention and resources of the Postmaster-General’s Department were diverted elsewhere.  
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Though it had taken some years, the construction of a coastal network of wireless stations had 
forced the settlement of major constitutive questions. The primacy of government control 
over the medium, in the hands of the Postmaster-General’s Department since the passage of 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act in 1905, had been consolidated through the establishment of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Branch and the appointment of a wireless expert with a strong influence 
over policy. The Commonwealth bureaucracy had thus assumed a central role in the 
development of Australian wireless. The coastal scheme – the major focus of this period – was 
an initiative that originated in the Postmaster-General’s Department in 1906. The only other 
organisations that were consulted on policy questions in this area were other branches of 
government, primarily defence officials who had a strong interest in the military application of 
the medium. Following the creation of the Wireless Telegraphy Branch in 1911, and the 
appointment of Balsillie as its head, the bureaucracy assumed even more importance with 
regard to policy. Bureaucratic control brought with it the centrality of government priorities to 
the sector’s development. Principal of these was the development of a coastal network of 
stations for the purpose of communicating with naval vessels. 
 
The pre-war years also saw the prevalence of international influences upon policy 
developments in Australia. The Henderson report was a key illustration of this. Its 
recommendations to establish a centralised network of wireless stations under the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, and to nationalise every dimension of the emerging 
industry, were a strong influence on Australian decision-makers. Their embrace of these 
principles reflected several things. One was a drive to extend the established paradigm of 
government enterprise over Australian communications to the new field of wireless. Another 
was a desire to keep in step with British recommendations; to develop Australia’s wireless 
capabilities commensurate with the need to communicate with naval forces for the defence of 
the continent.   
 
Tension between the Commonwealth government and private interests, particularly the 
Marconi Company, was another important feature of this period. While this was foreshadowed 
in the earliest years after Federation, with the Commonwealth refusing to permit the British 
company to erect stations for anything more than demonstrative purposes, relations between 
these organisations deteriorated with each passing year. They reached a nadir in the Fisher 
years when the government decided to erect the coastal scheme using the Balsillie system 
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despite the Marconi Company’s threats of legal action. But while a poor relationship between 
the Commonwealth and the British company was a constant feature of the period, the Fisher 
years also saw the shutting out of Telefunken, which had previously attained contracts to 
construct the first two stations of the coastal scheme.  
 
At the dawn of the twentieth century the new Commonwealth government had faced a range 
of questions regarding the constitution of wireless telegraphy services. These concerned what 
the primary use of the new medium would be, and who would control it. By 1914 these 
constitutive questions had been given answers. Wireless telegraphy was to be developed in 
accordance with government priorities, focused on its potential for trans-oceanic and maritime 
communication. These goals related to the medium’s defence applications, and also to its 
capacity to exchange commercial and distress messages with the mercantile marine. Control 
over wireless was vested in the bureaucracy, namely the Postmaster-General’s Department 
working in collaboration with the Defence Department. With one key exception, outlined 
below, there was no latitude for private participation in the field.    
 
The First Domestic Interests  
 
Despite the consolidation of bureaucratic control over Australian wireless in the pre-war years, 
a number of small private interests managed to emerge during this period. Of these, the most 
important for future developments – the company which was granted control over Australia’s 
international wireless service in 1922 – was AWA. The formation of the company in 1913, an 
amalgamation of the domestic Marconi and Telefunken subsidiaries, was a result of 
international and domestic circumstances. Though its operations were limited by government 
policies, it nevertheless managed to attain a small commercial foothold in Australia by 1914.  
 
The Commonwealth government’s control of the sector precluded any private interests from 
establishing commercial wireless stations on the Australian continent without permission from 
the Postmaster-General. With the minor exception of the Marconi stations erected for 
demonstrative purposes in 1906, this was never forthcoming. This restriction left two means 
by which private firms could make money from Australian operations. One was through 
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providing equipment for government stations, such as in the Australasian Wireless Company’s 
and Maritime Wireless Company’s provision of apparatuses for the coastal scheme. The other 
was through providing shipborne wireless equipment and services, a practice which was 
licenced through regulations under the Wireless Telegraphy Act gazetted in 1911. From 1910, 
the increasing adoption of wireless by shipping in Australian waters, and the imminent 
construction of the coastal scheme’s first stations, which would allow communication with 
vessels at sea, compelled the Postmaster-General’s Department to devise a set of regulations 
under the Act covering ship-to-shore communication. A new system of regulations was 
instituted in July 1911, introducing ‘general’ licences. These were exclusively available to 
stations on board ships, and a mandatory requirement for the lawful use of seaborne 
wireless.80  
 
The provision for general licences, which was in contrast to the Henderson report’s 
recommendation to nationalise maritime wireless, would prove to be of great importance to 
the future of the industry. By granting scope for the commercial provision of maritime wireless 
equipment and services, it provided an opportunity for firms to establish domestic operations 
and gain a foothold for private enterprise. According to a later account from Balsillie, the 
decision to permit private operations in this field was made so as to limit the Commonwealth’s 
potential liabilities in relation to legal challenges from the Marconi Company over patents: 
 
[Nationalisation of maritime wireless] was the original policy propounded by myself, 
but could not be applied – or, to be more accurate – it was considered not wise to 
apply this scheme until the patent position had been defined, as considerable 
opposition was raised by the Marconi Company…It was considered that the fitting of 
vessels by the Commonwealth until the Patent position was defined, would be unwise, 
as it was merely incurring further liability; after Swinburne’s report was made on the 
[Balsillie] System, I did not raise the point, because this Branch was too busily 
engaged…to attend to any necessary or advisable policy matters.81     
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This is a rare example from this period of a policy decision which was made at the ministerial 
level against Balsillie’s advice. Though it was made in response to short-term pressures, the 
private activity that it enabled would have long-term consequences. From this point the scope 
of private participation in Australian wireless grew steadily.  
 
The first notable private wireless firm in Australia was the Australasian Wireless Company, 
which won the contracts to build the first two stations of the coastal scheme. It was formed in 
December 1909, as a venture of Hugh Denison, a wealthy tobacco and newspaper proprietor, 
in partnership with Telefunken, with the German company holding a substantial stake in 
exchange for the use of its patent rights in Australia.82 In addition to the provision of 
equipment for the coastal scheme, the company began outfitting a small number of ships with 
imported Telefunken equipment, the first time that this had been done in Australia.83 Despite 
these minor successes, it remained a small organisation. 
 
The Marconi Company had had representatives in Australia since 1905, tasked with opening 
the local market for the company. As described above, it was completely unsuccessful in 
attaining any business from the Commonwealth government, and it also lagged behind the 
Australasian Wireless Company with regard to fitting ships with wireless equipment.84 When 
Ernest Fisk – who was to become the Managing Director of AWA in 1917, and one of the key 
figures in the future development of Australian wireless – arrived in Australia in 1911 as the 
Marconi Company’s newest representative, the company’s antipodean operations were 
virtually stagnant.  
 
AWA was born from an amalgamation of these Australian subsidiaries of the Marconi and 
Telefunken companies. There were both global and domestic factors behind this merger. 
Internationally, the raft of patent-related litigation around the world between the two rival 
companies culminated in an agreement in which they agreed to share patents and divide the 
world into spheres of influence, as described in the previous chapter. One dimension of this 
                                                          
82 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 82-85. 
83 L. Durrant, The Seawatchers, p. 19.  
84 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 81. 
113 
 
arrangement was the formation of several joint enterprises in continental Europe.85 Specific to 
Australia, the Commonwealth’s stranglehold over the sector meant that neither of the foreign 
wireless subsidiaries were making money in their operations.86 As a result, there was an 
incentive for the two companies to combine and end the unrewarding competition between 
them. Denison, in his capacity as Managing Director of the Australasian Wireless Company, 
embarked for London and negotiated a merger deal with the Marconi board, which was 
approved in November 1912.87  
 
As a result of the deal brokered in London, AWA was formally registered in July 1913, with 
Denison appointed as Managing Director and Fisk second-in-charge. With rights to both the 
Marconi and Telefunken patents, the new company was comprised of 140,000 £1 shares. Half 
of these were owned by the Marconi Company, with Telefunken holding less than ten percent 
and the remainder held by Australian owners.88 At the end of June 1913 Fisk wrote to the 
Postmaster-General’s Department to give notice of the merger and outline the new company’s 
intention to consolidate the control of shipborne wireless in Australian waters under a single 
commercial organisation.89 Balsillie responded to this development with enthusiasm, noting 
that bringing maritime wireless under a single domestic organisation “will add to the value and 
efficiency of the radiotelegraph service” and make it easier for the Wireless Telegraphy Branch 
to monitor the use of wireless on oceangoing vessels.90 Unstated in Balsillie’s letter, but 
revealed by the action he took after the outbreak of war – covered in the following chapter – 
was the source of his enthusiasm: the centralisation of control over Australian maritime 
wireless would ease the administrative complications of a future decision to nationalise this 
section of the industry.  
 
From its inception AWA took over all shipborne wireless services in Australia, essentially 
without competition. It quickly established a foothold in the sector by signing agreements with 
Australian shipping firms for the provision of wireless equipment and services on their vessels. 
                                                          
85 A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, 
2003, p. 273. 
86 J. Given, “Not Being Ernest”, p. 165. 
87 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 92-93. 
88 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 94-96. 
89 Letter to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from Fisk, 30th June 1913. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1913/11258, Wireless – Marconi’s Wireless Transmitting Co. Pty Ltd, 1913. 
90 ‘Wireless: Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd’, 18th July 1913. NAA: MP341/1, 1913/11258. 
114 
 
In contrast to the two companies from which it was born, AWA managed to turn an £8000 
profit in its first year of operation, demonstrating the benefits of a united approach.91 At the 
time of inception the new company had 44 Australian vessels under contract, and this number 
had increased to 75 by mid-1914.92 Recognising its dependence on the maritime sector, AWA 
was “maintaining the closest possible liaison with shipowners”, who were also well-
represented amongst its shareholders.93  
 
AWA’s expansion in the field of maritime wireless brought with it a need for the domestic 
manufacturing of equipment. At first the company was forced to import its equipment, as the 
small workshop it was operating in Sydney was only suitable for repairs. However, because it 
had attained a viable foothold in maritime wireless, in May 1914 the company opened a new, 
larger, workshop and began the domestic production of wireless equipment for installation on 
ships. The company also established an Australian branch of the Marconi School of Wireless in 
1913 for the purpose of training wireless operators for service at sea.94 Thus, the commercial 
opportunities provided by the maritime use of wireless, along with the consolidation of the 
small field under a single company, allowed private enterprise to take root in Australia. 
 
Although AWA had managed to establish a foothold in Australia on the eve of war in 1914, it 
remained a small-scale operation. The company employed around 40 staff in mid-1914.95 This 
compared to the 93 personnel working in the Wireless Telegraph Branch of the Postmaster-
General’s Department in December 1913, and a number of RAN personnel who were also 
working with the new technology.96 With the Commonwealth in exclusive control of the 
coastal scheme, AWA’s commercial operations were confined to the provision of equipment 
and services for the maritime trade, and training operators. Nevertheless, AWA was the largest 
non-government organisation involved in wireless, and its importance would grow 
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tremendously in the near future as the outbreak of war compelled the Commonwealth to 
utilise its stocks of equipment and trained operators. 
 
Though it was the largest and most professional, AWA was not the only private commercial 
wireless interest operating in this period. There was also a small enterprise named the 
Maritime Wireless Company run by a Catholic priest, Father Archibald Shaw.97 This firm was 
based out of an electrical workshop in the Sydney suburb of Randwick. When the decision was 
made to source wireless equipment for the coastal scheme from within Australia, rather than 
importing it, Shaw offered to sell his plant to the Postmaster-General’s Department for this 
purpose. Though the department rejected that offer, the Maritime Wireless Company was 
commissioned to produce the equipment of Balsillie’s design for use in the coastal scheme, 
and it was the only supplier of such.98 Though little is known about the operations of the 
company, a Royal Commission, covered in the next chapter, later revealed disreputable 
connections between Shaw and members of the Labor Party, helping to explain how the 
Maritime Wireless Company became the sole supplier of material for the coastal scheme 
under the Fisher government.99 
 
Australian Wireless on the Eve of War 
 
By mid-1914, a number of distinctive features were apparent in the field of Australian wireless. 
Most prominent was its division into separate spheres of activity, with the Commonwealth 
exerting a monopoly over land-based stations – with a minor exception for experimental use 
by the general public – while leaving maritime wireless to commercial interests operating 
under the regulatory control of the Postmaster-General’s Department. The central 
developmental role assumed by the Commonwealth government – with private enterprise 
mired in a subsidiary role – was a prominent feature of this period. Though the Fisher 
government had amplified this, by refusing any cooperation with private enterprise (except for 
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the Labor-linked Maritime Wireless Company), the non-Labor governments of Deakin and 
Cook had similarly endorsed government ownership and operation of wireless stations.  
 
The pre-eminence of government in the sector during the pre-war years can be explained with 
reference to a number of factors. One, specific to the field of wireless, was the poor reputation 
of the Marconi Company within government circles, owing to its aggressive conduct elsewhere 
in the world.100 However, this cannot explain the refusal of Commonwealth officials to 
countenance other private firms establishing commercial wireless services in Australia. 
Although the Commonwealth consistently used private enterprise to source the equipment for 
its stations throughout this period, there was never any indication of an appetite to open the 
field to commercial exploitation. Even the private usage of shipborne wireless permitted under 
the 1911 regulations was tolerated, rather than encouraged, by the government. Another 
important influence on the assertion of governmental control over wireless in the pre-war 
years was the Australian tradition of communications as a governmental monopoly that had 
been in place since the colonial era. The Postmaster-General’s Department’s control over 
other forms of communication, particularly the telegraph, provided compelling reasons for 
that department to also take control over the new medium, as was formally instituted in the 
1905 Wireless Telegraphy Act. Indicative of this, control of wireless was initially invested in the 
same official that was responsible for telegraphy – the Chief Electrical Engineer – before the 
creation of a dedicated Wireless Telegraphy Branch under Balsillie. Internal departmental 
records discussing policy towards wireless are also replete with mention of its control of 
telegraphy, demonstrating that a connection between the mediums was widespread in the 
minds of officials at the time. Since the Commonwealth maintained complete control over 
telegraphy, it followed that it should also exert its power over wireless telegraphy.  
 
From the very beginning Australia’s principal interest in wireless was as a strategic asset that 
would enable communication with other lands of the Empire and, vitally for national security, 
the ships of the Royal Navy. This was a vital factor in the trajectory of Australian wireless 
development in the pre-war years. The impetus for the Commonwealth considering the 
constitution of the medium in the first instance came from the recommendations of the 
                                                          
100 For instance, officials of the Postmaster-General’s Department were referring to international 
experience to caution against any engagement with the company from as early as 1905. See ‘Electrical 
Conference – Wireless telegraphy’, 20th April 1905. NAA: MP341/1, 1906/362.  
117 
 
Admiralty as it took the first steps towards equipping the British fleet with wireless in response 
to the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the utility of the medium for naval 
operations was first demonstrated. Similarly, the recommendations of Admiral Henderson in 
relation to developing Australian wireless were held in high esteem after the publication of his 
report in 1911. Henderson’s report recommended developing a single wireless organisation 
that would be run by the Postmaster-General’s Department in peacetime, but would be 
capable of transferral to military authorities in a conflict. The Commonwealth’s prioritisation of 
this objective explains that, though Henderson also recommended the nationalisation of 
shipborne wireless services, it was willing to tolerate private intrusion into this sphere of 
operations. Because the priority was to construct a coastal network that could, in times of war, 
coordinate the naval defence of the Australian continent, it was a lesser concern that the 
merchant marine would be utilising the services of private enterprise. Though government 
control of these installations was desirable, as evidenced by Balsillie’s enthusiasm for AWA 
bringing Australian maritime wireless under a single organisation, it was not seen as essential 
in the same way as the construction of a coastal network that would enable communicate with 
naval vessels was. Nationalisation of maritime wireless could be deferred until a later point in 
time.       
 
This chapter also demonstrates the impact of short-term factors upon various aspects of 
policy. Though they did exert strong influences, it is insufficient to see developments as simple 
manifestations of larger structural trends. The two principal examples of this were Australia’s 
reaction to the first incarnation of the Imperial scheme, and in the shape of the 1911 
regulations. Despite the compelling reasons for acquiescing with British plans for the Imperial 
scheme, the Australian government determined its response with reference to immediate 
domestic concerns: the ongoing patent dispute with the Marconi Company. Domestic 
considerations were also behind the form of the 1911 regulations, with space being left for the 
private sector to enter the market for the provision of maritime wireless services out of 
concerns relating to the Commonwealth’s financial exposure and the Marconi Company’s 
ongoing legal challenge. In each of these cases, which represented significant policy decisions, 
the same pattern appeared. This pattern was one of external developments – that is, outside 
of the Australian wireless community – forcing the consideration of questions related to policy, 
which were then decided in response to proximate circumstances.  
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Another characteristic of this period was the emergence of domestic wireless interest groups. 
From the earliest years after Federation the Marconi Company had sought, without success, to 
expand its international business into Australia. It was later joined in these endeavours by the 
Australasian Wireless Company, a subsidiary of Telefunken. Though global rivals, these 
concerns had the common element of being international companies seeking to open up the 
Australian sector against the suspicions of Commonwealth policymakers. From around 1910, 
this landscape became more domesticated, with the emergence of Shaw’s Maritime Wireless 
Company as the supplier of material for the coastal scheme, and the Marconi and Telefunken 
subsidiaries beginning to install imported equipment on Australian vessels. A further step 
towards domestication happened in 1913 with the formation of AWA, which shortly thereafter 
began its own domestic manufacturing and training operations. 
 
Of these private interests, AWA was the best placed to emerge as a significant force in the 
future of Australian wireless. While it had not been granted the opportunity to participate in 
the coastal scheme, AWA had nevertheless gained an effective monopoly over the wireless 
sets on Australian shipping by 1914. Unlike the earlier domestic operations of its parent 
companies, this allowed it to turn a profit; providing a commercial basis for its future 
expansion. 
 
Along with the roots of a domestic industry centred on the maritime trade, this period also 
saw the first development of an Imperial scheme of wireless. The negotiations over this 
scheme had seen the Commonwealth government assert its preferences against the 
remainder of the Empire by determining the terms under which it would participate. The 
timing of these negotiations, coming at the height of tension between the government and the 
Marconi Company, saw Australian officials determine that the erection of a station to integrate 
with the remainder of the scheme would be undertaken by the government itself, and that 
there was no place for cooperation with private enterprise on this matter. This indicates that 
the strategic imperatives necessitating the establishment of a wireless connection between 
Australia and the rest of the Empire were not immune from the influence of domestic politics. 
This influence would reappear when the question of international wireless was reopened after 
the hiatus forced by the Great War. 
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Unbeknownst to all involved, the prevailing state of affairs in Australian wireless was about to 
be upended by the outbreak of the Great War. The remainder of this study is dedicated to 
exploring the process by which the key feature of this period – the importance of the 
Commonwealth government, centred on the Postmaster-General’s Department, and the 
relative unimportance of private enterprise to the sector’s development – was overturned and 
replaced by a state of affairs in which private enterprise came to play a leading role in the 
industry’s expansion in the early 1920s. To understand these changes, it is necessary to 
examine the experience of Australian wireless during the Great War. 
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Chapter 4 – The Great War and Australian 
Wireless, 1914-1918 
 
This chapter concludes Part III of the study through examining the disruptive impact of the 
Great War on Australian wireless communications. By August 1914 an equilibrium had 
emerged in the sector. After some delay, the medium had bifurcated into largely separate 
public and private areas of operation. The Postmaster-General’s Department, responsible for 
enforcing the Wireless Telegraphy Act, had erected a network of stations around the 
Australian coastline under its own monopoly control exercised through the Wireless 
Telegraphy Branch. Stations aboard commercial shipping, on the other hand, were all in 
private hands. Following the lead of the Marconi Company internationally, AWA had secured 
agreements with commercial shipping lines operating in Australian waters for the provision of 
wireless sets and services. A clear separation between public and private involvement in the 
wireless industry had been established, characterised by tension and mistrust. The outbreak of 
the Great War in August 1914 was the impetus for this status quo being unwound.   
 
The Assertion of Military Control 
 
Wireless’ military utility immediately came to the forefront during the conflict. On 2nd August, 
with the deteriorating situation in Europe making war imminent, the British Colonial Secretary 
cabled the Governor-General directing the Commonwealth to institute a regime of censorship 
over cables and other forms of communication. As Ernest Scott describes, no action like this 
had ever been undertaken in Australia prior to this point.1 Responsibility for implementing 
censorship fell upon the Postmaster-General’s Department and, according to an internal 
history of the department’s operations during the war written shortly after the Armistice, the 
implementation of censorship presented an unprecedented challenge for the organisation.2  
 
                                                          
1 E. Scott, Australia During the War, pp. 58-59. 
2 See NAA: MP341/1, 1921/4656, History of Operation of Postmaster General’s Department during war 
– all states, 1917-1921. 
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Though the main targets of censorship were Australia’s fixed telegraph, telephone and cable 
services, wireless was also included. On 3rd August the Acting Defence Minister sent an urgent 
telegram to the Acting Postmaster-General, asking the latter to “suspend all private wireless 
licences” as quickly as possible under the authority provided by the Wireless Telegraphy Act.3 
These censorship measures, undertaken by the caretaker Cook government under emergency 
powers, were formally instituted by the Fisher government after its electoral victory in 
September.4 By the end of 1914 the censorship regime had solidified. Notwithstanding a 
handful of prosecutions for the illegal possession of wireless equipment,5 there was very little 
change in this arena for the remainder of the conflict. The unauthorised use of wireless by 
civilians would result in punishment from the government.    
 
Another major change in the field of Australian wireless that took place during the war was the 
displacement of the Postmaster-General’s Department’s administration of the medium from 
1915, and its shift to the control of the newly-created Department of the Navy. While at the 
time of the war’s outbreak the RAN had a limited involvement in the area for its own purposes 
– operating ten wireless stations on board its vessels and three land-based stations separate 
from those of the coastal network – it was the Postmaster-General’s Department that had 
primary responsibility for the area under the Wireless Telegraphy Act.6 However, the outbreak 
of war and the resultant shifts in the usage of wireless prompted new administrative priorities.  
 
One incident in 1914 illustrated a problem posed by the continued civilian control of wireless 
under wartime conditions. It saw the operator of the Sydney coastal station, an officer of the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, send an uncoded message to all other coastal stations 
asking about the location of the first troop convoy that had departed Australia for the main 
theatre of war. In response, the operator of the station at Esperance, Western Australia, 
replied that “they are here old man” in another uncoded message capable of being received 
                                                          
3 Telegram to Acting Postmaster-General from Acting Defence Minister, 3rd August 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 
1914/42, Wireless Licences. Suspension of O/A of war, 1914-1919. Original capitalisation removed. 
4 Executive Council Order, 30th September 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 1914/42.  
5 See NAA: MP341/1, 1915/3457, Wireless Licence Generally Unauthorised Experimenters, 1914-1915; 
NAA: MP341/1, 1915/6509, Unauthorised Experimenter’s Bleeck W. A., 1915. 
6 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from the Secretary of the 
Defence Department, 7th December 1914. National Archives of Australia: Navy Office [I], Department of 
Defence [I]; MP472/1, Correspondence files, annual single number series, 1901-1925; 1/15/4232, Visits 
of HMA Ships and Establishments. Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries and Transports employed in conveyance 
of Troops fitted with Wireless Transmitters, 1913-1915. 
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over 1500 kilometres away.7 Though nothing adverse came from this episode, the careless 
transmission of uncoded information about shipping movements could potentially have been 
intercepted by enemy vessels in the region. Curnow points to this incident as being the 
impetus for a transfer of wireless responsibilities away from the Postmaster-General’s 
Department to the Navy, but the available evidence does not support such a clear line of 
causation. It does appear, however, to have provided RAN officials with “an example of the 
dangers attending the untrained civilian operators in war operations”.8   
 
Contra Curnow, there is no evidence to suggest that the idea of transferring responsibility over 
wireless to the RAN originated within that organisation. It appears to have originated within 
the Cabinet, as an accompaniment to that body’s decision to transfer the Navy from the 
Department of Defence and, from July 1915, to create a separate Department of the Navy with 
Jens Jensen as its minister.9 One document states that Cabinet decided to transfer the 
Commonwealth’s wireless responsibilities from the Postmaster-General’s Department to the 
new department from the latter’s very inception on 1st July 1915.10 In early September 1915 
Parliament passed an amendment to transfer responsibility over the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
away from the Postmaster-General to the more ambiguous “Minister for the time being 
administering the Act”.11 Following this, the next month saw the Secretary of the Navy 
Department write to Balsillie “in view of the transfer of your Branch to the control of the 
Department of the Navy”.12 In anticipation, Balsillie began to furnish the Navy Department 
with details of the Wireless Telegraphy Branch’s operations, and its employees were 
transferred to the new department. This marked the end of the Wireless Telegraphy Branch as 
an influential body in the field. The transfer of wireless was finalised in March 1916, when 
Cabinet decided that responsibility for the administration of wireless would be placed under a 
new organisation called the Royal Australian Navy Radio Service (RANRS) under the command 
                                                          
7 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from Cresswell, 22nd March 1919. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1916/1066, Organization Papers re offer made to staff and various questions arising 
therefrom, 1915-1919. 
8 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from Cresswell, 22nd March 1919. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1916/1066. 
9 See C. A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, p. 44. 
10 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury from the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, 26th May 1916. National Archives of Australia: Australian Archives, Central Office; A6006, 
Folders of copies of Cabinet papers, 01 Jan 1901 -; 1915/12/31, Transfer of Wireless Branch from PMG 
to Navy, 1915. 
11 Amendment to the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1905, No. 33, 1915. 
12 Memorandum to Balsillie from the Secretary of the Navy Department, 12th October 1915. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1916/1066.  
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of Engineer Lieutenant Frank Cresswell.13 Though Balsillie was retained by the Navy 
Department as a consultant, the transfer to the RANRS effectively ended his influence in the 
field. According to one contemporary, after the switch to RAN administration Balsillie “never 
came near the Navy Radio Section” despite being employed as a consultant.14  
 
For the remainder of the conflict, and for some time after its conclusion, wireless remained in 
the hands of the RAN. This brought a large increase in the department’s responsibilities in the 
field. In addition to its stations on warships and bases, it attained control of the 
Commonwealth’s coastal stations and those former German stations in the South Pacific which 
came under military occupation in late 1914. The RAN also became responsible for the 
inspection of stations aboard ships, along with licencing, training, and examining wireless 
operators.15 
 
The wartime reorganisation of Commonwealth wireless administration was a great departure 
from the status quo that had emerged prior to August 1914. Wartime circumstances, which 
elevated the importance of wireless’ military applications, saw the displacement of the 
Commonwealth’s wireless expert, who had emerged as one of the most important architects 
of policy over the medium since his appointment in 1911. New figures within the Navy 
Department, Cresswell in particular, would seek to promote policies in accordance with their 
own preferences. However, as will be shown below, the consolidation of all levers of formal 
control over wireless by the RAN did not give that organisation free rein to reshape policy. Its 
capacity to do so was constrained by the importance that AWA assumed during the war years, 
allowing the company to act as a counterweight to a number of policy suggestions emanating 
from the Navy Department. Furthermore, some policy alternatives proposed by RAN officials 
were not enacted because they were at odds with political conditions.     
 
 
                                                          
13 “The Wireless Service – To Be Under Naval Control – Statement by Minister” in The Age, 2nd March 
1916. 
14 “Transcript of Interview with C.B. Cutler”. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 28, Material created and 
acquired by P.L. Geeves, 1. Staff, 1913-1976. 
15 ‘Wireless: Naval Organisation of Commonwealth Radiotelegraphic Service’, 25th January 1916. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1916/1066. 
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AWA/Commonwealth Cooperation in the South Pacific 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Australian forces were involved in a campaign against German 
colonial possessions in the South Pacific at the war’s outbreak as part of a broader strategy to 
dismantle the enemy’s global communications network. Detailed exposition of this dimension 
of the Great War can be found elsewhere.16 One subsidiary, yet consequential, development 
associated with the South Pacific campaign was the beginning of cooperation between AWA 
and the Commonwealth. This represented the first instance of cooperation between these 
organisations, as the hostility and disengagement that had previously characterised their 
relationship began to dissolve under wartime conditions.  
 
On 6th August 1914, two days after the declaration of war, a request from the British Colonial 
Secretary was received by the Governor-General, stating “if your ministers desire and feel 
themselves able to seize German wireless stations at Yap in Marshall Islands, Nauru on 
Pleasant Island, and New Guinea, we should feel that this was a great and urgent Imperial 
service”.17 An impromptu task force, comprised of several RAN warships carrying 1500 infantry 
and naval reservists, was dispatched from Sydney on this mission the following night.18 This 
force had conquered the German South Pacific colonies, with a minimum of bloodshed, by the 
end of 1914. 
 
There were considerable logistical challenges associated with the preparation of the task force 
within two days. Unable to deal with the increased need for wireless equipment and trained 
operators generated by the operation, Commonwealth officials reached out to AWA to secure 
the company’s assistance. According to a contemporary description, cribbed from an October 
1914 edition of The Bulletin, Fisk received a phone call at his house from Cresswell on the 
evening of 7th August, as the expeditionary force was preparing to embark. In their 
conversation Cresswell asked Fisk to “enlist 12 expert operators and deliver them between 
                                                          
16 See S.S. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul: The Capture and Administration of the German 
Possessions in the Southern Pacific, Volume X of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, 
Angus and Robertson Ltd, Sydney, 1937; J. Beaumont, Broken Nation, pp. 28-31; chapter 3 in N. Meaney, 
Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923; chapters 1 and 2 in H.J. Hiery, The Neglected War.  
17 Quoted in S.S. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul, pp. 5-6. 
18 J. Beaumont, Broken Nation, p. 29. 
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now and midnight aboard HMAS Melbourne, under steam for ‘hush destination’”.19 This 
account notes that within hours a group of operators in the employ of the company had been 
recruited by Fisk and despatched to the RAN “ready to face hell for his country, provided 
they’d give him 10 minutes to get his toothbrush and say goodbye to Mother”.20 Along with 
operators, AWA also supplied the task force with the components for half a dozen wireless 
stations. A number of these stations were subsequently erected in the captured territories for 
the purpose of establishing communication with the Australian mainland.21  
 
This contribution to the South Pacific campaign was not the only way in which the 
Commonwealth relied upon AWA for assistance upon the war’s outbreak. In August the 
company was also hastily contracted to erect a new shore station at the RAN’s Garden Island 
base in Sydney, for which it also supplied the wireless operators for a number of months until 
the Navy had time to train its own.22 Furthermore, at the behest of the Defence Department, 
AWA established a wireless direction finder near Sydney, with which “a watch was observed 
for unauthorised or suspicious signals, which when heard would be traced as to direction by 
means of the new instrument”.23 The company also provided the government with other 
pieces of equipment, such as three portable stations purchased by the Defence Department 
under direct instruction from Acting Prime Minister Cook,24 and loaned a Telefunken set to the 
Postmaster-General’s Department “for the purpose of intercepting…traffic which is passing 
between certain German stations”.25 
 
                                                          
19 Quoted in ‘Chapter II: The Early Days of Wireless in Australia’. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 30, 
AWA and Its History, History Files (5) – Correspondence, Documents, MSS, Notes, Printed Material, 
Photos, etc, 1904-1968. 
20 Quoted in ‘Chapter II: The Early Days of Wireless in Australia’. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 30, 
AWA and Its History, History Files (5) – Correspondence, Documents, MSS, Notes, Printed Material, 
Photos, etc, 1904-1968. 
21 See the entry labelled ‘7/8/14’ in the untitled, undated timeline of AWA’s milestones in ML: MSS 
2954/Add-On 1910; Box 30, AWA and Its History, History Files (5) – Correspondence, Documents, MSS, 
Notes, Printed Material, Photos, etc, 1904-1968. 
22 See the entry labelled ‘August, 1914’ in the untitled, undated timeline of AWA’s milestones in ML: 
MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 30, AWA and Its History, History Files (5) – Correspondence, Documents, 
MSS, Notes, Printed Material, Photos, etc, 1904-1968. 
23 See the entry labelled ‘1914’ in the untitled, undated timeline of AWA’s milestones in ML: MSS 
2954/Add-On 1910; Box 30, AWA and Its History, History Files (5) – Correspondence, Documents, MSS, 
Notes, Printed Material, Photos, etc, 1904-1968. 
24 See NAA: MP341/1, 1915/19589, Amalgamated Wireless War Office, 1914-1915. 
25 Letter to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from Balsillie, 29th August 1914. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1914/18687, Wireless. Accounts. Amalgamated Wireless Ltd, 1914-1915. 
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In all of these cases officials from the Commonwealth government reached out to AWA for 
assistance with the provision of equipment and operators in the first days of the conflict. This 
represented the first steps towards cooperation between these entities, and provided a 
foundation for further cooperation in the years to come. Because it was not equipped with the 
materiel and qualified personnel required for military operations, the crisis compelled the 
Commonwealth to overturn the established policy of avoiding commercial transactions with 
AWA – the company was the only organisation with the capacity to immediately meet the 
Commonwealth’s wireless requirements. Therefore, the beginning of cooperation between 
AWA and the Commonwealth in 1914, which would develop into formal partnership eight 
years later, was based upon circumstances that were short-term and incidental. However, 
these initial instances of cooperation were not sufficient to immediately dispel the widespread 
mistrust of AWA within the government. An example of the lingering tension came in late 1914 
in relation to the terms demanded by AWA for its provision of the six wireless stations supplied 
to the South Pacific task force. After receiving an invoice from the company, Cresswell claimed 
that its charges were excessive and included royalties from which the Commonwealth should 
have been exempt. Consequently, he recommended that the Commonwealth should refuse 
payment; a stance supported by the Naval Board and departmental secretary.26 Although the 
company’s charges were eventually paid in mid-1917, this was an indication that tension 
endured between the organisations despite the cooperation in the war’s first weeks.     
 
Balsillie’s Failed Gambit 
 
While the coming of war created the conditions that led to the first collaboration between 
AWA and the Commonwealth, it also provided an opportunity for a restructuring of the entire 
sector. In late 1914, using the opening presented by the coming of war, Balsillie attempted to 
orchestrate a fundamental change to the organisation of the Australian wireless industry by 
removing AWA’s foothold in the area. Though it came close, his proposal was ultimately not 
implemented. Had it been, the subsequent development of Australian wireless could have 
been very different. 
 
                                                          
26 See NAA: MP472/1, 9/15/1982, Purchase of WT Sets from the Amalgamated Wireless Co, Sydney – 
Question of Patents Right – Claim by firm for extra apparatus shipped in Melbourne, 1914-1917. 
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Balsillie’s proposal to reorganise the sector was first detailed in an October 1914 
memorandum circulated within the Postmaster-General’s Department. With frustration, it 
noted that, despite Admiral Henderson’s pre-war recommendations, the Commonwealth had 
not instituted a requirement that “all ships registered in Australia, and fitted with Wireless 
apparatus, should carry apparatus manufactured and operated by the Commonwealth 
government”.27 Balsillie’s frustration came from the fact that “had we applied this policy from 
the inception, we would have been in a better position to control Wireless than we are at the 
present day”.28 Nevertheless, using the cover provided by wartime circumstances, Balsillie 
proposed to attain exclusive Commonwealth control over maritime wireless. He advocated 
that “the Government should protect the Ship Owner from exploitation by commercial 
radiotelegraph companies, on whose tender mercies they are doubtless thrown”.29 This 
‘protection’ would take the form of the Commonwealth installing and operating ship-borne 
sets itself, which, Balsillie also claimed, would also enable streamlined administration due to 
the fact that “the whole of the land and ship organisation, that is practically all radiotelegraphy 
of the Commonwealth, could be controlled from the one source”.30 This proposition, Balsillie 
claimed, was supported by commercial shipping firms upset at the rates charged by private 
enterprise for the provision of wireless services on their vessels. 
 
Following up on the matter over a year later, in December 1915, Balsillie noted that his 
proposal to nationalise the maritime wireless market had gained ministerial approval and was 
subsequently put before the Cabinet.31 He wrote that “the Postmaster-General informed me in 
May of this year that the Ship Scheme was approved” by Cabinet, but lamented that “no action 
has however been taken”.32 Due to a paucity of surviving evidence, it is not clear why no action 
was ever taken on this proposal, given the assent of Cabinet. Balsillie’s follow-up 
correspondence on the matter in late 1915 was an attempt to push the policy again, but in this 
case he did not receive a reply. By this time Balsillie was no longer a central figure in the field 
of Australian wireless, with responsibility having been transferred to the Navy Department. 
Furthermore, Hughes’ replacement of Fisher as Prime Minister in October 1915 saw a greater 
                                                          
27 ‘Wireless: Ship Scheme’, 23rd October 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 1914/18660. 
28 ‘Wireless: Ship Scheme’, 23rd October 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 1914/18660. 
29 ‘Wireless: Ship Scheme’, 23rd October 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 1914/18660. 
30 ‘Wireless: Ship Scheme’, 23rd October 1914. NAA: MP341/1, 1914/18660. 
31 This is confirmed in Cabinet records. See NAA: A6006, 1915/12/31, Wireless – Ship Scheme, 1915. 
32 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from Balsillie, 16th December 1915. NAA: 
MP341/1, 1914/18660. 
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centralisation of decision-making and a diminished capacity for other ministers to influence 
policy. As the remainder of this study will demonstrate, Hughes was more favourably disposed 
towards AWA than his Labor predecessor had been.  
 
Had Balsillie’s proposal been put into effect, the potential consequences for the future of 
Australian wireless were great. Maritime operations represented AWA’s largest foothold in the 
sector in Australia, given Commonwealth control of the land-based stations. Had this foothold 
been removed, AWA would have been without the principal component of its business 
organisation, and this would have had profound effects on the course of future development. 
Though the company was extending its operations into other areas throughout the war years, 
and though the scale of its maritime services was reduced due to the censorship regime, its 
internal records demonstrate the continued importance of this branch of the enterprise’s 
operations, and an increase in the number of ships contracted to use AWA’s services between 
1914 and 1918.33 Its expulsion from this field of operations may have made the company 
commercially unviable. Furthermore, the attainment of a Commonwealth monopoly over the 
whole of Australian wireless, the core of Balsillie’s proposal, would have presented a major 
obstacle to any future commercial involvement in the sector.      
 
Changes in AWA’s Ownership 
 
The war also prompted changes in AWA’s ownership, transforming it from a company with a 
substantial foreign stake to one that could claim itself a national enterprise. This would later 
enable the company to promote itself as a national asset rather than a foreign tool, and this 
change proved to be of great importance to policy development in the post-war years by 
allowing the company to portray policies to promote its commercial expansion as serving the 
national interest.  
 
Though the amalgamation between the Australian subsidiaries of Marconi and Telefunken had 
taken place over a year earlier, by August 1914 no formal agreement had yet been signed 
                                                          
33 See the Director’s Reports from 1914-1918 in ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910, Box 37, Shareholders 
Reports, 1914-1921 (Printed).  
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between AWA and Telefunken granting a licence to the former to use the latter’s patents in 
exchange for 13,000 shares in the new Australian company. While, according to contemporary 
newspaper coverage, a licencing agreement had been drafted “for a considerable time before 
the war”, it was not formally signed by representatives of the two firms until 8th December 
1914.34 The signing of this agreement with enemy subjects after the outbreak of hostilities led 
to the Commonwealth taking legal action against AWA executives under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act – which had been enacted several weeks earlier.35 It also saw the government 
confiscate Telefunken’s shares in the AWA and place them under the control of the Custodian 
of Enemy Property.  
 
In September 1915 three of AWA’s executives – Fisk, Denison and Bartholomew – appeared 
before a Sydney court charged with breaching the Trading with the Enemy Act. The 
prosecution’s case centred upon the agreement signed between Denison and a Melbourne 
Patent Attorney who held the power of attorney for Telefunken’s patents in Australia.36 This, 
the prosecution argued, constituted a breach of the Act with the potential punishment of “a 
fine not exceeding £500, or 12 months’ imprisonment, or both”.37 According to press coverage 
at the time, the AWA representatives executed this agreement because they were “afraid the 
Telefunken Company might go back on them after the war. Another reason was that the 
company wanted to be in a position to show that the exclusive rights of the Telefunken 
Company’s patents had been purchased by them in the event of application being made to the 
Commissioner of Patents by other persons to use those patents”.38 However, as discussed 
below, these patents were later nullified by the Commonwealth. After two days of hearings, 
the three AWA directors were all found guilty of a technical breach of the law. However, their 
punishment was lenient, consisting of a minimal fine of £10 each, with the company itself fined 
a further £10. Though the potential sentence was considerably heavier, the magistrate’s 
opinion was that the need for more substantial punishment was mitigated by the fact that 
“after the war began, the company offered their plant to the Government, and this offer was 
availed of by the naval and military authorities on several occasions”.39 AWA’s directors 
                                                          
34 “The Wireless Case. Alleged Trading With The Enemy” in The Advertiser, 21st September 1915. 
35 J. Beaumont, Broken Nation, p. 44. 
36 See the transcript of Geeves’ interview with J. Wilson, 12th October 1972. ML MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; 
Box 29, Material created and acquired by P.L. Geeves, 1. Staff, 1913-1976. 
37 “Enemy Trading – Small Fine Imposed“ in The Sydney Morning Herald, 23rd September 1915.  
38 “Enemy Trading Act – Wireless Company in Court“ in The Sydney Morning Herald, 21st September 
1915.  
39 “Enemy Trading – Small Fine Imposed“ in The Sydney Morning Herald, 23rd September 1915.  
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therefore received a lighter punishment for their infraction as a direct result of their 
company’s enthusiastic support of the war effort, a sign of the special position that the 
company had assumed. 
 
Of greater long-term importance, though, was the fate of the 13,000 shares in AWA that had 
been the property of Telefunken prior to their confiscation by the Commonwealth. This, in 
connection with the broader question of AWA’s ownership, was a subject to which 
Commonwealth officials paid close attention. In November 1917, the AWA shares formerly 
owned by Telefunken were scheduled to be put on public auction in accordance with 
procedures put in place for the disposal of enemy property. A Nationalist MP, Willie Kelly, 
contacted Navy Minister Cook urging the latter to ask Cresswell’s opinion on the matter. Kelly’s 
suggestion, on which Cresswell’s advice was sought, was that the shares should be purchased 
by the Commonwealth so as “to prevent the Marconi Company getting complete control of 
Amalgamated Wireless”.40 In response, Cresswell composed a brief report on the subject. 
Noting that more than two-thirds of AWA’s shares were held by a combination of the Marconi 
Company and AWA’s management – implying a unanimity of these interests – and claiming 
that “there is little doubt that the Marconi Company will make an attempt to extend its 
operations and influence in Australia”, he nevertheless rejected the notion of the 
Commonwealth purchasing the shares at auction.41 He justified this recommendation by 
noting that it would be preferable to nationalise the entire sector:  
 
The Government’s interests are adequately protected, and there is no reason why the 
Government should not at any time declare Wireless Telegraphy to be an entire 
Government Monopoly so far as Australia is concerned. Of course such declaration 
would necessitate the taking over of the Marconi Company’s interests in Australia. I 
cannot justify the suggestion that the Government should compete in the open 
market for the purchase of the Shares held by enemy subjects.42 
                                                          
40 Memorandum to the Acting Director of the Commonwealth Radio Service from the Secretary of the 
Navy Department, 20th November 1917. NAA: MP472/1, 1/17/8181, Amalgamated Wireless – Suggested 
purchase by C’wealth of enemy Shares, 1917. 
41 ‘Amalgamated Wireless (A/asia) Ltd.: Re Suggested Purchase by Commonwealth of Enemy Shares’, 
21st November 1917. NAA: MP472/1, 1/17/8181. 
42 ‘Amalgamated Wireless (A/asia) Ltd.: Re Suggested Purchase by Commonwealth of Enemy Shares’, 
21st November 1917. NAA: MP472/1, 1/17/8181. 
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In line with these recommendations, discussion of the matter was dropped and the 
Commonwealth did not seek to acquire the shares. They were instead purchased by a pair of 
Sydney solicitors at the behest of Fisk, who arranged for their subsequent resale to shipping 
firms.43 An important consequence of this was its confirmation that ownership of the 
enterprise was now exclusively Anglo-Australian, with an increased proportion now under 
domestic control. This change was an important step towards the company being “made local” 
after being “born global”, and would prove to be of great importance to AWA’s future 
expansion and the post-war direction of wireless policy.44   
 
Cresswell’s memorandum reveals that, like his predecessor Balsillie, he supported the goal of 
bringing the entire wireless sector under the control of the Commonwealth and removing 
AWA’s foothold in the industry. Though he did not directly advocate for such, his view of the 
desirability of such a step is clearly embedded in this document. This demonstrates that even 
in 1917, by which time AWA had become further entwined in the war effort, a good deal of 
hostility towards the company remained within the Commonwealth bureaucracy. 
 
Evidence uncovered by Given suggests that Cresswell’s suspicion that the Marconi Company 
would seek to extend its stake in the Australian company was well-founded, and that Fisk had 
arranged for the shares to be resold to domestic concerns so as to prevent “Marconi increasing 
its stake at a time when the share price was depressed”.45 These changes in AWA’s ownership 
were also consistent with broader structural changes in the Australian economy associated 
with the Great War outlined in Chapter Two. Like the metals sector, it saw the Commonwealth 
directing the removal of German ownership and influence from a strategic industry and those 
former German assets coming under domestic control. It was also consistent with a larger shift 
in the direction of economic nationalism that was emerging at the time.  
 
                                                          
43 Memorandum to the Chief Clerk of the RANRS from the Acting Comptroller-General, 12th December 
1917. NAA: MP472/1, 1/17/8181. 
44 J. Given, “Born Global, Made Local”. 
45 J. Given, “Born Global, Made Local”, p. 9, fn 50. 
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Wireless Training Schools 
 
As was revealed in the preparations for the South Pacific campaign, the beginning of the 
conflict saw the Commonwealth short of trained wireless operators in its employ. As a result, 
the government was forced to rely upon AWA’s cache of trained personnel for its operations in 
the war’s first weeks. As the conflict became a protracted one, and particularly as the use of 
wireless became more important to operations in its latter stages, demand for qualified 
wireless operators in both the armed forces and the merchant marine grew. The provision of 
training services, both directly through its own facility, and indirectly through the involvement 
of senior personnel in military training facilities, represented another dimension of AWA’s 
contribution to the war effort, and another axis along which it expanded its operations. 
 
AWA’s Marconi School of Wireless, which had begun training operators for maritime service in 
the pre-war years, had been forced to disassemble its equipment to comply with the 
censorship regime in August 1914. However, within weeks the company wrote to the Naval 
Board seeking permission to resume its training operations and reinstall those sets at the 
facility that had been dismantled. With reference to an “arrangement” for the supply of 
trained operators between AWA and defence officials, presumably referring to those 
personnel supplied for the South Pacific campaign and elsewhere, Balsillie recommended this 
request be approved by the Naval Board in September 1914 “on the distinct understanding 
that, at no time, is either the receiving or transmitting apparatus to be associated with an 
antenna or ground connection”.46 Given that it was impossible to use this equipment without 
antennae, this was a small concession by Balsillie. Nevertheless, it represented an early 
exemption to the strict rules covering the private use of wireless introduced upon the 
outbreak of war, and a sign of Commonwealth officials’ recognition of AWA’s usefulness as a 
provider of operators for the war effort.     
 
                                                          
46 ‘Wireless: Licences: McKail H.’, 22nd February 1915. NAA: MP341/1, 1915/16282, Amendment of 
Regns. under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1905. to come into operation forth with, 1912-1915. 
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By April 1915, a number of other, smaller, organisations besides AWA had also sought 
permission to instruct students in the use of wireless. In response to these requests, Balsillie 
outlined a proposal for a formal policy to cover the training of wireless personnel. Recognising 
the need for more qualified operators, he recommended that certain institutes, upon 
successful application, should be permitted to “conduct experiments in Radiotelegraphy” for 
training purposes.47 Rather than being issued licences, approved institutes would be covered 
by a permit system, whereby permission would be granted by a letter from the Postmaster-
General which could be withdrawn at the minister’s discretion. Balsillie’s proposal was 
recommended by the departmental secretary a few weeks later, and subsequently assented to 
by the Cabinet and formalised in September.48 This month also saw the Postmaster-General’s 
Department begin to issue proficiency certificates to wireless operators, without which one 
could not legally operate a set.49  
 
In addition to AWA, a dozen other small private schools and colleges became involved with 
wireless training under the new procedures.50 However, none of these matched the scale of 
AWA’s endeavours in this area. In addition to dwarfing the other organisations in the scale of 
its operations, AWA was also the only organisation involved in training that regularly 
corresponded with Commonwealth authorities on the subject and vouched for the bona fides 
of its students. From early 1916 onwards, in response to the introduction of similar restrictions 
in Britain, Navy Minister Jensen introduced additional prerequisites for the awarding of 
wireless proficiency certificates. These required holders of certificates to demonstrate they 
were not enemy subjects by providing particulars of their, and their parents’, places of birth.51 
These restrictions were further tightened in 1917, again in response to policy changes in 
Britain, whereby only those of “purely British descent” were permitted to gain instruction in 
the use of wireless.52 Those of enemy background were to be excluded automatically, while 
                                                          
47 ‘Wireless: Licences: McKail H.’, 15th April 1915. NAA: MP341/1, 1915/16282. 
48 ‘Regulation Under the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1905’, 17th September 1915. NAA: MP341/1, 
1915/16282. 
49 See NAA: MP472/1, 1/15/7596, Wireless Operations Certificate of Proficiency in R/T forwarded for 
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50 See the list in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from Cresswell, 9th October 
1917. NAA: MP472/1, 1/19/6333, R/T in relation to persons of foreign parentage, 1915-1919. 
51 See NAA: MP472/1, 1/15/9963, Grant of licences to act as wireless operators on ships, to Brit 
Subjects, 1915-1916. 
52 Unaddressed memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy Department, October 1917. NAA: 
MP472/1, 1/19/6333. 
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those of Allied or neutral background would have their individual cases considered by the 
Naval Board.  
 
In line with this change in procedure, the Navy Department asked those institutions authorised 
to engage in wireless instruction to furnish lists of their students affected by the change in 
policy. The largest number of responses came from AWA, who advocated for their students to 
be permitted to continue training, though with mixed results.53 Nevertheless, AWA was the 
only organisation that played an active role in assisting applicants to gain permission to 
undertake training, such as through providing letters attesting to the credibility of applicants. 
While its advocacy did not always persuade the Naval Board, it demonstrated a greater level of 
organisational sophistication than any other institution offering wireless training. Furthermore, 
applications associated with AWA received considerably more attention from RAN officials. 
Questionable applicants at other institutions were often summarily refused by the Naval 
Board, such as in the cases of several applicants associated with Stott’s Correspondence 
College in Melbourne.54 Most notable about these cases was the department’s perfunctory 
treatment of them when compared to applications connected with AWA’s training school. This 
is further evidence of the special position AWA had assumed in the eyes of Commonwealth 
officials. 
 
In addition to its own training of wireless operators for the war effort, there was also a 
significant AWA connection with a large-scale military wireless instructional facility established 
in the latter years of the conflict. At the beginning of the war the Army’s Signal School 
provided training in wireless for military personnel. However, by 1915 this institute was 
stretched to capacity and unable to provide adequate instruction in the medium for the 
number of trainees passing through it. As a result, “half-trained men, technically unfitted for 
service abroad” were graduating from the school.55 To rectify this problem, military authorities 
arranged for Captain Payne, AWA’s Traffic Manager, to come to the Army’s Moore Park facility 
in Sydney on a part-time basis to conduct instruction in wireless once per week. However, 
recognising that simply providing supplementary training to graduates of the Signal School was 
                                                          
53 See the individual cases in NAA: MP472/1, 1/19/6333. 
54 See the individual cases in NAA: MP472/1, 1/19/6333; NAA: MP472/1, 1/17/2187, R/T [Radio 
Telegraph] Students – Signed forms respecting nationality of, 1917-1918. 
55 K. Burke (ed.), With Horse and Morse in Mesopotamia: The Story of Anzacs in Asia, Arthur McQuitty 
and Co., Sydney, 1927, p. 80. 
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not an ideal practice, Payne advocated for the establishment of a single Wireless Training 
School wherein trainees from around the country would be sent to Moore Park for half a year 
to undergo instruction.56  Payne himself designed and developed a systematic program of 
instruction and “under his command, the Wireless Training School grew rapidly, [with] the 
standard of the trainees soon reaching a high level”, thereby ensuring that “the units in the 
field…[received] trained reinforcements, capable of taking their place in the day’s work 
without delay”.57 In total, over 3000 men received instruction from the school throughout 
1917 and 1918. Though Payne was later deployed to – and killed in – the Middle East in 
command of an army signalling unit,58 he played an instrumental role in the institutionalisation 
of wireless training for the Australian armed forces.  
 
Both directly – through the Marconi School – and indirectly – through Payne’s creation of the 
Wireless Training School – AWA was instrumental in the provision of wireless instruction for 
Australians during the war. This fact would further contribute to the company’s cache of 
credibility in the post-war years, and represents another example of the unique capacity it 
possessed to assist the war effort in the field of wireless. The company’s assistance in this area 
proved to be of particular importance in the latter stages of the war, by which time 
technological improvements had seen the incorporation of wireless into a wider range of 
military operations on sea, land and, eventually, in the air. This led to a greater demand for 
qualified operators and, consequently, a need for expanded training operations.      
 
Domestic Manufacturing 
 
As was the case with other Australian industries, the war provided stimulus for the domestic 
manufacturing of wireless equipment. The root cause of this, discussed in Chapter Two, was 
the ‘natural protection’ offered by a marked decline of foreign imports resulting from the 
shipping crisis and the widespread dislocation of world trade patterns. In addition, the 
aforementioned increase in demand for equipment, as wireless became increasingly important 
for military operations, contributed to the growth of manufacturing in Australia. AWA was the 
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organisation best positioned to capitalise on this opportunity, and the flourishing of its 
manufacturing provided another dimension of the company’s growth during the Great War.59 
However, it was not the only organisation to involve itself in this area. The war years also saw 
the Navy Department acquire its own plant and commence manufacturing wireless 
equipment. However, due to controversy surrounding the circumstances under which this 
facility was purchased, the potential threat that government manufacturing posed to AWA was 
never fully realised. 
 
In the pre-war years much of Australia’s wireless equipment was imported, with AWA’s non-
service operations focused upon a small workshop in which it conducted repairs. The domestic 
manufacturing that was taking place was done by Father Archibald Shaw’s Maritime Wireless 
Company – which had supplied the Commonwealth with the Balsillie equipment for its coastal 
network – at a facility in Randwick.60 By the war’s end, AWA had established its own 
manufacturing plant and begun producing equipment to compensate for the diminished level 
of overseas imports.61 The Randwick facility, sold to the Navy Department prior to Shaw’s 
death in 1916, was on the brink of an ignominious closure. The war years, therefore, saw a 
reversal of the position in 1914; AWA had emerged as the only wireless manufacturing 
operation on the Australian continent, further cementing its importance to the future of 
Australian wireless.  
 
During the war AWA’s manufacturing operations allowed it to expand its customer base. While 
it continued to supply apparatuses to oceangoing vessels, it also started to receive government 
orders. These were not limited to the aforementioned instances of the Commonwealth 
purchasing equipment from the company. AWA also sold sets to the governments of New 
Zealand and Tonga.62 Furthermore, in 1917 the company was contracted by the British 
government to outfit a number of steamships being constructed in Japan with wireless.63  
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The increased demand for wireless was a boon for AWA due to the virtual disappearance of 
other sources of equipment in the Pacific region. In the recollection of one of its employees, 
“all the Marconi Company equipment was diverted to England’s own war effort, so that AWA 
was obliged to take its first steps in manufacturing its own equipment”.64 The increased 
demand for production during the war years prompted the company to move its 
manufacturing operations to a new, bigger, facility.65 Related to this change, the number of 
staff employed by AWA in its manufacturing operations increased fivefold during the war, from 
30 to 150.66  
 
AWA’s establishment of wireless manufacturing at a significant scale in Australia, consistent 
with larger patterns of economic development outlined in Chapter Two, would also prove 
influential over the trajectory of post-war developments. Its central position in the domestic 
arena endowed it with a good deal of influence over policy formation in the sphere of wireless. 
However, the dominance of the company in the field of manufacturing by the time of the 
Armistice was not a foregone conclusion, and in the mid-war years it was faced with a 
potentially powerful new competitor when the Commonwealth government thrust itself into  
wireless manufacturing operations. Though it would prove short-lived, this was a meaningful 
development. In the pre-war years, despite the Commonwealth’s monopoly over land stations, 
it had never entered the business of manufacturing, instead relying on tenders to procure the 
necessary equipment. The direct entry of the Commonwealth into the manufacturing business 
represented a great potential threat to AWA’s position, although this was never fully realised 
because of the irregular circumstances under which the government’s plant was acquired. 
 
Shaw, the Catholic priest who owned the Randwick facility, had offered to sell it to the 
Postmaster-General’s Department in 1914. After some consideration, the department declined 
this proposal.67 Following this, in 1915 he had approached AWA offering a merger between 
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that entity and his Maritime Wireless Company, but AWA’s executives quickly dismissed the 
offer, considering Shaw’s proposed terms unfavourable.68 However, after these two rejections 
a confluence of circumstances enabled Shaw to offload his plant to the Navy Department in an 
agreement made in 1916.  
 
In March 1915, while responsibility for wireless remained with the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, Cresswell authored a memorandum to the Naval Board recommending that the 
Commonwealth form its own plant capable of manufacturing wireless equipment. He argued 
“that the developments of wireless telegraphy within the Commonwealth, apart from the W/T 
demands consequent upon the outbreak of war, justify the Government in establishing its own 
workshops for the manufacture and repair of all wireless apparatus used by the 
Government”.69 This document provides further demonstration of a sentiment that the whole 
of the wireless industry properly belonged under the direct control of the government and an 
opposition to the private development of wireless.  
 
Of more importance to the later course of events, however, was the opportunity that 
Cresswell’s manufacturing aspirations gave to Navy Minister Jensen in 1916. In May, Shaw 
wrote to Jensen offering to sell the assets of the Maritime Wireless Company to the Navy 
Department. In response Jensen directed his department to obtain a valuation of the 
company’s assets. In the following month Cabinet, under Acting Prime Minister Pearce while 
Hughes was on his first overseas trip as Prime Minister, approved the decision to seek a 
valuation and resolved to consider the question of purchase once one had been attained. In 
July, with reference to a report authored by Cresswell recommending the purchase of the 
Randwick works for £55,000, Cabinet approved the Navy Department’s acquisition of the 
site.70 
 
From the time of purchase to its closure in 1919, the Randwick works were engaged in 
manufacturing wireless apparatus – consisting mostly of maritime sets – along with other war 
                                                          
68 Report of the Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration, p. 28. 
69 Report of the Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration, p. vi. 
70 Report of the Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration, pp. vi-viii. 
139 
 
materiel.71 Around 20 new wireless sets were constructed at the site during the war years.72 
This allowed the RAN to avoid doing business with AWA when it came to obtaining equipment 
for its own purposes, and to create an alternative source of wireless equipment for those 
authorised to use it. AWA’s executives, for their part, were acutely conscious of the threat that 
the Navy’s acquisition of the Randwick plant posed to their company’s operations. Denison, 
AWA’s Managing Director at the time of the purchase, claimed that the Commonwealth’s 
entry into wireless manufacturing saw his company receive fewer government orders for the 
provision of equipment. While he denied that this was a problem in the short-term, he 
conceded that it posed a substantial threat to AWA’s long-term viability, stating that “we did 
not want the Government to be a competitor – a competitor with Government money behind 
it”.73 The manager of the Randwick site was similarly displeased at not holding a monopoly in 
the field of manufacturing, noting in one report that “the problem of competing with outside 
Companies is a very difficult one”.74 
 
However, the potential threat to AWA’s commercial position represented by the 
Commonwealth’s acquisition of its own wireless manufacturing capacity was never fully 
realised. In July 1917 a Royal Commission was convened to investigate matters relating to 
administration within the Navy Department, with a particular focus on the circumstances 
surrounding the purchase of the Randwick works. The Royal Commission’s report, presented in 
December 1918, found that the Navy Department’s purchase of the facility was tainted by 
impropriety involving two Tasmanian Parliamentarians: Senator Long and Navy Minister 
Jensen. Shaw had bribed Long, who in exchange had drafted the former’s offer to sell the plant 
to the department and advocated for its purchase by the government. Jensen, for his part, was 
deemed to have circumvented proper process regarding the purchase of the site. The report 
written by Cresswell and submitted to Cabinet, suggesting the purchase price of £55,000, had 
originally recommended £40,000. Jensen had pressured Cresswell to increase his report’s 
recommended price prior to its submission to Cabinet, but made no mention of this 
interference when the matter was put before that body for approval.75 Both Long and Jensen 
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resigned from Parliament after the publication of the Royal Commission’s findings. In the 
winter of 1919 Cabinet recommended the Randwick works be transferred to the Repatriation 
Department from the Navy Department, with Cook, in his capacity as Navy Minister, directing 
that this transfer was to happen “immediately and that terms were to be adjusted later”.76 
Following the transfer of the Randwick works to the Repatriation Department, the Navy’s 
involvement in the manufacturing of wireless ceased. The department did, however, maintain 
a minor facility, consisting of a number of specialist staff and a small workshop, at its 
Williamstown base for the purpose of repairing and maintaining the fleet’s wireless sets. This 
was, in effect, a reversion to the pre-war state of affairs after a short-lived attempt to establish 
the Commonwealth as a direct provider of equipment. 
 
The changes in the area of domestic wireless manufacturing between 1914 and 1918 would 
prove to be of great consequence for the further development of the medium in post-war 
Australia. Come the Armistice AWA’s predominance in manufacturing, facilitated by the 
particularities of wartime conditions, provided the company with a basis for further expansion 
in the years to come. Furthermore, by virtue of its status as the only concern on the Australian 
continent capable of the mass production of wireless equipment, it was uniquely positioned to 
influence wireless policy in the early 1920s. The advantage of the company’s position was 
further enhanced by the collapse of the Commonwealth government’s brief foray into 
manufacturing at the Randwick facility following the publication of the Royal Commission’s 
findings. This represented a major blow against the notion of direct government involvement 
in the industry. Furthermore, the disappearance of Shaw’s Maritime Wireless Company left no 
other source besides AWA from which the Commonwealth could procure equipment for its 
future needs. These factors presaged a reshaping of the respective roles of the public and 
private sectors that would become enshrined in policy in the immediate post-war years.   
 
Wireless on the Commonwealth Line of Steamers 
 
                                                          
76 Letter to the Chairman of the Repatriation Commission from the Secretary of the Navy, 9th November 
1920. NAA: MP472/1, 15/20/10935, Transfer of Machines from Repatriation School, Randwick to 
Garden Island W/T [Wireless Telegraphy] Station and Electrical Workshops, 1920-1921. 
141 
 
The unease between AWA and the Navy Department that arose during the Great War was also 
reflected in other areas related to wireless, such as in relation to the provision of equipment 
and services on the Commonwealth Line of Steamers. This area of dispute reflected a larger 
dynamic of rivalry between these organisations. AWA’s ability to secure its position on the 
vessels of the line in the face of resistance from departmental officials speaks to the limitations 
of the latter’s influence, as well as the idiosyncrasies of Hughes’ administrative record as Prime 
Minister.    
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Hughes’ first wartime voyage to Britain in 1916 saw the 
formation of the Commonwealth Line of Steamers as a means of addressing the shipping crisis. 
As Fitzhardinge documents, the Prime Minister deputised H.B. Larkin, “an experienced 
shipping man”, to act as the organisation’s manager and oversee the details of his scheme’s 
implementation.77 This was typical of Hughes’ methods of wartime administration; 
conceptualising a new scheme but leaving the operational details to a hand-picked figure. This 
method would prove critical to the wireless-related aspects of the line’s organisation. In 
August an agreement was signed between Larkin and Fisk, under which AWA would supply the 
government line with its wireless services on terms favourable to the company.78 The 
agreement required AWA to install wireless sets in the ships of the line, and also to take 
responsibility for the maintenance and operation of those sets. In exchange, the 
Commonwealth committed to pay AWA £250 per ship per year, with an additional clause of 
the agreement capping AWA’s contribution towards operator wages at £100, with any 
additional wage costs to be borne by the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the agreement was 
slated to last for a minimum of ten years, with the Commonwealth obliged to compensate 
AWA for each ship upon which their equipment was installed that fell short of the ten year 
marker.79 The signing of this agreement also indicates the importance of the established ties 
between AWA and shipping companies. The fact that Larkin possessed experience in the sector 
likely made some arrangement with AWA a natural decision, given the company’s 
predominance in the field of maritime wireless in Australian waters.    
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Fisk must have anticipated that the agreement, and its generous terms, would stir controversy 
in Australia. The documentation surrounding it contains multiple references to his insistence 
that it be formally ratified by government officials in Australia as, in Larkin’s words, “he is not 
quite satisfied that the authority which I hold from the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister renders the 
agreement sufficiently binding”.80 This suggests that Fisk was concerned that the agreement 
would be overturned in response to resistance by others with an interest in wireless. 
 
Fisk was correct to anticipate controversy in relation to the matter. In September Cresswell 
submitted a lengthy, passionate rebuke of the agreement to his departmental secretary. He 
described the agreement as comparable to the agreements that had previously been signed 
between AWA and various Australian shipping firms, wherein a number of costs associated 
with wireless operations, which he estimated as £385 annually per vessel,  were shifted from 
AWA to the shipowner. He also estimated that the £100 set aside to pay operators’ annual 
wages would only cover two-thirds of the costs, and that the Commonwealth would end up 
paying a further £56 per operator towards this end.  Cresswell was indignant at the fact that 
the Commonwealth was “receiving only the same terms [from AWA] as the private ship 
owner”, despite having “acquired the necessary Patent Rights to enable it to manufacture and 
equip its own vessels with Government-owned W/T installations”.81  
 
In addition to his concerns over cost, Cresswell also worried that “entry of the Government 
into the Agreement in question weakens the Government’s position in endeavouring to make 
Wireless Telegraphy a Government Monopoly”.82 Consequently, he concluded that the 
Commonwealth should block the agreement’s ratification, and that the Naval Board should be 
consulted before the signing of any future contracts relating to wireless so as to prevent any 
further arrangements being made on similar terms. 
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Cresswell was supported in this position by the departmental secretary and Navy Minister 
Jensen. A memorandum to the Prime Minister’s Department from the Navy Department called 
for Cresswell’s report to receive “the earnest consideration of the Prime Minister”, and also 
stated that “Mr Jensen regrets that any arrangements have been entered into with an outside 
company [because] all such work can be done at the Commonwealth Wireless Workshops” in 
Randwick.83 Cresswell’s report appears to have had some initial influence, with a later 
memorandum written by the Secretary of the Navy Department claiming a degree of 
downscaling: “advice has been received from the Prime Minister’s Department per telephone 
that steps would be taken to confine the Agreement to the 15 ships purchased by Mr Hughes, 
but that the Agreement otherwise must stand”.84  
 
However, this apparent compromise of limiting the agreement to 15 vessels was never 
formalised. Later documentation, dating from September 1918, indicates that the 
Commonwealth Line of Steamers had recently purchased an additional dozen ships and that 
those vessels were also being outfitted with wireless equipment by AWA in Sydney. Cresswell 
again protested that the line’s management had embarked upon this course of action without 
consulting the RANRS, and that the Commonwealth had the means to provide the necessary 
equipment itself through the Randwick works. With reference to his proposal of two years 
earlier, he urged that “a definite policy should be laid down by the Government” to bring 
wireless on the line under the exclusive control of the Commonwealth.85 This suggestion was, 
however, brushed off by the departmental secretary, who noted that the decision was 
consistent with the 1916 agreement signed between the line and AWA.86  
 
Cresswell’s attempt to secure this policy change in late 1918 was further impeded by the 
transfer of responsibility over the Commonwealth Line of Steamers, along with other vessels 
under the control of the government – principally German ships that had been captured in 
Australian ports at the war’s outbreak – away from the Navy Department the previous year. 
                                                          
83 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department from the Secretary of the Navy 
Department, 7th October 1916. NAA: MP472/1, 1/19/4242. 
84 Memorandum to Cresswell from the Secretary of the Navy Department, 31st October 1916. NAA: 
MP472/1, 1/19/4242. 
85 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from Cresswell, 21st September 1918. NAA: 
MP472/1, 1/19/4242.  
86 Memorandum to Cresswell from the Secretary of the Navy Department, 7th October 1918. NAA: 
MP472/1, 1/19/4242.   
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From 1st July 1917 all Commonwealth controlled vessels were placed under the administration 
of the Prime Minister’s Department.87 Although Cresswell was kept on “in an advisory 
capacity”, his attempts to introduce RAN supervision over wireless on government ships 
appear to have been fruitless.88 
 
The issue of wireless on the Commonwealth Line of Steamers illustrates four interrelated 
aspects of wartime impacts upon the medium. One was the limits of RAN control. Though the 
Navy Department had been given formal responsibility for the administration of wireless from 
1915, in practice its officials were constrained in their capacity to influence developments. 
Another was AWA’s ability, through the signing of contracts, to carve out market niches for 
itself and defend them from opposition within the Commonwealth bureaucracy during a 
period characterised by increased government powers. Third was the company’s cultivation of 
political influence. It was this influence, cultivated across a range of areas from its support of 
the war effort to its material capacities, which enabled AWA to defend its commercial 
operations against those within the government who were hostile to the company and desired 
to see its activities curtailed. Without the support of the Cabinet, which from 1915 on 
effectively meant the support of Hughes, no such moves against the company could be made. 
The reliance of the government upon AWA’s capacities, in addition to the political capital the 
company had accumulated from August 1914 onwards, made such a manoeuvre unlikely, 
despite the pressures from within the bureaucracy to do so. Finally, it demonstrates a dynamic 
that would prove crucial to the post-war development of Australian wireless: the dominance of 
Hughes as Prime Minister over the agenda-setting and decision-making processes. The whole 
dispute over the fate of wireless on the Commonwealth Line of Steamers would not have 
come about without Hughes’ decision to purchase the vessels in the first place, nor if the line’s 
organisation had been left to the established bureaucracy rather than a personal appointee 
with industry ties. It also represents the earliest instance of Hughes’ whims having an impact 
on the development of wireless, albeit indirectly and in a comparatively minor way. However, 
in future years he would come to take a personal interest in the medium, and his unmatched 
influence would prove to be a critical ingredient in future policy decisions.    
                                                          
87 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s 
Department, 30th June 1917. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/968, Ships Commonwealth government line – 
wireless installation, 1917-1920. 
88 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy Department from the Acting Director of Naval Accounts, 
15th April 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/968. 
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Experiments in Direct Wireless 
 
Hughes’ footprint was also evident in one of the most critical wartime developments, insofar 
as it would affect the shape of post-war policy. During the conflict’s final year Fisk – who had 
replaced Denison as AWA’s Managing Director in 1917 – engaged in the first successful 
experiments establishing a direct wireless connection between Australia and Britain. As well as 
demonstrating the new capabilities of wireless – a crucial factor in the direction the medium’s 
development would take in the coming years – this episode further illustrates the political 
privilege that AWA had assumed by the war’s end. 
 
The capabilities of long-distance wireless signalling advanced considerably as a result of 
technological improvements in wireless during the war years. An AWA promotional booklet 
from the mid-1920s notes that the first long-distance signals – between New York and Berlin – 
were intercepted by Australian stations in the winter of 1916.89 Further corroboration of this is 
provided by the Navy Department’s records. An internal report, written shortly after the end 
of hostilities, details that during 1917 and 1918 stations under RAN operation were regularly 
picking up transmissions from stations in Europe and the United States. Of these, the most 
conspicuous was “the daily intercept from Nauen, High Power Wireless Station in Germany, 
[which] on many occasions reached over 2000 words – the distance bridged being over 12 000 
miles”.90        
 
AWA’s records note that at some point in the middle of the war, while Fisk was in Britain, 
Marconi discussed with him the possibility of establishing a direct wireless connection 
between Australia and Britain. According to this account the two men “agreed that at the 
earliest opportunity experiments would be conducted between England and Australia. Mr Fisk 
                                                          
89 Wireless in Australia booklet, 1925, p. 19. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910, Box 57, Australia. Parliament. 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into Proposed Agreement with AWA re Wireless Communication, 
1922- Correspondence, Documents, Report, Printed Material. 
90 ‘Report on Operations of RAN Radio Service’, unspecified date. NAA: MP472/1, 1/14/8441. 
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returned to Australia in 1917 and immediately established an experimental receiving station at 
his home” to work towards this goal.91 
 
Fisk’s establishment of a powerful wireless station at his home was in contravention of the 
censorship regime that had been operating since the war’s outbreak. His ability to circumvent 
the restrictions that applied to others is testament to the special position he and his company 
had assumed. At the end of January 1917, Fisk wrote to the Secretary of the Navy Department 
requesting permission to erect a station at his home for experimental purposes. Permission for 
him to do so was summarily communicated by the Secretary, having received ministerial 
approval. The only conditions attached to this permission were his use of a call sign and 
particular wavelengths allocated by the department.92 Besides this, there does not appear to 
have been any involvement by the government in his long-distance experiments. 
 
Throughout 1918 a number of experimental transmissions were sent from Marconi’s station in 
Wales and received by Fisk at his Sydney home.93 By the spring of that year these men were 
sufficiently confident in this direct connection to arrange an audacious public demonstration of 
direct wireless involving Hughes and Cook, both of whom were in Britain for the 1918 Imperial 
War Cabinet. On 22nd September, messages composed by the Prime Minister and Navy 
Minister, praising the contributions of Australians to the Allied cause, were transmitted 
directly from the Wales station and received by Fisk at his home.94 The following day this event 
received widespread coverage in the press. Contained within this newspaper coverage was an 
early suggestion of Fisk’s intentions for the future of Australian wireless, and the cause to 
which he would dedicate a good deal of effort in the coming years: the establishment of a 
direct wireless service between Australia and Britain. This suggestion took the form of selling 
                                                          
91 Untitled document covering AWA’s early history, unspecified date, p. 4. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; 
Box 24, Fisk, Sir E.T. – Addresses, Articles, Lectures and Reports, 1921-1942 (MSS); Articles by Sir E.T. 
Fisk, 1921-1932 (Printed).  
92 See the correspondence in NAA: MP472/1, 18/17/247, Manager, Amalgamated Wireless Ltd, Sydney 
requesting permission to erect an antenna for experimental purposes at his private residence in Sydney, 
1917. 
93 Untitled document covering AWA’s early history, unspecified date, p. 4. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; 
Box 24, Fisk, Sir E.T. – Addresses, Articles, Lectures and Reports, 1921-1942 (MSS); Articles by Sir E.T. 
Fisk, 1921-1932 (Printed). 
94 The full text of these messages is available in L.A. Hooke, ’Australian Radio Communication Services’, 
Proceedings of the World Radio Convention, 1938. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910; Box 25, Hooke, Sir 
L.G.A. – Articles by Sir L.G.A. Hooke, 1938-1974 (Printed). 
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the virtues of direct wireless in comparison to submarine cables: “Mr Fisk is of the opinion 
that, whereas the present full rate for cables is 3/ per word, there is no reason why direct 
wireless communication should not be established at 1/ per word at the most”.95 As the 
following chapter demonstrates further, Fisk’s positioning of direct wireless as a way to escape 
the downsides of communication through cables represented an endeavour to attach a policy 
proposal – establishing a direct wireless service – with a problem – the expense of cables as a 
means of international communication. 
 
The involvement of Prime Minister Hughes and Cook, a former Prime Minister now serving as 
Navy Minister, also demonstrated an important dimension of Fisk’s – and the Marconi 
Company’s – efforts to lay the foundation for policy change that would facilitate the 
construction of a direct wireless service by raising the visibility of the issue. For one, to 
successfully demonstrate the capabilities of the medium to senior elected officials was a tactic 
to bring the matter to the politicians’ attention and create some manner of personal 
connection between them and the scheme that Fisk sought to implement. Arranging that 
statements composed by Hughes and Cook would be the first messages openly sent in this 
manner was also likely to have been a calculation to appeal to their vainglory, as a means of 
cultivating future influence. In addition, the participation of two prominent figures increased 
the likelihood of the demonstration receiving attention from the press, further raising its 
visibility as an issue in the public sphere. In this demonstration one can identify the first stages 
of a campaign of ‘softening up’. That is, the introduction a new idea – in this case, that of a 
direct wireless link with Britain – as a precursor to having it placed on the formal agenda.  
 
Another noteworthy aspect of this demonstration is the degree to which Fisk was acting 
autonomously from the bureaucracy. This was another manifestation of a dynamic that had 
emerged by the final stages of the war. Despite the Navy’s formal responsibilities over the 
field, and the tight government control over the medium first established in August 1914, its 
involvement in the demonstration was limited to perfunctory approval in the form of 
allocating a call sign and wavelength. There is no evidence that the RAN sought to monitor 
Fisk’s activities, nor that departmental officials were aware of the nature of his activities. This 
demonstrates that the Commonwealth bureaucracy had little effective control over the 
                                                          
95 “Wireless – First Messages from England” in Sydney Morning Herald, 23rd September 1918.  
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activities of AWA’s Managing Director and that the company, by virtue of its contribution to 
the war effort and well-wishers in the political system, had attained a notable degree of 
immunity from the system of control governing other private wireless users.  
 
The demonstration of direct wireless communication between Australia and Britain, just weeks 
before the cessation of hostilities, meant that the stage was set for the struggle over 
international wireless that would be a primary concern of policymakers in this field in the post-
war years. As Part IV of the study demonstrates, the successful (and well-publicised) direct 
transmissions of September 1918 would be portrayed by AWA as proof of the viability of a 
direct long-distance connection between the two countries. However, there remained a great 
gulf between a single test transmission and the adoption of policy that would facilitate a fully-
functioning commercial service. Advocating for such policy would become Fisk’s main focus 
shortly after the Armistice.     
 
Australian Wireless, 1914-1918 
 
The Great War was a pivotal episode in the development of Australian wireless. A range of 
changes stemming from the need to orient the medium towards application in wartime would 
prove to have effects persisting beyond the Armistice, and would also become important 
factors feeding into policy formation in the early 1920s. For this reason the war years should 
not be viewed as simply a transitory period, after which development resumed upon the same 
terms as had been interrupted with the outbreak of conflict. The changes that took place 
between August 1914 and November 1918 were so great that a reversion to pre-war norms 
upon the resumption of peace was not possible. Therefore, the war is properly understood as 
a crucial event that altered the trajectory of development in the field of Australian wireless.96 
The constitutive decisions made in relation to the international wireless service under 
examination in Part IV of the study demonstrate indelible marks of wartime experience.  
 
                                                          
96 For discussion of this notion, albeit within a different context, see R. Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, pp. 
57-59. 
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One of the most important ways in which the war changed the course of development was 
through its effect of breaking down the organisational patterns that had been established prior 
to its outbreak, and the replacement of actors influencing wireless policy. Although its formal 
responsibility over the field continued until 1915, from the very first hours of the war the 
officials of the Postmaster-General’s Department became notably less influential as they 
responded to pressure from defence authorities, such as through the introduction of 
censorship. The reduced influence of the Postmaster-General’s Department was codified with 
the formal transfer of responsibility over wireless to the Navy Department in 1915 and the 
disbanding of the Wireless Telegraphy Branch. This transfer signified the end of Balsillie’s 
tenure as one of the most important figures in the field; a power he would never regain. By 
late 1918 formal control over wireless had been consolidated under the Navy Department and 
Cresswell, the fleet’s wireless officer, had effectively replaced Balsillie as the Commonwealth’s 
wireless maven at the head of the RANRS. 
 
However, the consolidation of formal RAN control belied important changes that had taken 
place within the sector during the war years. Ironically, in a period of augmented government 
powers over all sectors of society, Commonwealth bureaucrats were exercising little more 
direct control over wireless than they had prior to the war’s outbreak. Both of the 
government’s experts, Balsillie and Cresswell, harboured ambitions to direct the 
Commonwealth’s wartime powers to crush AWA’s position in the sector and bring the entirety 
of wireless under government monopoly control. While Balsillie’s effort to achieve this goal in 
late 1914 came close to formal execution, as the conflict ground on the likelihood of 
government action against the interests of AWA steadily decreased. The reason for this relates 
to Mayhew’s observation that “wartime governments may see fit to make use of industries 
rather than to confront them”.97 Though ire towards AWA persisted within the bureaucracy for 
the duration, the company had used the opportunities presented by the war’s disruption to 
demonstrate its usefulness. As a result of its support for the war effort, the company was able 
to accumulate enough political capital to avoid significant consequences for its officials’ breach 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and also to prevent any action against its business interests 
initiated by hostile elements within the bureaucracy.  
 
                                                          
97 D. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics”, p. 481. 
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This is not to suggest that AWA possessed complete freedom of action in its activities. Instead, 
what began to take place during the war years was a recasting of the respective roles of public 
and private within the sector. In comparison to the period prior to 1914, by war’s end the 
Commonwealth had widened its participation in the sphere of wireless substantially. 
Importantly, however, its direct involvement had scarcely increased from its pre-war position, 
with the exceptions of the military training facility established in 1917 and its ill-fated foray 
into manufacturing at the Randwick facility. The bulk of its expanded wartime involvement was 
indirect, through increased oversight and stewardship of private activity, principally that of 
AWA. Whereas in the pre-war period there had been a clean division between the major parts 
of the wireless industry dominated by public organisation – the coastal network – and private 
organisation – the maritime trade – no such clear divisions remained at the war’s end. Though 
AWA, by virtue of its contracts with major shipping lines, still controlled the maritime trade, its 
operations were subject to strict conditions placed upon it by Commonwealth officials under 
the censorship regime. Similarly, through such means as the introduction of a mandatory 
certification programme for wireless operators, the company’s training school was brought 
under a framework of government management. Both of these areas saw the extension of 
government monitoring in ways that had not existed prior to the war.  
 
Another crucial shift resulting from the war was the transition towards private organisation as 
the key driver of development in the sector. This was the case with the first experiments in 
direct wireless communication with Britain, in which the role of Commonwealth officials was 
simply one of light supervision. Whereas the expansions of direct public participation in the 
sector would not long survive the Armistice, the principle of government acting as a facilitator 
and regulator of private activity – with the latter taking the lead role in developing the industry 
– would come to underpin the constitution of the international service in the early 1920s. 
 
Another development driven by wartime conditions that would prove vital in the post-war 
years was AWA’s expansion and domestication. While the censorship regime greatly affected 
the maritime wireless trade, which had been the company’s principal business plank up to 
1914, wartime conditions opened new directions for its growth. Most important of these was 
its manufacturing operations, enabled by the collapse of foreign imports resulting from the 
shipping shortage and the diversion of Marconi equipment towards Britain’s war machine. 
With this opportunity, AWA increased both the quantity and sophistication of the equipment 
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produced domestically between 1914 and 1918. Another important effect of the Great War 
that would have lasting consequence was AWA’s severance with its German stockholders. The 
acquisition by Australian investors of the 13,000 shares previously held by Telefunken was 
important for future developments because it solidified the company’s connection with 
Australia after its birth as the amalgamation of foreign subsidiaries, and brought it under 
exclusively Anglo-Australian control. Though the Marconi Company still owned the single 
largest portion of AWA’s shares, the majority were held domestically. These developments, 
which combined to strengthen the company’s domestic connections, allowed the company’s 
management to credibly portray AWA as a national enterprise in the post-war years. As Part IV 
of the study demonstrates, this would prove to be an important factor in the enactment of 
policy favourable to the company’s commercial interests.      
 
If the changes that took place within the sphere of Australian wireless during the Great War 
made a reversion to the pre-war norms governing the sector impossible, they also created new 
possibilities for future development. This was not by conscious design. In many cases wartime 
changes in organisation and policy were introduced hastily and without consideration for their 
lasting impact; instead designed to address pressing problems. They were emergency 
measures and never meant to be permanent, but, through their influence upon the 
subsequent course of events, proved to have notable long-term effects. With the conclusion of 
the war, and no justification for the retention of heavy-handed restrictions on wireless usage 
in peacetime, the principal concern of those actors interested in the medium became what 
would supplant the emergency measures of wartime. The process through which these policy 
settings came to be replaced, and new policies enabling the further development of wireless 
communications enacted, is the primary focus of this study’s concluding chapters.    
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Part IV – Constitution 
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Chapter 5 – Options for International Wireless, 
1918-1921 
 
Part IV of the thesis turns its attention towards the process through which the agreement 
between AWA and the Commonwealth to construct a direct wireless link to Britain was 
adopted as policy. It uses the analytical framework of MSA, coupled with a smaller-scale focus 
than that presented in the preceding chapters. Whereas Part III provided a sweeping view of 
the industry’s origins and the changes wrought by the Great War – covering nearly two 
decades – this and the following chapter have a narrower focus upon the post-war debate on 
international wireless. Together, they cover a period of roughly four years between the 
Armistice of November 1918 and mid-1922, by which time the collaborative project had gained 
Parliamentary approval. 
 
This chapter focuses on developments between the Armistice and April 1921 – a vital 
preliminary stage of the policymaking process preceding the formal decision of 1922. The most 
significant development during this period was the designation of two rival schemes for 
Australia’s international wireless service, and the mobilisation of supporters around them 
within the political system.     
 
The Armistice, coming mere weeks after the first demonstration of direct wireless 
communication between Britain and Australia, heralded the beginning of a new period in the 
history of the medium. As documented in the previous chapter, the imposition of emergency 
controls during the Great War had swept aside the arrangements that had governed wireless 
prior to 1914. The return of peace meant that wartime controls were no longer required, 
bringing the need for new policy settings to guide wireless’ development in the post-war 
world. This presaged a political struggle. While, for some actors, the goal was a restoration of 
the policy settings that had characterised the sector up to 1914, for others the return of peace 
presented an opportunity to establish new patterns of development.  
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The primary concern of wireless policymakers in this period was to establish a connection 
between Australia and Britain. By the end of the war, there was a consensus amongst 
Australian policymakers on the desirability of this goal. However, unanimity on the goal did not 
denote unanimity on the means by which to achieve it. By 1921, two alternative plans for 
Australia to establish an international wireless service had emerged. One of these was, in 
effect, a rebirth of the pre-war Imperial scheme consisting of a series of relay stations 
connecting the Empire. This would see the form of Australian participation derived from the 
larger design of the scheme put forward by British policymakers. The alternative to this was an 
ambitious plan to create a direct wireless connection between the two countries, of the type 
that had been demonstrated with great fanfare by Fisk and Marconi in September 1918. 
 
The principal division that emerged during this period was whether government or private 
enterprise would drive development in the field. While private interests had pioneered the 
first direct messages between Britain and Australia, officials within the Australian and British 
governments sought to shut off the potential for private involvement in international wireless 
by advocating policies for a service under the monopoly control of government. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, however, the wartime controls over wireless instituted by the 
Commonwealth belied an increased reliance upon private organisation to meet its wireless 
needs during the conflict. The period under scrutiny in this chapter would see efforts on behalf 
of different Commonwealth officials to reassert the government’s primacy over the medium 
following the Armistice. At the same time, both the Marconi Company and AWA sought to 
secure a prominent role for private enterprise in any future international wireless scheme.     
 
The First Marconi Proposal 
 
The successful demonstration of direct wireless communication between Britain and Australia 
in September 1918 presaged a push from the Marconi Company to introduce a regular service, 
under its own control, between the countries immediately after the Armistice. A development 
in the problem stream, relating to considerable delays in cable communication, led to the 
opening of a policy window. However, an unfavourable political environment meant that the 
window closed without any policy changing. Nevertheless, this episode prompted the 
development, with political encouragement, of policy alternatives within the bureaucracy.   
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In December 1918, while in London prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Hughes received an 
overture from the Marconi Company consisting of two letters dispatched on the same day 
from Isaacs, its Managing Director. The correspondence centred on his company’s aspiration 
to construct a direct wireless link between Australia and Britain in the same manner as had 
been demonstrated two months earlier. One of Isaacs’ letters represented an attempt to 
promote his proposal as the ‘solution’ to a problem that had manifested, to increase the 
chances of that policy’s adoption – playing the role of a policy entrepreneur. The problem was 
substantial delays in the transmission of cable messages between Australia and Britain, which 
saw some messages take a fortnight to reach their recipients.1 Citing this “very considerable 
delay” in cable transmission, Isaacs suggested that his company “might be able temporarily to 
relieve the cables by receiving messages, both Government and ordinary, to be transmitted to 
Australia by wireless”.2 He also declared that the service could commence almost immediately, 
writing that “we should be prepared to start such a service within the next few days if 
approved by your Government, subject to the formal consent of the Postmaster-General 
here”.3 The motivation of the company was to gain a foothold in the provision of 
communication between the two countries by capitalising on the immediate problem with 
cables; demonstrating the capabilities of a regular direct wireless service in anticipation of 
making it permanent.  
 
The goal of a long-term, rather than a merely temporary, agreement was more explicit in the 
other of Isaacs’ letters to the Prime Minister. It detailed his vision of a lasting arrangement for 
the provision of a direct wireless service between Australia and Britain. He estimated that, 
with the cooperation of the authorities in each country, the Marconi Company could establish 
this in a little more than a year. Noting the message authored by Hughes that had been 
transmitted, to great publicity, by the company in the final weeks of the war, he claimed 
“there is now no reason why wireless stations should not be erected in this country and in 
Australia for the purpose of a direct continuous commercial and press service”.4 Consequently, 
he sought permission to erect a long-distance station in Australia “subject to our obtaining a 
                                                          
1 See, for example, “Delay in Cable Traffic” in The Argus, 5th December 1918; “Cable Messages Delayed” 
in The Argus, 11th December 1918. 
2 Shorter letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144, Establishment 
of Long distance Wireless service, 1919-1920. 
3 Shorter letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
4 Longer letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144.  
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license to erect a similar station in this country”.5 Should permission be forthcoming from the 
two governments, Isaacs declared that his company was willing to proceed without any 
financial cost to the Commonwealth: “my Company would defray the whole cost of the 
erection of these stations and would propose in times of peace, to conduct the service for 
their own account and if required hand the station over to the Australian Government during 
any period of war”.6 The prospective Australian-based station he suggested to “place under 
the control of Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Limited, of which Mr Fisk, who I think is 
known to you, is Managing Director”.7  
 
Isaacs’ entrepreneurship, tying a policy ‘solution’ to a problem that had caught the attention of 
policymakers – framing the problem of cable congestion as one that his company could 
address by commencing direct wireless services – opened a policy window. However, he was 
unsuccessful in attaining permission from the Commonwealth government because of unusual 
political circumstances. A fortnight after receiving Isaacs’ proposition, Hughes cabled its details 
to his Cabinet colleagues in Australia. He wrote that “Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company 
desire erect station in Australia subject to their obtaining licence to erect similar station here 
for transmission of Commercial and Government cables by long distance wireless. Company 
would defray whole of cost of erection such stations”, and concluded by noting that the 
Australian station would be placed under the control of AWA.8  
 
Having received this cable from Hughes, Acting Prime Minister Watt soon brought the subject 
before Cabinet. In early January 1919, Cabinet passed a resolution to “cable Prime Minister 
giving views of Navy and Postmaster-General’s Departments”.9 This represented a willingness 
on behalf of Cabinet members to defer to the opinion of departmental officials on the subject, 
thus subjecting the Marconi Company’s proposal to the scrutiny of the domestic policy 
community.  
                                                          
5 Longer letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
6 Longer letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
7 Longer letter to Hughes from Isaacs, 16th December 1918. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
8 Cable to Watt from Hughes, 31st December 1918. National Archives of Australia: Prime Minister’s 
Department; A3932, Correspondence files, SC (Secret and Confidential) series – second system, 10 Jan 
1909 – 31 Dec 1926; SC457 PART 1, Long Distance Wireless Scheme – First section of file, 1918-1920. 
9 ‘Cabinet Decision – 9th January 1919’. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1.  
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Both the Navy and Postmaster-General’s departments opposed the Marconi Company’s 
proposal, though for different reasons. The Navy Department claimed that wartime experience 
had demonstrated the advantages of governmental control of wireless, and that ceding it to 
civilian – let alone commercial – control would simply create confusion and inefficiency in any 
future conflict, which would require the reassertion of military control. Moreover, the Naval 
Board, with hyperbolic flourish, expressed concerns about the threat that permitting private 
enterprise to operate long-distance wireless would pose to national security: 
 
In the opinion of the Board a conclusive reason for declining to consider this proposal 
is that a H.P. [high-power] Station such as the Marconi Company propose to instal 
would have the power of ordering or directing any fleet or vessel of ours in the Pacific 
and Indian oceans and even in the Atlantic. Considering Australia’s island conditions, 
her position relative to the Centres of Strength of the Empire, her complete 
dependence on Sea control for security, and misuse of this powerful means of 
communication with sea forces however distant may endanger her existence.10 
 
The Postmaster-General’s Department, in contrast, framed its opposition in terms of the 
negative financial impact direct wireless would have upon the Pacific Cable, in which the 
Commonwealth government owned a stake; a view endorsed by the Postmaster-General, 
William Webster.11 As further justification for opposing the Marconi plan, Webster also 
highlighted a resolution passed by the Imperial War Conference in July 1918. This resolution 
had endorsed the principle of state-ownership of cable communications, with Webster adding 
that this principle “will, of course, apply equally to Wireless, although Wireless was not 
included in the resolution”.12 Shortly thereafter, the departmental views were cabled to 
Hughes to express Cabinet’s opposition to the Marconi Company’s offer.13  
 
                                                          
10 ‘Minute Paper: Proposed Erection of Super High Power W/T Station at Lake Eyre, South Australia’, 8th 
January 1919. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1. 
11 See letter to Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department from Secretary of the Postmaster-
General’s Department, 7th January 1919. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
12 Letter to Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department from Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, 13th January 1919. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
13 See cable to Hughes from Watt, 17th January 1919. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1. 
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Hughes’ reply echoed Isaacs’ framing of direct wireless as a temporary measure to alleviate 
the ongoing problems with the cable network. It referred to “very strong representations 
being made to me by Australian business men in London who would greatly benefit by using 
wireless system to relieve cable congestion, which has reached intolerable point”, and added 
that the measure “would be temporary expedient and so will not prejudice any permanent 
scheme”.14 Hughes’ cable also dismissed the objections offered by the bureaucracy, concluding 
with “I abstain from official criticism of Navy Department’s remarks re permanent scheme, but 
personally think it is beneath contempt”.15 However, this last sentence was deleted prior to 
the cable’s dissemination beyond the Prime Minister’s Department. This cable provides further 
evidence of the gap between Hughes’ and Watt’s inclinations to defer to departmental advice. 
Once received, Watt sought Webster’s opinion of its contents – another difference between 
his and Hughes’ approach to consultation with colleagues.  
 
The Postmaster-General remained sceptical of any arrangement offered by the Marconi 
Company. In response to Hughes’ claim about the Marconi proposal representing a temporary 
measure, he warned that “experience shows that temporary arrangements do have a 
prejudicial effect when the question of permanent arrangements comes up for 
consideration”.16  In his view, granting permission to the Marconi Company to undertake the 
service “as a temporary expedient would give them a very strong lever in any attempt to force 
the Government to allow them to work their system permanently”.17 Webster also attacked 
the rationale of the Marconi plan, describing the problem of cable congestion as overblown 
and nothing but a temporary annoyance owing to conditions created by the end of the war. 
Watt cabled these views of Webster’s to Hughes shortly afterwards. In addition, Watt 
challenged the Prime Minister’s dismissive attitude towards departmental advice, writing “do 
not understand your expression of contempt for Navy Department views”, and suggesting that 
the Prime Minister “cable me your full opinion as well as your criticisms of PMG’s ideas as 
above”.18 There is no evidence of any further reply on the subject from Hughes, but a division 
between him and the domestic Cabinet on the subject was clear. 
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With no political appetite in Australia to accept the Marconi Company’s offer, and Hughes 
unable to exert his will over his Cabinet because of his attendance at the Paris Peace 
Conference, the policy window closed without any decision made on international wireless. 
This marked the beginning of a new phase of activity in the policy stream, with domestic actors 
beginning to focus attention on the subject.    
 
With Hughes engaged in Europe, AWA and other interests aligned with the company began 
contacting senior politicians in Australia to advocate for the establishment of a direct wireless 
service with Britain. In late February 1919, Fisk, “acting upon the suggestion of the Managing 
Director of the Marconi Company”, forwarded Watt copies of the proposals that Isaacs had 
made to Hughes the previous December.19 Fisk’s covering letter framed the proposal for a 
direct wireless scheme in a different way to Isaacs’ original communication, however. Instead 
of depicting it as a way to alleviate cable congestion, he advertised the benefits it would bring 
in relation to the speed and cost of communication with Britain, and as an initial step towards 
establishing future wireless services with other parts of the world. Because of the benefits it 
offered, and “since the establishment of these stations would involve no expense on the part 
of your Government and since they will be subject to control in war times”, he urged that “the 
proposals merit careful consideration”.20 Having been forwarded copies of these letters by 
Watt, Webster re-expressed his reservations about the proposal, stating that “I cannot see any 
reason to alter previous advice”.21  
 
AWA also mobilised other private groups to assist its advocacy on the issue. One internal 
document from the Postmaster-General’s Department refers to recent “inquiries that have 
been made by the Press” on the subject of international wireless as “evidently…prompted by 
persons interested in the Company in Sydney”.22 Similarly, in April Webster received a letter 
from the Sydney Chamber of Commerce extolling the potential “commercial and social” 
benefits from direct wireless connection with Britain.23 This was followed by similar appeals 
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160 
 
from the Melbourne, Brisbane and various regional Queensland Chambers of Commerce, along 
with persistent follow-ups from the Sydney body.24 The campaign appears to have had little 
impact upon Webster, however, who wrote to a colleague “that the Marconi Company, 
through the Amalgamated Wireless Ltd. in Sydney, is really at the bottom of this ostensibly 
Chamber of Commerce movement”.25 As the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department noted, “the recommendation of the Postmaster General was that the offer of the 
Marconi Company be refused, and so far as I am aware he has not changed his views”.26 AWA’s 
efforts to generate political momentum for the scheme were making no headway; its attempts 
to ‘soften up’ politicians and the bureaucracy to the idea of a direct wireless scheme under its 
control were unsuccessful. 
 
Wary of AWA’s campaign, groups within the Commonwealth bureaucracy sought to develop 
an alternative policy that would pre-empt any private involvement in the field of international 
wireless. With the encouragement of the Acting Prime Minister, this marked the first time in 
which the domestic policy community had considered the subject since the pre-war years. The 
Naval Board was the first body to devise an alternative to the proposal of the Marconi 
Company, submitting a proposal to the Council of Defence “for the erection at a probable cost 
of from £150,000 to £180,000 of a super-high-power wireless station at Lake Eyre”, primarily 
for naval communication, and to supplement the existing cable services.27 In April 1919 the 
Council of Defence, though not endorsing the idea of constructing a station at Lake Eyre, 
“unanimously resolved that rights within the Commonwealth and its dependencies should not 
be given to private individuals or companies for long-distance wireless” and that the matter 
should be given consideration by the government.28 In May 1919, Cabinet endorsed the 
Defence Council’s resolution affirming the principle of government ownership, and 
recommending the furnishing of reports on the question, with a cable sent to Hughes 
informing him of the decision.29 This action was taken with full knowledge of the Prime 
                                                          
24 See ‘Marconi Company’s Proposal to Establish a Long-Distance Wireless Service Between Great Britain 
and Australia – Summary of Resolutions Transmitted to this Department’ and other documents in NAA: 
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28 ‘Planned Establishment of Super-High-Power Wireless Station at Lake Eyre’, 22nd December 1919. 
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Minister’s likely antipathy towards the idea, with Cabinet records describing “Mr Hughes’ 
intervention in the matter” as characterised by being “not very much impressed with the Navy 
Department objections” to the Marconi Company’s proposal.30 With the Prime Minister 
absent, the remainder of the Cabinet – in line with departmental preferences – sought to 
defend the principle of government primacy against the potential intrusion of private 
enterprise.   
 
Following Cabinet’s endorsement of government enterprise in the field of international 
wireless, Watt re-enlisted the services of John Graeme Balsillie. While Balsillie had exercised 
considerable influence over wireless policy in the pre-war years, his role had effectively ceased 
in 1915 with the transfer of responsibility over wireless to the Navy Department. In late May 
1919, Balsillie received a letter from the Acting Prime Minister asking for recommendations on 
future wireless policy. The letter referred to the request as following from a “conversation last 
week” between the two men.31 To aid Balsillie in this task, Watt instructed his department that 
“all available official information is to be submitted to him”.32 Although the letter to Balsillie 
was couched in hypothetical language, the clear implication was that he should design a 
scheme of overseas wireless communication that would exclude participation by AWA or any 
other private interest. The Acting Prime Minister asked Balsillie to report on the following 
questions, and anticipate the potential repercussions of such: 
 
In the event of the Government determining not to grant wireless telegraph station 
rights to any private company, what difficulties would the Government be faced with? 
If interchange with privately owned wireless telegraph stations in Britain, Europe or 
America would be difficult, what steps would be necessary to surmount the 
difficulties?33 
 
After acknowledging the terms of reference, Balsillie withdrew for several months to compile 
his report. 
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In the meantime, a July letter to Acting Navy Minister Poynton from the Chairman of the Naval 
Board expressed the Navy Department’s awareness of the division within the government on 
the question of international wireless, and a recognition of which side was inclined to support 
its preferences for government monopoly. The letter attached a press cutting describing a 
statement made by Hughes in Britain. Under the headline ‘Commonwealth May Adopt 
Marconi Wireless System’, the article claimed that “Mr Hughes…says he has not abandoned 
the idea of using the Marconi wireless system”.34 In response, the Naval Member 
recommended that “as this is in direct opposition to Government policy, it should be brought 
to the notice of the Acting Prime Minister. A statement of the Government’s determination on 
this point will prevent future misunderstanding”.35 This is further evidence of bureaucratic 
officials wanting to entrench the principle of government monopoly before Hughes’ return to 
the country. By describing the government’s policy as one embracing government enterprise, 
and seeking a public affirmation of this from Watt, the goal was to obstruct Hughes’ ability to 
alter the course of future policy.  
 
Despite the agitation and preparation for such, no definite action on the question of 
international wireless was ever undertaken in Hughes’ absence. The Prime Minister returned 
from Europe in late August 1919 to a rapturous public reception.36 Watt, for his part, resumed 
his position as Treasurer, although the relationship between the two had been irreparably 
strained during Hughes’ extended absence, and Watt would resign from the ministry the 
following year.37 While the domestic political environment appears to have been amenable to 
a decision to exclude private enterprise from participation in international wireless while 
Hughes was overseas, there was no ready-made alternative policy. The policy and political 
streams were, in this instance, inharmonious.    
 
In an illustration of the crucial importance of timing to the policymaking process, Hughes’ 
return to Australia came just days before Balsillie submitted his report on wireless policy 
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commissioned by Watt. This meant that when Balsillie delivered his report, it was to someone 
predisposed to reject its recommendations. The report’s main recommendation was to return 
wireless to the pre-war status quo of direct Commonwealth control, suggesting “that no 
permit for the erection maintenance or operation by individuals or corporations of 
radiotelegraph stations…within or from the territory of the Commonwealth of Australia should 
be granted”.38 Instead of engaging with private enterprise, Balsillie advocated extending the 
model of government monopoly that had underpinned the Commonwealth’s coastal network 
of stations since its inception, and which he had been heavily involved in constructing. Balsillie 
also recommended that “a radiotelegraph station of 10,000 miles range be established within 
the Commonwealth…when arrangements have been completed with or through the 
governments” of other countries with which the Australian station would communicate.39 If 
constructed, this station would be capable of direct communication with Britain, and, he 
claimed, would be capable of generating large amounts of revenue for the Commonwealth. 
Furthermore, he claimed that it would be possible to construct this station without infringing 
any patents, thereby avoiding any controversy such as that which had marked the pre-war 
development of Australian wireless. Balsillie cautioned that Australia would probably be 
bucking the international trend if it instituted such a policy. He portrayed the most likely 
scenario as one in which Australia was the only country adopting such a model, with other 
countries having their policy in this area effectively dictated to them by voracious private 
interests. The irony of this assessment is that within two years Australia would be the lone 
advocate for a leading role for private enterprise, and against government monopoly, in the 
debate over the Imperial scheme.  
 
Balsillie’s report marked a significant development in the policy stream, being the first detailed 
proposal for a scheme of international wireless prepared in Australia in the post-war years, 
and because it advocated a station capable of direct communication with Britain owned and 
operated by the Commonwealth. However, in isolation, without any pressing problem or 
political support, there was no prospect of its adoption. While a couple of internal documents 
from the Prime Minister’s Department in December 1919 contained gentle reminders that “Mr 
Balsillie’s report still awaits the consideration of the Government”, none was forthcoming.40  
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Hughes’ return to day-to-day leadership in Australia marked a substantial shift in the political 
stream. The Prime Minister, clearly impressed by the “very strong representations” made to 
him by Australian businessmen while he was abroad, was more willing than any of his Cabinet 
colleagues to entertain the Marconi Company’s offer to construct a direct wireless link 
between Australia and Britain, and less inclined to defer to departmental advice.41 In 
November 1919, a major international development arose that would delay any further 
consideration of the subject. The British government established the Imperial Wireless 
Telegraphy Committee, headed by Sir Henry Norman, to re-examine the question of a wireless 
project to link the British Empire.42 As a result, any decision in Australia was postponed until 
after the Norman Committee had delivered its report.  
 
The Marconi Company’s effort to gain permission to establish a direct commercial wireless 
service between Australia and Britain, and the Australian response to this offer, conforms with 
MSA’s model of policymaking and the importance it assigns to synchronicity. The Marconi 
Company, in partnership with AWA, had proven its capability to achieve direct messaging in 
September 1918, and desired to establish a regular service for the companies’ commercial 
benefit. Then, in a case of ‘solutions chasing problems’, Isaacs had leveraged his skill as a policy 
entrepreneur to attach his preferred ‘solution’ to the problem of the demonstrated inability of 
the existing cable network to handle the volume of traffic placed upon it in the immediate 
post-war period, and gain the support of the Prime Minister. However, the unusual 
circumstances in the political stream – with Hughes several weeks’ voyage from Australia and 
unable to exert his customary authority over the Acting Prime Minister and Cabinet – meant 
that this policy window closed without any decision made. Of considerable importance here 
was the fact that Hughes was the only figure within the executive that was willing to consider 
the Marconi proposal – his Cabinet in Australia, led by the Acting Prime Minister and 
supported by the advice of the Commonwealth bureaucracy, rejected the proposal 
unanimously. Though Hughes was the dominant figure in Australian politics at the time, his 
absence from Australia prevented him from exerting his will to secure the enactment of the 
proposal. 
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The subject’s appearance on the agenda had important flow-on effects in Australia. Following 
Isaacs’ lead, Fisk began to advocate for direct wireless, though the campaign made little 
headway against political and bureaucratic opposition to the idea. The flurry of attention given 
to the matter, and the fact that the only ready-made policy proposal was a product of the 
Marconi Company – designed to expand the commercial prospects of that company and its 
affiliates – prompted the domestic policy community to begin examining the matter with an 
eye towards blocking private penetration of the field. The most notable result of this was Watt 
commissioning Balsillie to prepare an alternative policy for international wireless based on the 
principle of government enterprise in order to preclude private participation. However, the 
problem for those actors in Australia who opposed the idea of private participation – the 
Acting Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the bureaucracy – was that although the political 
circumstances, in Hughes’ absence, were amenable to a decision along those lines, there was 
no ready-made alternative policy to implement.  
 
Timing, in this case, was crucial. By the time that Balsillie’s report was ready, Hughes had 
returned to Australia, meaning that the political stream was no longer favourable to its 
adoption as policy. Following Hughes’ return, the agenda shifted towards other subjects such 
as the peace settlement. The British government’s decision in November 1919 to establish the 
Norman Committee then ensured that no decision would be made on the subject in Australia 
until after its findings were announced. 
 
Although a consensus had emerged on the desirability of establishing a wireless link with 
Britain, political divisions regarding the terms under which such a service should be constituted 
had emerged. At the centre of this dispute was the role of private enterprise. Watt, the 
remainder of the domestic Cabinet, and the bureaucracy were in unanimous opposition to the 
idea of opening the field to commercial enterprise. Though there was no agreement on the 
other details, this bloc sought to affirm the primacy of the government in any future scheme. 
On the other side, AWA – in coordination with its British parent company – represented the 
principal advocates for discarding the principle of government enterprise. In this goal, they had 
identified Prime Minister Hughes as a crucial ally.  
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Interregnum 
 
Two developments between August and November 1919 – the shift in the political stream 
marked by Hughes’ return to Australia, and a major event in the policy stream in the 
appointment of the Norman Committee – meant that the subject of international wireless 
dropped off the decision-making agenda until the winter of 1920. Nevertheless, these 
intervening months saw a number of changes that would prove to be of crucial importance 
when the subject next rose to prominence. Further changes in the policy stream saw 
responsibility over wireless transferred back to the Postmaster-General’s Department from the 
RAN, and AWA intensify its direct appeals to senior politicians, particularly Hughes. This period 
also saw the growing relevance of the structural developments outlined in Chapter Two. Not 
only did the company identify the Prime Minister’s support as crucial to its chances of 
achieving its policy aims, its executives also began to frame those aims in terms compatible 
with the ‘national mood’ of increasing economic nationalism.     
 
With the return of peace there was no longer a clear case for the RAN to maintain the 
responsibility for wireless it had exercised since 1915. Nevertheless, there was no immediate 
consensus regarding which organisation should administer the medium in the post-war years. 
As a result, the policy community within the Commonwealth government experienced a period 
of disruption and uncertainty.  
 
Cresswell, for his part, aspired to make naval control of wireless permanent. He justified this 
ambition on two grounds. The first was with reference to a cable from the British Admiralty, 
which “indicates Admiralty approval of the policy of absolute Naval Board control of the W/T 
organisation of the Commonwealth” and suggested that the Admiralty sought the same 
degree of control over wireless in Britain.43 The second was with a view to a future conflict, 
which would again necessitate military control of the medium. Because of this, he claimed that 
Australian wireless should be “organised in peace in order that there should be practically no 
change from a peace to a war organisation”.44 This, he claimed, necessitated the continuance 
of naval administration. Men of the RAN could be trained to undertake the commercial aspects 
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of wireless usage in times of peace, but he considered it impossible for civilian operators to 
undertake military operations in the event of war. These reasons, Cresswell argued, were 
“sufficient to justify the necessity for the retention of the W/T Organisation of the Shore 
Stations under Naval Board control in times of peace as also in war”.45 
 
However, two developments militated against the Navy Department’s retention of control 
over the medium. The first was a report on the subject of the future naval defence of Australia 
authored by Admiral Jellicoe, the commander of the British fleet at the Battle of Jutland.46 
Jellicoe’s report, focused on the need to prepare for a future confrontation with Japan, was a 
major event for the RAN and would prove to be a strong influence on Australian naval policy in 
the post-war years.47 In relation to the state of Australian wireless, the report declared that 
“the present position of affairs cannot be considered satisfactory”.48 In particular, Australia 
required a high-power station capable of transmission as far afield as Japan and Ceylon, for the 
purpose of communicating with naval forces and, eventually, “to work in co-operation with the 
Imperial wireless chain”.49 At the same time, Jellicoe recommended a downscaling of the 
RAN’s involvement in the field, and for the medium to be transferred to another government 
department to be expanded and run along commercial lines.50 As a result, any attempt from 
within the naval bureaucracy to retain administrative control of wireless would be in conflict 
with the preferences of the Royal Navy’s hierarchy.  
 
The second was a campaign led by AWA against the RAN’s continued control of wireless. 
Commencing shortly before Hughes’ return from Europe, this campaign had both covert and 
overt components. In July 1919, Fisk wrote to Acting Prime Minister Watt on the subject of the 
future regulation of Australian wireless. In it, he expressed frustration about the Navy 
Department’s continued control of the sector, portraying it as a retardant on the medium’s 
future development: 
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We have decided to write fully now, because we have reason to believe that the 
Wireless Department of the Royal Australian Navy is putting forward an effort to 
restrict the use of wireless apparatus by private citizens, and virtually to render it 
impossible for anyone to make or sell wireless apparatus other than the Navy…we 
submit with all deference that the most important function of any department 
administering the Wireless Telegraphy Act is to direct the operation of that act for the 
benefit of all who wish to use wireless apparatus, to give the broadest possible 
encouragement for development.51  
 
Fisk also sent an identical letter to Hughes and Navy Minister Cook, following their return to 
Australia in September. 
 
After reading a copy of the letter sent to Cook, Cresswell composed a lengthy response. He 
criticised AWA for seeking to expand its business beyond shipping, despite the company 
“knowing that the policy of the Government was to make Wireless Telegraphy a 
Commonwealth Government Monopoly”.52 He cautioned that AWA was merely a proxy for the 
Marconi Company, “one of the largest (if not the largest) monopolies in the world”, and should 
therefore be prevented from increasing its foothold in Australia as a matter of “public 
interest”.53 For this reason, he urged the government to make an explicit statement affirming 
what had hitherto been the government’s policy of “making Wireless Telephony and 
Telegraphy a Government Monopoly”.54 Cresswell’s report was forwarded to the Naval Board 
for the information of Cook. Cresswell also recommended to the Naval Board that an 
additional copy be sent to the Prime Minister.55 There is no evidence that the report was 
provided to either minister, however. Nor did the Naval Board take any action urging the 
government to assert its prerogative over the sector. In light of the fact that the Naval Board’s 
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members had urged the same action two months earlier, this represented a recognition of the 
changed political circumstances since the Prime Minister’s return and the publication of the 
Jellicoe report. 
 
AWA’s criticisms of the Navy in correspondence to senior ministers were accompanied by a 
public campaign of disparagement. In late August 1919, in an address to a half-yearly meeting, 
company executive Sir Thomas Hughes spoke against “the ideas of a few people who argue 
that [wireless] stations should be worked by the Navy in preparedness for war”.56 A number of 
newspapers subsequently published the details of Thomas Hughes’ speech.57 The First Naval 
Member later complained about the campaign to Cook:  
 
There appears to be a press agitation in full swing on the subject of the Control of 
Wireless, in fact hardly a day passes in which there is not an article in some paper 
pressing for a decision and upbraiding the Navy Board for their supineness in the 
matter. I understand that the campaign is inspired by certain people interested in 
commercial concerns.58  
 
There was a strong hostility within AWA towards the RAN. In addition to the press campaign, a 
number of anecdotes related by AWA staff reveal sentiments that were prevalent within the 
company at the time. For instance, a 1925 article in Wireless Weekly written by an AWA 
operator contained passages that reminisced about Navy control of wireless with contempt, 
writing that the medium had been:  
 
Administered by a Department rejoicing in the vain glorious title of the Royal 
Australian Naval Radio Service, under the control of Commander Cresswell, who upon 
the establishment of this Department, had succeeded in elevating himself above the 
privileges covered by the somewhat meaningless designation of Fleet Wireless Officer, 
carrying the rank of Engineer Lieutenant. Rumour had it that the R.A.N.R.S…was 
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regarded as somewhat of a joke by the rest of the Naval Service, and whether or not 
this was so, it is certain that by the sea going operators, it was considered the most 
Gilbertian affair ever staged in the history of Australia.59  
 
Other AWA staff expressed similar sentiments, with Cresswell a preferred target of derision. 
One, who had served in the RANRS prior to transferring to AWA, later claimed in an interview 
that “Cresswell wasn’t popular, so nobody had much sympathy for him…‘He wasn’t a man’s 
man, only an imitation naval officer, as you might say. He had never been to sea and was 
merely an instrument fitter in the Post Office’”.60   
 
Given claims that “after the war, the Navy and the Post Office jostled for control” of wireless, 
but it would be more accurate to say that senior officials in the two departments jostled to 
avoid responsibility for the medium.61 Despite Cresswell’s best efforts to maintain his control 
over wireless, senior officials of the Navy Department coordinated to transfer responsibility for 
the medium elsewhere.62 The decisive factor in this was not AWA’s campaign, but deference to 
the Admiralty and the recommendations of Jellicoe’s report. In the autumn of 1920 the Naval 
Board wrote to Cook, citing Jellicoe’s report and urging that “in view of the probable future 
expansion for all commercial purposes and the growing demands for wireless…the commercial 
side of wireless should be turned over at once…to the Postmaster-General or other 
Department of the Government which is more clearly concerned with the commercial affairs 
of the Nation”.63  
 
There were mixed opinions on the subject within the Postmaster-General’s Department. Its 
Chief Electrical Engineer, Frederick Golding, also proposed to remove the bulk of responsibility 
from the Navy and return it to his department. In effect, he advocated a return to the pre-war 
status quo, proposing that “Wireless Telegraphy for commercial purposes in Australia should 
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be under the sole control of the Postmaster-General in a similar manner to the present land 
telegraph service and telephone service”.64 However, the measures advocated by Golding 
contrasted with a proposal from the head of his department written in the same week, which 
recommended that the Navy retain its responsibility for wireless. This proposal stated that 
with “defence being the paramount consideration, it seems to me that the general control of 
wireless should be exercised by the Navy”, while the Postmaster-General’s Department’s 
involvement with wireless should only be “so far as it relates…to its use as an adjunct to or 
substitute for land line telegraphy and telephony”.65 Echoing many of the points previously 
raised by Cresswell, it provided a host of justifications for continued naval control. These were 
the complications that would result from a reorganisation, the necessity of the Navy retaking 
control in the event of another conflict, and the fact that many wireless stations in the hands 
of the Commonwealth “while useful for naval purposes…and useful for ship to shore work, 
would not be justified as purely commercial stations”.66 Attached as proof of the final point 
were statistics demonstrating the annual losses to the Postmaster-General’s Department, in 
the tens of thousands of pounds, incurred from operating its coastal wireless service prior to 
its transfer to the RAN.  
 
The expense associated with operating the Commonwealth’s wireless stations explains the 
unwillingness of senior officials in both the Navy and Postmaster-General’s departments to 
have the medium under their responsibility during a period of post-war budget cuts.67 
However, in June 1920 Cabinet resolved to transfer responsibility over wireless back to the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, nominally from the beginning of the following month.68 
Although records do not reveal the motivation for this decision, it is likely that the main reason 
was that offered by both AWA and RAN officials: to facilitate the further commercial 
development of wireless. This was suggested by a report on the impending transfer in The Age. 
The journalist hoped the transfer would spur the further commercial development of the 
medium, something which had effectively ceased under RAN administration although “it has 
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the excuse, of course, that the war practically put a stop to the use of wireless for commercial 
purposes”.69  
 
This episode illustrates the degree to which contextual factors came to influence policymaking 
in this area. The available records illustrate that the transfer of responsibility over the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act from the RAN to the Postmaster-General’s Department was motivated by a 
combination of international factors – the recommendations of the Admiralty and “following 
the lead of the Mother Country” – and the post-war fiscal environment.70 Yet, because this 
decision marked a major change in the policy community, it would prove to have weighty 
implications for policymaking in the near future. The Postmaster-General’s Department, which 
had had its responsibility for wireless stripped away five years prior, with Balsillie no longer in 
its ranks and the Wireless Telegraphy Branch no longer extant, did not have an experienced 
cadre of officials interested in the medium. This would prove to be a retardant on the 
development of policy proposals for the field that maintained the primacy of government 
enterprise. As a result, AWA was able to spearhead developments in the domestic policy 
stream. 
 
Although the Postmaster-General’s Department was no more accommodating to private 
wireless concerns than the RAN had been, it was immediately forced into a defensive posture. 
Now that the department had had the responsibility for wireless foisted back upon it, its 
officials turned their attention towards preventing any further penetration of private interests 
into the sector. These efforts, revealed in inter-departmental correspondence from September 
1920, rested on the invocation of Australia’s tradition of government enterprise in 
communications:  
 
The policy of Australia, both as separate states and as a Commonwealth, has been for 
telegraphic and telephonic services to be in the hands of the Government, and 
Parliament has provided that these services, both line and wireless, shall be so worked 
and controlled throughout the Commonwealth. [It would be] reversal of policy, and of 
legislation…to allow private enterprise to enter into competition with Government 
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telegraphic and telephonic lines. The tendency is to nationalise all such means of 
communication where this has not already been done.71    
  
AWA’s executives, in the meantime, were working to achieve the overthrow of this tradition – 
their success in doing so was, in large part, a result of aligning the company’s goals with two 
major structural developments of the post-war years: Hughes’ power as Prime Minister and 
the rise of economic nationalism. The centrality of these factors to AWA’s efforts to open the 
field of wireless to private enterprise became apparent over the course of a year between mid-
1919 and mid-1920.  
 
AWA’s use of economic nationalism to frame its desire to open Australian wireless to 
commercial exploitation first manifested in July 1919. Citing the company’s accomplishments 
to date, including the creation of advanced manufacturing facilities, the development of 
maritime wireless services, and the training of hundreds of operators, Fisk declared in a letter 
to Watt “that we have successfully established an industry which is beneficial to the country in 
many directions, and which will be increasingly beneficial if it enjoys a reasonable opportunity 
for expansion”.72 Noting the wide range of interests – including newspapers, farmers, 
railroads, and aircraft – that stood to gain from its adoption, he linked the private 
development of wireless with numerous dimensions of national development: “[it] will assist 
commerce, improve social conditions, relieve isolation, and render the inland districts more 
attractive and productive”.73 Furthermore, with specific regard to international 
communication, Fisk emphasised the desirability of private control: 
 
We have quite recently conducted, in conjunction with the Marconi Company, some 
very important experiments which indicate the possibility of wide development and 
considerable value to Australia, but those developments can only be realised if the use 
of Wireless Apparatus by private individuals for business and social purposes will be 
permitted.74  
                                                          
71 Letter to Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department from the Acting Secretary of the Postmaster-
General’s Department, 23rd September 1920. NAA: MP341/1, 1920/9144. 
72 Letter to Watt from Fisk, 1st July 1919. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1. 
73 Letter to Watt from Fisk, 1st July 1919. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1. 
74 Letter to Watt from Fisk, 1st July 1919. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 1. 
174 
 
Fisk’s letter portrayed the opening of wireless to private enterprise as the best means to 
leverage the medium as a means of promoting national development. In contrast, he claimed, 
the retention of government control would stymie the sector’s development: 
 
If persisted in will greatly restrict the development of this valuable art in Australia, that 
individual enterprise and initiative will be destroyed and that a great and unnecessary 
hardship will be enforced on those who have done so much to bring this art to its 
present stage and to build up a useful industry in Australia.75  
 
Though these themes were not persuasive to Watt – a handwritten comment in the margins of 
the letter makes a snide referral to AWA’s “pecuniary interest in the matter” – they resonated 
with Hughes.76 Following the Prime Minister’s return to Australia, the company focused most 
of its advocacy on him. This advocacy was also of a different character to that which had 
previously characterised its engagements with Commonwealth departments. Supplication 
replaced confrontation. Through its concentration on Hughes, and the fawning tone it 
sometimes adopted, AWA recognised his primacy in the political system, and his potential 
usefulness to the company’s agenda.  
 
Following Hughes’ return from Europe in August 1919, he received numerous letters from 
AWA outlining the company’s aspirations and policy recommendations. Furthermore, Given 
describes that Fisk “had the ear of” Hughes and took part in a short meeting with him during 
the 1919 election campaign, in which “the Prime Minister said there was a lot of opposition 
from the cable interests [to Marconi’s direct wireless proposal] and he needed a better offer 
on wireless”.77 This demonstrates that the company’s officials engaged in discreet lobbying 
efforts in addition to those efforts that are traceable through the Commonwealth 
government’s records.  
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A letter sent by Thomas Hughes to the Prime Minister in February 1920 framed AWA’s quest 
for access to the field as another area in which Hughes’ direct intervention was required. As a 
prelude to outlining the company’s preferences, it began with a deferential tone: “appreciating 
the practical interest you have shown in the development of the resources and industries of 
Australia, we desire to seek your interest and assistance in connection with the Wireless 
industry”.78 The form of ‘assistance’ that Thomas Hughes requested from the Prime Minister 
was “a slight amendment of the Wireless Telegraphy Act” to “permit private individuals or 
companies to own and use wireless apparatus for commercial or social purposes” – an opening 
of Australian wireless to private development.79 The consequences that would flow from this 
change of policy, he claimed, would benefit Australia as a whole: an increase in the number of 
people employed by the company, the expansion of domestic manufacturing, and a blow 
against Australia’s isolation. Thomas Hughes also invoked his company’s support for the war 
effort, and its aspirations to build a strong national industry that would again be “available to 
serve the country in war time”.80 While AWA retained its connections with the Marconi 
Company, through which it gained “the right to draw upon all their latest scientific knowledge 
and manufacturing experience”, he nevertheless depicted his firm as one of national 
importance whose interests were synonymous with Australia’s.81 The letter concluded with a 
gentle reminder of the company’s earlier offers to construct a station capable of direct 
communication with Britain, in terms unaltered from those offered over a year earlier. This 
letter confirms a shift in the company’s approach during this period: to cast itself as a national 
enterprise, and to link its own development with the broader concept of national 
development. The response to Thomas Hughes’ letter from the Prime Minister’s Department 
was brief and opaque, stating that “the whole question of wireless communication is at 
present receiving the attention of the Government, and consideration will be given, in this 
connection, to the representations made by you”.82  
 
An exchange between Hughes’ office and Fisk, taking place over March and April 1920, 
provides an indication of the efforts that AWA’s Managing Director was making to maintain a 
good relationship with the Prime Minister – a recognition of Hughes’ vital importance to the 
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company’s policy goals. The exchange also illustrates the power relationship between the two 
men at the time. It began with a letter to the editor of The Argus from Fisk. This letter, 
detailing the recent opening of a direct trans-Atlantic wireless service, described his company’s 
desire to construct a similar service linking Australia with Britain. It lamented that “we offered 
to do this in December 1918, and the service would have been in full operation by now, but 
the scheme has been delayed all this time, while we have to sit on the doorstep of the Federal 
Government awaiting the necessary permission”.83 This comment must have drawn Hughes’ 
ire, as two days later the Prime Minister received an obsequious handwritten note from Fisk. 
The note claimed that “Sir Thomas Hughes has told me that you have made complaints about a 
letter published recently in the Argus over my signature”, that “absolutely no personal 
reference to you and no reflection on your government was intended”, and concluded that “if, 
through lack of care on my part, any portion of my letter was so construed I hasten to offer my 
personal apology and regrets”.84 The Prime Minister’s response, written by his departmental 
secretary, was to thank Fisk for his note and demand “that, in order to put the matter right, 
you should write a further letter for publication in the ‘Argus’ stating that [the Prime Minister] 
has taken the keenest interest in the question and that you feel every confidence the 
Government will recognise its great importance and go on with it”.85 
 
Fisk was quick to respond to this request, asking the department’s secretary “to assure the 
Prime Minister that I shall be only too happy to do so”.86 Furthermore, in order to avoid 
upsetting Hughes further, he forwarded a draft of his follow-up letter to The Argus to the 
Prime Minister’s office before sending it to the newspaper for publication. This letter, framed 
as a response to “some of your readers appear[ing] to have misunderstood my remarks”, 
stressed that the Prime Minister had not wilfully delayed acting on the question of wireless, 
and that the Prime Minister recognised the importance of wireless to Australia’s future 
development: 
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In fact, Mr. Hughes has shown the keenest personal interest in the question from its 
inception, realising, as he does, that wireless communication is destined to provide 
very great benefits for Australia both externally and internally. Although Mr. Hughes is 
a very busy man, I have every confidence that the present Government will recognise 
the great importance of wireless communication and will do everything within its 
power and authority to assist the development of this industry in Australia.87  
 
Following its reception by the Prime Minister’s office, Fisk’s letter was personally approved by 
Hughes and subsequently sent to The Argus for publication. The AWA chief executive’s 
behaviour in this episode – not mentioned in Given’s study – demonstrates Fisk’s recognition 
that the Prime Minister’s openness to his company’s goal of establishing a direct wireless 
service was not a widely-held sentiment in the government, and that it would be foolish to 
alienate Hughes with overheated rhetoric.  
 
Another episode with relevance to the relationship between Hughes and AWA took place 
towards in November 1920. At a public ceremony in Sydney, the Prime Minister was 
recognised for his contribution to “services to the country during the war and at the Peace 
Conference” to “a storm of applause”.88 As part of the ceremony, Hughes was presented with 
a cheque for £25,000. As Horne describes, this came “at a particularly convenient time”, as 
Hughes was nearly bankrupt.89 According to Fitzhardinge,   
 
£12,000 was subscribed in England and the balance in Australia. The fund had been 
organized quietly for some time, but was made public only in the last three weeks. 
Subscriptions, large and small, came from many quarters, but the list was not 
published nor were the names revealed to Hughes, to avoid any suggestion of 
corruption.90  
 
                                                          
87 Draft letter to the Editor of The Argus from Fisk, 1st April 1920. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 2. 
88 “People’s Tribute – To Prime Minister – His Services to Empire” in Sydney Morning Herald, 25th 
November 1920. 
89 D. Horne, Billy Hughes, p. 168. 
90 L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, p. 456. 
178 
 
Horne similarly declares that the list of donors was never revealed, although both he and 
Fitzhardinge conclude that most of the sum came from business interests. Given documents 
that AWA was one of these interests, contributing £250 along with the same amount from the 
Marconi Company.91 Furthermore, contemporary newspaper coverage notes that Thomas 
Hughes was one of the major participants, including a speaking role, in the ceremony.92 
 
Regardless of whether Hughes was aware of AWA’s contribution to his gift – it is impossible to 
demonstrate that he did – he was involved with the company in other ways beyond receiving 
their lobbying efforts. Most noteworthy was his collaboration with Fisk to provide a public 
demonstration of wireless telephony in October 1920. Organised at the request of Hughes 
himself, it featured the transmission of music to the assembled members of both houses of 
Parliament in Melbourne.93 This reveals that the Prime Minister was willing to provide the 
company with a platform in full recognition of the publicity and legitimacy that would result 
from it.  
 
Though this period did not see wireless appear on the formal agenda, developments that took 
place during it would prove decisive when the subject of international wireless rose to 
prominence again in 1921. These were concentrated in the policy stream. The transfer of 
responsibility over wireless from the Navy Department to the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, now without a wireless expert in its employ, was a considerable disruption to the 
development of policy proposals within the Commonwealth government – there is little 
evidence of the subject receiving attention from bureaucratic officials during this crucial time. 
In contrast, AWA was active in the policy stream. Both Fisk and Thomas Hughes were busy 
playing the role of policy entrepreneurs during this period. They had been nurturing support 
for their company’s goals, and their campaign of ‘softening up’ had identified the Prime 
Minister as supportive. Though it had not been without tension, AWA’s efforts to cultivate 
Hughes as an ally would yield results in the near future. Fisk and Thomas Hughes had also 
refined the terms in which they were advocating for permission for their company to access 
the field – portraying AWA as a national asset in response to the prevailing ‘national mood’ of 
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economic nationalism. Their capitalisation upon these structural factors would be instrumental 
to AWA securing permission to participate in Australia’s international wireless service.  
 
The Emergence of Rival Schemes 
 
Within the space of days in mid-1920, the Commonwealth government received two new 
proposals for international wireless schemes. The first of these was the report, presented at 
the end of May, of the Norman Committee. The second, in early June, was the initiative of Fisk 
and AWA. These represented major developments in the policy stream. The rival proposals 
presented a stark contrast in policy choices for those who would decide the terms under which 
Australia’s international wireless service was to be constituted.  
 
The Norman Committee’s report proposed a new Imperial scheme of wireless with two salient 
features: government enterprise and a chain of relay stations. It signalled a resurrection of the 
basic design of the pre-war scheme, construction of which had been abandoned in early 1915. 
The Norman scheme would see construction of a series of relay stations based 2000 miles 
apart, owned and operated by governments, to connect the territories of the Empire. This 
would be comprised of two axes extending from the British Isles, with one running south to a 
terminus in South Africa, and the other east with its last station in Australia. The design of the 
Norman scheme was justified in terms of a single scheme that could meet both strategic and 
commercial needs.94 It was to be funded by governments, with the British government 
covering the bulk of its costs, supplemented by contributions from the Dominions. The report 
estimated that Australia would pay £60,000 annually towards its upkeep, while receiving 
£40,000 in annual revenue.95 Overall, the committee concluded that its scheme was likely to 
lose £100,000 each year at the beginning but would eventually become a profitable venture. 
Despite the prospect of an immediate financial loss, the report concluded that there were non-
financial benefits that would result from its scheme: “we have had evidence that the overseas 
communities are eager and impatient for those Imperial links to be forged. It would be a false 
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economy at this moment, in our opinion, to think more of a few thousand pounds than of 
many nations”.96   
 
Unlike the Imperial scheme of the pre-war years, that proposed by the Norman Committee did 
not contain any scope for the Marconi Company’s participation. The company had submitted 
its own proposal for the committee’s consideration in February 1920. Its proposal was grand in 
scale, consisting of hundreds of stations of varying ranges throughout the entire British 
Empire. If approved, the company proposed “entirely at its own cost to construct, maintain, 
and operate” these stations, and to “pay yearly into the Treasury of each Government, in 
whose territory one or more stations may be situated, a sum equal to 25% of the net profits 
earned by the said station or stations”.97 However, the Norman Committee rejected the 
Marconi proposal for being too ambitious. Furthermore, the committee deemed that the high 
projected cost of the Marconi scheme was likely to prompt the company to charge high prices 
for the service, which would be possible because the scheme would effectively grant the 
company a monopoly in the area.98 Another reason for this rejection, unstated in the 
committee’s report but no less important, was the poor relationship between Norman and 
Isaacs, and the unwillingness of the latter to give evidence before the committee.99 Thus, the 
Norman scheme eschewed any arrangements with the Marconi Company whatsoever – it 
would instead utilise equipment of the kind already in use by the British government, thereby 
avoiding the need for royalty payments to the company. 
 
Isaacs’ submission to the Norman Committee did not only fail to win the support of that body, 
but also alienated Fisk by changing the thrust of their efforts to penetrate the sector. Unlike 
the proposals that had been made in late 1918 and early 1919, it abandoned the idea of 
creating direct wireless connections and instead reverted to a relay system featuring several 
“trunk routes”, one of which would link Australia to Britain via connecting stations in Singapore 
and India.100 This move by the British company is described by Given as representing “a 
decisive moment” in the relationship between AWA and the Marconi Company, from which 
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point AWA would begin to exercise a greater degree of autonomy from its parent company.101 
Fisk’s disappointment over the new Marconi Company proposal came from a feeling that it 
had undercut the progress that AWA had made in its domestic advocacy for direct wireless. In 
a letter to Isaacs from March 1920, Fisk noted that he was witnessing a shift wherein there 
was an increasing “tendency on the part of the government to abandon its previously fixed 
ideas about absolute government monopoly in wireless communication and in fact to give very 
wide freedom to individuals and companies”.102   
  
In light of the disagreement with its British parent company, AWA formulated its own 
proposal. This would prove to be important for two interrelated reasons. It demonstrated the 
company’s emergence as an actor in the Australian policy community, being the first proposal 
for the private provision of international wireless services originating in the Australian 
company, rather than its British parent, and also furthered AWA’s claim to be a national 
enterprise rather than a mere appendage of an international firm.  
  
Just days after the report of the Norman Committee was published, Hughes received two 
letters from his namesake in AWA outlining a new proposal from the company to establish a 
direct wireless service. AWA’s new scheme offered to “construct, maintain and operate in 
Australia the necessary stations and equipment for a direct commercial Wireless Service 
between Australia and England”.103 This direct service would be incorporated with a domestic 
network consisting of the existing coastal stations, along with stations connecting all of the 
capital cities. In exchange, and on the condition that the British government would grant 
permission for the erection of a station capable of direct communication in that country, the 
company pledged to offer rates lower than those charged by the cable network, and “to pay 
yearly into the Treasury of the Commonwealth a sum equal to 25 per cent of the net profits 
earned by the Australian stations”.104  
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The accompanying letter offered the Prime Minister “a guide for your consideration of the 
scheme” which reinforced the theme of national development prevalent in the company’s 
previous advocacy, and introduced the language of strategic necessity.105 It described the chief 
advantage of a direct connection as guaranteeing Australia a means of communication 
“entirely independent of all ocean cables, foreign landlines, [and] intermediate Wireless links”, 
the securing of which “has been proved to be vitally necessary in war time by the almost 
complete severance of our two main cables by the enemy”.106 The letter also emphasised that 
the direct link would be “an unsurpassed monument to British enterprise and scientific 
progress” that would benefit the Australian population at large by reducing the cost, speed, 
and hassle of communication with Britain, along with providing jobs through its construction 
and operation.107 However, it advantages would not be simply economic: “the country will be 
provided with an asset of incalculable strategic value”.108 This new emphasis on strategic 
factors was an effective way for the company to contrast its proposal for direct wireless with 
the relay scheme, by framing the direct scheme as more secure. Fisk later wrote a letter to the 
Prime Minister’s departmental secretary in August expressing thanks for a copy of the Norman 
Committee’s report provided by the Prime Minister’s office. In it, he wrote that the report 
“makes interesting reading but Australia needs a ‘direct’ service, not one dependent on the 
maintenance of relay stations in countries over which she has no control”.109 These were the 
terms in which Hughes would advocate for direct wireless in the near future.  
 
The Prime Minister appears to have been receptive to AWA’s offer from the beginning. A letter 
to AWA from the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department sent on behalf of Hughes at 
the end of July stated that “the Commonwealth Government is quite prepared to give 
favourable consideration to the proposals”.110 However, “in view of the decision reported to 
have been arrived at by the British Government” – referring to the recommendations of the 
Norman Committee – any firm decision would have to be postponed: “this, the Prime Minister 
wishes me to say, he very much regrets, as he has the greatest faith in the possibilities of 
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wireless”.111 It concluded by asking for details of any discussion the company had conducted 
on the question with the British government. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s 
enthusiasm for the proposal, the Commonwealth was not going to immediately and 
unilaterally commit itself to the company’s scheme. It would be necessary to make the 
decision in light of international circumstances, and discuss the matter with the other 
governments of the Empire.   
Thomas Hughes’ response to the Prime Minister’s enquiry regarding AWA’s discussion of the 
matter with the British government revealed the company’s intention to first secure a deal 
with the Australian government and then use that deal as leverage against the British:  
 
We have not approached the British Government on this subject because we 
considered that our proper procedure would be to submit our offer to you in the first 
instance, and if your Government approves of our proposal to ask you to enter into a 
preliminary agreement with the Company. When that stage is reached a Director of 
the Company will immediately proceed to England to arrange for the corresponding 
station in that country. We do not anticipate any difficulty in obtaining a licence for 
our station in England, particularly as our request would be supported by your 
government.112 
 
Another important detail regarding AWA’s proposal of June 1920 is that it was kept secret 
from the remainder of the policy community. Neither the RAN nor the Postmaster-General’s 
Department were aware of its existence, shielding it from critical scrutiny. While AWA’s offer 
was being considered at the political level, the bureaucracy was instead focused on the 
Norman scheme. Extra impetus came following an August communication from the British 
Colonial Secretary, informing Australia and the other Dominions of the British government’s 
intention to implement the measures recommended by the Norman Committee and asking for 
the views of the Commonwealth.113  
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Later in August, Golding, the Chief Electrical Engineer, responded to the Colonial Secretary’s 
request. He endorsed the decision to adopt the Norman scheme, writing that the “the 
Engineering Branch of the Australian Post Office” would take responsibility for the proposed 
Australian station.114 Golding justified this by reference to the Norman Committee’s dismissal 
of the notion of private involvement in international wireless: “The proposals of the Marconi 
Company for an Imperial chain of wireless stations was dealt with by the Committee and 
reported on unfavourably. Further comment is therefore unnecessary”.115 Golding’s report was 
endorsed by the Postmaster-General, George Wise, and forwarded to the Prime Minister’s 
Department. Several weeks later, a cable was sent to the British Colonial Secretary stating 
“Commonwealth Government prepared to adopt Imperial Wireless Committee’s 
recommendation for creation of Imperial Wireless system”.116  
 
This reflected an effort from the bureaucracy, with ministerial support, to commit Australia to 
the Norman scheme and thereby shut out AWA. There was also a public dimension to this 
strategy. Several days later, a brief piece in The Argus proclaimed that “within the next few 
days…it is expected that the Commonwealth will give its approval to the Imperial 
Government’s scheme for the establishment of a wireless chain”.117 It is likely that Wise was 
complicit in this effort. One internal memorandum from the time describes his approval of the 
Norman scheme, while also demonstrating unease at the notion of any private involvement in 
international wireless communication.118 Several months later, the Postmaster-General’s 
Department submitted a piece for publication in the major metropolitan newspapers and 
Commerce – the journal of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce – calculated to ward off any 
private wireless interests. This stated that work had already commenced on the first stations 
of the imperial scheme in Britain and Egypt, and that “preliminary action” was also underway 
in Australia.119  
 
                                                          
114 ‘Imperial Wireless Scheme’ Minute Paper, 26th August 1920. NAA: MP341/1, 1922/5649. 
115 ‘Imperial Wireless Scheme’ Minute Paper, 26th August 1920. NAA: MP341/1, 1922/5649. 
116 See letter to Secretary to the Governor-General from the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s 
Department, 15th September 1920. NAA: MP341/1, 1922/5649. 
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The department’s claim of ‘preliminary action’ was overstated. As a result of several factors – 
the disruption in the policy community with the transfer of responsibility from the Navy to the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, deference to the British – detailed bureaucratic 
consideration of policy only began after the publication of the Norman report. Further delays 
came from a desire to consult with the British, along with the RAN and other Defence officials, 
with regard to basic details. It would be necessary to select the site of the proposed Australian 
station in consultation with the other departments. The design of the station, meanwhile, 
would be decided by the British “as explained in the Imperial Wireless Committee’s report”.120 
In October 1920, it was decided to hold a conference between officials from the Postmaster-
General’s, Navy and Defence departments on the subject of the station’s location, “but action 
in this regard can wait until further information is received from London”.121 The Postmaster-
General’s Department was still waiting for British input in January 1921.122 
 
While the Commonwealth government’s policy community was bogged down, AWA continued 
to drive developments in the policy stream. A record from December 1920 demonstrates that 
a dramatic shift in the form of AWA’s proposal had taken place in the latter months of that 
year. It remained an offer to construct a direct wireless link with Britain and a domestic 
network of feeder stations, but many of the other details had changed. For the first time, it 
contained the idea of substantial Commonwealth investment in AWA. Under this new 
proposal, the company would increase its capital subscription by £800,000 to take its total 
capital to £1 million. The Commonwealth would acquire a majority stake, buying 500,001 of 
the company’s £1 shares. The deal would also establish a seven-member Board of Directors to 
oversee the company’s operations. The Commonwealth would appoint three of these 
directors, with the remaining four “elected by the other shareholders in general meeting”, 
though Commonwealth shares would not confer voting rights for these positions.123 This 
updated version of the proposal also called for AWA to establish a national monopoly over 
wireless communication: 
                                                          
120 Memorandum to the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department from Golding, 3rd September 
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The Amalgamated Company will forthwith proceed with the development 
manufacture sale and use of apparatus for wireless communication…within the 
Commonwealth and its territories and in marine and air craft owned registered or 
trading within the Commonwealth or its territories and for communication with 
countries overseas and the Commonwealth shall at all times grant to the Company all 
permits and licences and assistance necessary for the full realisation of these objects 
and for the full development of the industry together with the right for the Company to 
grant sub-permits or sub-licences to its clients and customers.124 
 
Furthermore, it declared that “during the existence of the Amalgamated Company the 
Commonwealth shall not revoke any licence or licences granted to the Company nor impose 
any condition or do any thing which might render the Company’s services or stations 
unprofitable”.125  
 
AWA’s new proposal portended a dramatic restructuring of the Australian wireless industry 
and a very favourable deal for the company. In addition to providing AWA with a large infusion 
of capital, and a virtual guarantee of profitability, it would effectively grant the company free 
reign over the entirety of Australian wireless. Further, while the Commonwealth would own a 
majority of the shares, the company would maintain a majority on the Board of Directors that 
the Commonwealth would be unable to alter. As a result, the Commonwealth’s majority stake 
in the company would not be sufficient to exert control over its operations.  
 
The updated proposal justified the scale of government investment in AWA through a contrast 
with the poor financial performance of the Commonwealth’s coastal network, which was 
losing between £40,000 and £50,000 every year. In the years since its construction, the 
amount of money put in to the coastal network was already in excess of the £500,000 
investment that AWA’s offer would entail. AWA’s proposal offered the Commonwealth the 
possibility of turning wireless into a money-making venture, allowing it to “eliminate the loss” 
                                                          
124 ‘Wireless Proposals’, 22nd December 1920. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 3. Emphasis added. 
125 ‘Wireless Proposals’, 22nd December 1920. NAA: A3932, SC457 PART 3. Emphasis added. 
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of the coastal scheme and instead turn wireless into “a profitable investment”.126 In addition, 
partnership with the company to establish a direct connection with Britain was presented as a 
means to reduce the cost of communication with that country, and, in line with the established 
theme of economic nationalism, a means to stimulate the development of “the Wireless 
Industry on lines commensurate with its importance to Australia”.127  
 
There was precedent for an agreement of this kind: a deal brokered between the 
Commonwealth and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in mid-1920 to create a refining company. 
Fitzhardinge suggests that this earlier agreement was an initiative of the Prime Minister, 
“distinctive of Hughes, both in its imaginative vision of future developments and in its bold 
marriage of government and private enterprise”.128 On the other hand Ferrier, the principal 
historian of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the forerunner of British Petroleum), suggests that 
it was the management of that company that had proposed the form of the agreement made 
in 1920, and that was itself based upon an earlier agreement made between that company and 
the British government in 1914.129 Regardless of its origins, the oil agreement was the model 
for that proposed by AWA. It was a joint venture to form a new company wherein the 
Commonwealth would take ownership of 250,001 of 500,000 shares, and that would be 
overseen by a seven member Board of Directors, of which three would represent the 
Commonwealth and the remaining four the oil company.130 As with the AWA proposal, the oil 
agreement was also put forward as a means to promote the development of a national 
industry. 
 
Given, discussing this matter, writes that “there is no evidence of any serious analysis…within 
government” of the parallels between the AWA deal and oil deal, and that “it appears the 
whole arrangement with AWA was not even considered by Cabinet before Hughes took it to 
Parliament”.131 The first part of this statement is true, although the similarity between the 
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details of the two proposals make it impossible to consider that the latter was drafted without 
reference to the former. However, the proposal was considered by the Cabinet. In July 1920, 
following AWA’s initial proposal, Cabinet resolved to form a sub-committee to consider the 
subject of international wireless.132  
 
Weeks after the establishment of the Cabinet sub-committee, another international 
development intervened as British Prime Minister Lloyd George contacted his Dominion 
counterparts announcing a conference in London in June 1921. The 1921 Imperial Conference, 
the first of three convened in the 1920s, represented a continuation of Imperial War 
Conferences held in Britain in 1917 and 1918 to discuss matters of interest to the Empire as a 
whole in the fields of defence and foreign policy. At Hughes’ prompting, the subject of 
communications was also added to its agenda.133 This portended the Prime Minister’s desire to 
resolve the subject after years of consideration.  
 
The Cabinet sub-committee – comprised of the Treasurer, Cook, the Navy Minister, Bruce Laird 
Smith, and the Postmaster-General, Wise – issued its report on wireless in April 1921, just 
weeks before the Imperial Conference. The report offered brief comments upon both AWA’s 
proposal and the Norman scheme, and made three recommendations with regard to wireless. 
The first was to consult with other governments on the subject at the Imperial Conference. The 
second, following from the first, was that “the fundamental principle of Imperial partnership 
and co-operation be observed” in this matter.134 Finally, it cautioned against abandoning the 
Australian communications tradition, recommending that “any proposals for local and 
Australian development be examined sympathetically, but with due regard to the 
Government’s monopoly in telegraphic and telephonic communication, as now existing, and 
the question of Defence”.135 However, the sub-committee’s recommendations were not 
unanimous. A dissenting note from Laird Smith was also included in the report, warning that 
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fealty to the principle of government enterprise threatened to increase the costs and delays of 
the international service, and alluding to the terms of AWA’s proposal:   
 
I naturally would like the Empire Radio-telegraphy owned and controlled by the 
Governments concerned, but that seems impossible to bring about without great 
delay and expense owing to the patent rights being solely in possession of a private 
company. Hence…I suggest that negotiations might be established with any wireless 
company with the view of getting a concrete proposal to place before the [Imperial] 
Conference. But, under any conditions, the Governments concerned should have a 
controlling interest if the work is done by a company – and whole control in time of 
war.136 
 
Laird Smith’s comments introduced another consideration that was to prove decisive: an 
emphasis on a swift resolution of the subject. Later in 1921, when Hughes placed the subject 
before Parliament, the need for a speedy decision was one of the major elements of his 
framing of the issue. This frame would prove powerful enough to attain a quick decision, and 
entrain the agreement with AWA that was formalised in the following year.   
 
Cabinet approved the recommendations of the sub-committee’s report in May, and an 
accompanying comment from the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department noted that 
“the P.M. is to deal with this question while in Great Britain”.137 What transpired while Hughes 
was in Britain at the Imperial Conference, though, showed a selective adherence to the 
contents of the sub-committee’s report. This is an indication of the relative weakness of 
Cabinet at the time, and the willingness of Hughes to override the preferences of his 
colleagues and their departmental advisors. It also suggests that, absent Hughes, there was no 
audience for AWA’s proposal amongst senior politicians, further emphasising his importance 
for the outcome of the 1922 agreement. 
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The Settling of Alternatives, 1918-1921 
 
Though the original Imperial scheme was shelved following the outbreak of war, the subject of 
international wireless communication soon reappeared on the agenda after the Armistice. 
Almost three years later, in mid-1921, the matter was still under consideration and awaiting a 
formal decision. However, the lack of a formal decision belied an ongoing subterranean 
struggle to shape the terms under which Australia would participate in an international 
scheme of wireless. The most important development during this period was the emergence of 
the two alternative policies, between which Parliament would choose as the basis for 
Australia’s international service. There were great contrasts between these rival proposals 
with regard to their origins, designs, and bases of support. The Norman scheme, an initiative of 
the British government, was based on the principle of government enterprise, planned for a 
relay service connecting the territories of the British Empire, and was supported by the 
Commonwealth bureaucracy and most of the Cabinet. The alternative was a scheme of 
domestic origin, designed by AWA and supported by the Prime Minister, which planned for the 
company, with financial support from the Commonwealth, to establish a direct wireless 
connection between Australia and Britain.  
 
The stark differences between the schemes obscured the fact that there was a firm consensus 
on the desirability of establishing a wireless link between Australia and Britain. The debate 
surrounding the subject centred on the form that the service should take, rather than whether 
to create in the first place. This consensus reflected the strong geopolitical imperatives 
compelling Australia to upgrade its international communications through the adoption of 
trans-oceanic wireless. Though these imperatives existed prior to 1914, they had attained a 
new sense of urgency during the Great War. The war years saw considerable improvements in 
long-distance wireless signalling by other great powers, particularly Germany and the United 
States. This revealed the potential for the British Empire to fall behind its rivals in the control 
of international communications, despite its continued dominance in the field of cables. For 
Australian policymakers, the perils of relying on cables had been underscored by the German 
raids against the cables that provided its communications with the outside world in the 
conflict’s first weeks.  
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Another problem with cables – congestion and delays in the immediate post-war period – 
provided a focusing event that drew attention to the underlying problem and, in combination 
with Isaacs’ efforts as a policy entrepreneur, led to the opening of a policy window. 
Highlighting the considerable delays in messaging between Australia and Britain, and with 
reference to the direct wireless demonstration that he had conducted with Fisk in September 
1918, Isaacs suggested that granting permission for his company, in conjunction with AWA, to 
establish a direct wireless service between Australia and Britain would relieve pressure from 
the cable network. In this case, there was an alignment between the problem and policy 
streams, but unfavourable conditions in the politics stream prevented any action. Though 
Hughes was willing to consider the offer, it met with strong resistance from the Acting Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, supported by departmental advice, in Australia. Because of this 
deadlock, with Hughes in Europe and unable to exert his will over his colleagues on the 
subject, the policy window closed without any decision made on the subject of international 
wireless. It would take until after the conclusion of the 1921 Imperial Conference for another 
to open, by which time circumstances had changed considerably. 
 
Most of the consequential changes during the remainder of the period covered in this chapter 
took place in the policy stream, which saw a divided, and disrupted, policy community develop 
a range of different proposals for a scheme of international wireless. The principal axis of 
division within the community was between government and private enterprise. Regardless of 
the specific design of different schemes, the crucial question of control always related to the 
origin of the proposal. Bureaucratic officials, when commissioned to develop their own 
proposals, invariably proposed schemes of international wireless with no scope for the 
participation of private enterprise. Similarly, the schemes developed by the Marconi Company, 
and then AWA, always advocated a leading role for private enterprise. This is a strong 
indication that the rival policy proposals concerning international wireless were emanations of 
a struggle of interests. In the case of AWA and its parent, the interest was commercial; to 
secure control over a lucrative communications route. With regard to the bureaucratic actors 
in the policy community, their interest lay in defending the Commonwealth’s primacy over a 
field that it had customarily controlled, and, following the report of the Norman Committee, 
staying aligned with the British preference for government control. An additional division 
emerged from 1920, when the Marconi Company abandoned the principle of direct wireless in 
its submission to the Norman Committee. This prompted Fisk to break from the British 
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company and develop the policy proposal, still based on a direct connection, which would later 
become the bedrock of the 1922 agreement. 
 
As noted in Chapter One, a fragmented policy community is more likely to produce divergent 
policy proposals that radically reshape policy in a field. The division within the policy 
community explains why, beyond the mutual desire to establish a wireless connection 
between Australia and Britain, there were no common elements between the rival proposals 
that had emerged by 1921. The Norman scheme was British in origin, based on a chain of relay 
stations under the control of governments, and anticipated losing money for its participants 
for its first decade of operation. In contrast, the Fisk scheme was Australian in origin, based 
upon the provision of a direct service in collaboration with private enterprise, and, though 
calling for a larger up-front capital expenditure, promised to be a profitable investment for the 
Commonwealth. In addition to the aforementioned struggle of interests, the contrasts 
between these schemes reflected the fact that the different segments of the policy community 
did not communicate with each other on the matter, as indicated by the fact that the 
Postmaster-General’s and Navy departments were not informed of AWA’s proposal, which had 
been delivered to the Prime Minister in mid-1920. Similarly, in Britain, Isaacs had refused to 
appear before the Norman Committee. 
 
The disruption within the bureaucratic segment of the policy community in Australia, largely a 
product of external influences, would also prove vital to the course of events. This disruption 
related to the uncertainty surrounding wireless after the return of peace. Much as the coming 
of war had shaken up the administration of the sector by removing Balsillie from the role of 
wireless expert for the Commonwealth government and the transfer of the medium to the 
Navy Department, the return of peace foreshadowed another adjustment. Despite Cresswell’s 
best efforts to justify continued naval control of wireless in the post-war years, responsibility 
for the Wireless Telegraphy Act returned to the Postmaster-General’s Department in mid-
1920. This was not because AWA had orchestrated a campaign against the continued naval 
control of wireless, which made little impression on those in and around the government, but 
because of Admiral Jellicoe’s report on the naval defence of Australia, which included 
recommendations for wireless to be developed along commercial lines. Removing wireless 
from naval control also allowed the RAN to offload the expensive upkeep of the coastal 
network elsewhere at a time of post-war budget cuts.    
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With regard to policy development, the critical effects of this disruption were delay and 
uncertainty. Though discussions regarding the future place of wireless commenced shortly 
after the Armistice, the uncertainty regarding its future administration was not resolved until 
Cabinet’s decided to return responsibility for wireless to the Postmaster-General’s Department 
from July 1920. During this time, there was little development of policy proposals from within 
the Navy Department. When responsibility for the Wireless Telegraphy Act was transferred 
back to the Postmaster-General’s Department, the department was ill-prepared to commence 
detailed policy work. Having not been in charge of wireless for five years, during which time 
there had been considerable technological advances, and having lost its chief technical expert, 
Balsillie, it lacked the technical and administrative acclimatisation necessary. In addition, the 
timing of this transfer was awkward, coming at around the same time as the reception of the 
Norman Committee’s report. As a result, the involvement of departmental officials was 
essentially limited to endorsing the Norman scheme and making preliminary plans to conform 
to the plans of the British government. 
 
The policy stream was thus divided into two eddies. The bureaucracy, which had played a 
substantial role in policy development in the pre-war years, was hampered by uncertainty, 
disruption, and deference to the Imperial government. This resulted in a lack of initiative from 
bureaucratic officials in formulating policy options for international wireless, as they looked to 
the British for guidance. In contrast, AWA’s executives were very active in the area. On the eve 
of the Imperial Conference, AWA had formulated a detailed scheme for a direct service with 
Britain and commenced a campaign of ‘softening up’ to gain support of its proposal.  
 
This relates to another important development from this period: the policy entrepreneurship 
of Fisk and Thomas Hughes. The period covered in this chapter saw considerable efforts on 
behalf of AWA to ‘soften up’ senior politicians for the adoption of a scheme of direct wireless 
service with Britain under its control; to lay the foundations for its acceptance. These efforts 
began prior to the end of the war with the enlistment of Hughes and Cook to participate in the 
September 1918 demonstration of direct wireless transmission between Britain and Australia. 
The campaign of ‘softening up’ the Prime Minister, which was initially spearheaded by the 
Marconi Company, continued after the Armistice, with evidence of a number of overtures to 
194 
 
establish a direct wireless link made to him while in Britain. In early 1919, AWA executives in 
Australia commenced a similar campaign targeting senior politicians in Australia, such as 
Acting Prime Minister Watt. In the case of Watt and the remainder of the domestic Cabinet, 
however, the company’s overtures did not receive a sympathetic hearing. In an attempt to 
strengthen the case for direct wireless, a number of Chambers of Commerce were enlisted to 
extol its potential benefits to members of the Cabinet, although these third-party exhortations 
were perceived as directed by the Marconi Company and not well received. 
 
Though the Cabinet led by Watt during his tenure as Acting Prime Minister was unmoved by 
AWA’s ‘softening up’ campaign, both AWA and its parent company had identified Hughes as 
open to the notion of direct wireless. Hughes was the only prominent figure within the 
Commonwealth government willing to consider proposals for a direct wireless service under 
private control. His openness to the approaches of the Marconi Company in the immediate 
post-war period contrasted with the other members of his Cabinet that remained in Australia. 
The remainder of the Cabinet, and the departments advising them, were opposed to any 
private involvement in international wireless. This was not simply a case of a fleeting 
sentiment while Hughes was overseas. The formation of a Cabinet sub-committee to report of 
the subject in mid-1920, which delivered its report in early 1921, reveals that attitudes of 
wariness towards private involvement in international wireless – along with a desire to 
cooperate with the British – remained strong with members of Cabinet other than Hughes. 
Similarly, documentation from this period demonstrates a complete aversion within the 
bureaucracy to any deviation from the hitherto-established principle of government control of 
communications. While there remained a degree of tension in the relationship between 
Hughes and AWA, the Prime Minister was the only figure open to the notion of private 
involvement in a scheme of international wireless.   
 
Following the Prime Minister’s return to Australia in August 1919, the company dedicated 
great effort to gain Hughes’ support for its proposals. This consisted of formal pleas, in the 
form of letters, as well as advocacy that was less overt. The company’s efforts to ‘soften up’ 
Hughes to its preferred policy of establishing a direct wireless link under its control would 
prove of vital importance to the eventual shape of the international scheme. It was only 
because of the company’s efforts to court Hughes’ support that its scheme for a direct service 
with Britain came to receive consideration. This, and the fact that the Prime Minister’s 
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openness to the scheme was sufficient to overcome the widespread resistance elsewhere in 
the political system, demonstrates his commanding influence within Australian politics at the 
time. It also reveals the wisdom of AWA’s executives in identifying this fact, and tailoring their 
campaign to accommodate for it.     
 
Fisk and Thomas Hughes were also attuned to the spirit of the times in the manner in which 
they framed their proposals. These men presented the case for the adoption of their scheme 
in terms of strategic benefits, national development, and financial advantage. These would all 
become prominent themes when the proposal went before Parliament in late 1921, speaking 
to the power of their framing. With reference to wartime experience, AWA’s proposals 
repeatedly referred to a direct connection with Britain as a military and strategic asset that 
would contribute to Australia’s defence, and allow communication with RAN vessels anywhere 
in the world. Another prominent theme was national development. Using the language of 
economic nationalism, and with copious references to AWA as an Australian firm, the 
company’s executives presented the case for opening the field of wireless to private enterprise 
as supporting the larger goal of development, promising to increase employment and develop 
an industry that would prove a national asset. The weight carried by these points speak to the 
importance of the surrounding structural context outlined in Chapter Two. The arguments for 
a direct wireless system versus a relay system hinged on the strategic superiority of the 
former. Furthermore, the presentation of AWA as a national firm would prove instrumental for 
the legitimacy of a large-scale government investment in it. The arguments made by Hughes 
when he came to advocate for AWA’s scheme in Parliament had been crafted and refined by 
the company’s executives in their advocacy efforts over the course of years, prior to being 
deployed in the open sphere of formal decision-making.    
 
Timing was another important consideration in this period. One instance of this was in the 
case of the scheme for an international wireless scheme that Watt commissioned Balsillie to 
design while Hughes was at the Paris Peace Conference. Had the scheme been prepared 
earlier, prior to Hughes’ return, it may have received consideration within an amenable 
political environment. However, the fact that the Prime Minister returned just days before 
Balsillie’s proposal was finalised meant that it was unlikely to receive favourable consideration 
in the political system.   
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Ultimately, though, timing would prove more important in relation to the Imperial Conference. 
This was because of the prominence given to the question of international wireless at the 
conference, which provided a focusing event that led to the opening of a policy window. In this 
case, what mattered were the specific proposals that were available for the consideration of 
policymakers at that point in time. As this chapter has shown, there were two principal lines of 
division concerning what the design of the scheme would be, and who would control it. The 
two axes of division between the AWA and Norman proposals – relay/direct and 
government/private enterprise – had been bundled so as to connect a preference for direct 
wireless with private enterprise, and a preference for government control with a relay system. 
These were not the only conceivable ways of configuring Australia’s participation in 
international wireless, but the fact that they were the available alternatives at the time a 
policy window opened ensured that the issue was framed as a choice between a relay system 
under government control or a direct service provided by private enterprise.   
 
Between the Armistice and the 1921 Imperial Conference, AWA’s executives – principally Fisk 
and Thomas Hughes – and the Prime Minister had emerged as pivotal figures. The company’s 
representatives had devised an ambitious plan to recast Australian wireless policy. Their 
proposal, in effect, called for the inversion of government monopoly. It was not simply a plan 
to allow private enterprise a foothold in international wireless, such as it already had in the 
field of maritime wireless. Instead, the AWA proposal sought a mandate for the company to 
exploit every area of wireless communications for its own commercial benefit. The proposal 
called for a massive Commonwealth investment in the company, but without the ability for the 
government to exercise control through the Board of Directors. It also contained a provision 
for the company to usurp the government’s licencing function, by guaranteeing the provision 
of licences to itself and control over the distribution of licences to others. Finally, it contained 
an ambiguous provision preventing the Commonwealth from ‘doing any thing’ that may 
obstruct the firm’s profitability. The company’s proposal was, in effect, a bid for private 
monopoly over the entirety of Australian wireless communication. Hughes, customary of his 
style, was more concerned with the larger concept of establishing a direct wireless connection 
with Britain than he was with the finer details. From the efforts that he undertook to promote 
the idea, it appears that he was willing to acquiesce to AWA’s designs.  
 
197 
 
Yet, as Chapter Six will demonstrate, these men were unable to dictate the outcome of the 
policymaking process at will. Conditions in the political stream at the time of the open policy 
window necessitated significant compromises in the company’s demands. Serendipity and the 
influence of structural considerations would also play a key role. Nevertheless, the 
groundwork that AWA’s leadership had done during this period – devising a concrete proposal, 
framing it in terms of strategic, developmental, and financial benefits, and ‘softening up’ the 
Prime Minister – would prove instrumental to the company securing the key role in Australia’s 
international wireless service. So too would the actions of the Prime Minister. 
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Chapter 6 – Constituting International Wireless, 
1921-1922 
 
Between late 1918 and mid 1921 two alternative propositions for Australia’s participation in a 
scheme of international wireless had emerged. One of these was the Norman scheme for a 
relay system of stations, to be owned and operated by governments, linking the territories of 
the British Empire. The other was Fisk’s proposal to establish a direct wireless connection 
between Australia and Britain, with his company – backed by Commonwealth investment – 
controlling the service. It was between these two options that Australian policymakers were 
compelled to choose in late 1921.  
 
Though the subject of international wireless had been on the agenda since late 1918, insofar 
as people in and around the Commonwealth government were discussing it and crafting 
policies, the intervening years had not seen any formal decisions made on the subject. This 
chapter is concerned with the time between the 1921 Imperial Conference, held between June 
and August, and the implementation of a revised form of Fisk’s proposal for a partnership 
between AWA and the Commonwealth for the purpose of creating a direct wireless link with 
Britain in 1922. It is focused on the way in which this formal decision, which constituted a 
paradigmatic shift in policy, was brought into effect.  
 
The formal decision came from an open policy window. The 1921 Imperial Conference 
represented a focusing event that drew attention to the underlying problem of a lack of 
progress in international communications. Through the efforts of AWA’s executives and the 
Prime Minister, acting as policy entrepreneurs, this problem was linked with an available policy 
proposal – AWA’s scheme – to produce a dramatic departure from Australia’s established 
tradition of government enterprise in communications. Nevertheless, the formal enactment of 
the proposal was not guaranteed, but subject to conditions within the political stream. This 
chapter demonstrates the importance of the prevailing political conditions to the final 
outcome. The Commonwealth’s rejection of the Norman scheme and embrace of direct 
wireless was dependent upon developments in Parliament. As the previous chapter 
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documents, Hughes was the only figure of significance within the Commonwealth government 
who did not oppose AWA’s plans for direct wireless. He therefore represented the company’s 
only hope to steer its preferred policy through the political system. His political support was 
vital to the outcome, but it was not simply a case of Hughes imposing his will on the area. The 
formal decision which was enacted in March 1922 was the outcome of a dynamic process, and 
the influence of political conditions resulted in a number of important revisions being made to 
the proposal. These revisions promised that the Commonwealth could retain a degree of 
control over the new enterprise, rather than simply handing the field over to private interests.  
 
Whereas the previous chapter was principally focused on developments in the policy stream, 
this one is centred on the passage of the Commonwealth/AWA agreement through the 
opportunity presented by an open policy window. The short-lived opportunity presented by an 
open policy window increased the importance of an available policy, which AWA had already 
provided, and the political conditions at that point in time. However, the enactment of AWA’s 
proposal was also aided by the shortcomings of the alternative policy – the Norman scheme – 
and the strong geopolitical imperatives surrounding international communications. In other 
words, the adoption of AWA’s proposal was not solely due to the strength of its case, nor the 
hard work of its advocates, but also the specific circumstances under which it was considered.  
 
During this period the most salient features of the political stream were the delicate balance in 
Parliament and the deteriorating relationship between Hughes and the remainder of the 
Nationalist Party. The 1919 election had produced one of the most unusual parliaments in 
Australian political history. The Labor Party, struggling to recover from the 1916 conscription 
split, won 25 of the 75 seats in the House of Representatives. The Nationalist government saw 
its position reduced to a bare majority, retaining 38 seats.1 The remainder of the seats, 
notwithstanding one independent, were captured by a grouping that would soon unite to form 
a new force in federal politics: the Country Party. Though it would later join the long-standing 
Coalition, during the 1919-1922 parliamentary term the Country Party was autonomous, and 
not simply a wing of a unified non-Labor grouping. Its parliamentarians paid little attention to 
Labor and instead focused on extracting concessions from the Nationalist government, 
                                                          
1 C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, p. 320. 
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particularly after the ascent of Earle Page to the party leadership in April 1921.2 Thus, Hughes’ 
government faced two separate opposition blocs while commanding only the narrowest of 
majorities. 
 
Nor was this majority steadfast. Though Hughes remained the dominant figure in the 
Parliament, by 1921 his position as leader of the Nationalist Party was perilous. With the war’s 
conclusion the Nationalist Party, cobbled together under wartime exigencies, found itself 
lacking a raison d'être. Stripped of its unifying goal of prosecuting the war, old divisions 
between the rival blocs from which it had been comprised began to re-emerge. Hughes found 
himself “disliked and distrusted by many of the ex-Liberals” and he was likewise suspicious of 
them.3 The political environment into which the wireless agreement was introduced was 
therefore finely-balanced and potentially unstable. The final outcome reflected a degree of 
compromise that was necessary to secure its passage under these conditions.   
 
The 1921 Imperial Conference 
 
The 1921 Imperial Conference, held in London between June and August, was a decisive 
episode for the constitution of the international wireless service. It saw Hughes undermine the 
Norman scheme as a blueprint for a unified Imperial wireless policy, creating room for 
Australia’s adoption of a scheme of direct wireless soon after. The conference functioned as a 
focusing event for the ongoing problem of inter-Empire communication. The heavy attention 
dedicated to the subject by the Prime Minister at the conference was instrumental in the 
subject being placed on the agenda after his return to Australia and the resumption of 
Parliament: the opening of a policy window. The conference was therefore an important 
preliminary development to the decision-making process.   
 
                                                          
2 M. Booker, The Great Professional, p. 226. 
3 J. Hirst, “Labor and the Great War” in R. Manne (ed.), The Australian Century: Political Struggle in the 
Building of a Nation, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1999, p. 79; M. Booker, The Great Professional, p. 226. 
Ideological divisions are a prominent theme in the analysis presented in C.J. Morgan, The First Minister 
in Australia: Studies in the office in crisis situations, 1920-1941, Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National 
University, 1968, pp. 253-288. 
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Though the proceedings of the Imperial Conference were of central importance to the future 
trajectory of wireless development, the subject was one of the conference’s subsidiary 
themes. Nevertheless, it dovetailed with the conference’s principal focus on defence and 
foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on the fate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As 
outlined in Chapter Two, this was of monumental importance to Australia. With the likely 
withdrawal of the Royal Navy from the Pacific in the post-war years, Australia faced the 
potential of a confrontation with an expansionist Japan.4 According to Fitzhardinge, it was 
Hughes himself that was responsible for the addition of “inter-Imperial communications” to 
the conference’s agenda, thereby assuring that the issue of wireless would receive 
consideration in the first place.5 It is of vital significance that discussions of wireless policy took 
place in this context. It demonstrates that, above any considerations related to commerce or 
doctrine, Hughes’ interest in wireless was geopolitical; as an asset with great implications for 
the future defence of Australia.     
 
In early July Hughes spoke before the conference on the subject of communications, 
portraying wireless as an important strategic asset. He began by addressing the subject from 
the perspective of the entire British Empire, emphasising the importance of improving 
communications for the Empire’s security in the post-war world. Adopting an advanced system 
of international wireless would enable communication with the combined navies of the 
Empire, regardless of their location, and avoid the proven vulnerability of submarine cables to 
the interdiction of rival powers. In addition, wireless would promote further trade and 
economic development throughout the Empire, and, consequently, “the expansion of every 
primary and secondary industry in every part of the Empire”.6 
 
In another theme that would prove to be of crucial importance when the subject was put 
before the Australian Parliament, Hughes’ speech also pressed for a quick resolution of the 
wireless question. As he later described, “I said that I was not wedded to any particular 
scheme, but that we could not afford to leave things as they were. I cared not how we 
                                                          
4 P. Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1983, pp. 219-229; M. 
Booker, The Great Professional, pp. 269-275. 
5 L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, p. 462. 
6 “Links of Empire – All-Red Wireless Chain” in The Argus, 8th July 1921. 
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achieved a better system so long as we did achieve one soon”.7 While Britain had made steps 
towards developing an international wireless network in the pre-war years, the interruptions 
of the intervening years had seen it fall behind rival powers such as Germany and the United 
States in the endeavour. Because of this, and the potential for the British Empire to lose its 
lead in international communications, he declared that “wireless development should be 
immediately the active policy of every part of the Empire”.8 This emphasis on speed, stemming 
from geopolitical imperatives, would prove to be a decisive element in Australia’s subsequent 
adoption of AWA’s scheme for a direct wireless connection with Britain. The importance of a 
rapid decision on the matter, combined with dissatisfaction with the Norman scheme, left 
policymakers facing AWA’s scheme as the only policy ready for immediate adoption.  
 
On the following day Hughes used his earlier comments on the importance of trans-oceanic 
wireless to the Empire to outline his rejection of the Norman scheme as unsuited to Australia. 
Echoing the terms in which AWA had been framing the issue since the Armistice, he described 
wireless as essential to Australia’s national development and defence. “The entire future 
prosperity of the Commonwealth depends upon the expansion of her industries and her 
overseas trade”, he claimed, and wireless would be an instrumental element in such 
expansion.9 Furthermore, wireless was important for security purposes because in the coming 
years “the defence of Australia will depend very largely upon the maintenance of 
communication with the heart of the Empire”.10 This could no longer be guaranteed by 
submarine cables. Hughes also added another criterion which had first been floated by AWA: 
the importance of a wireless scheme being financially viable. Because of the Commonwealth’s 
financial strain, he claimed it was necessary that an Australian international wireless service 
“be instituted and conducted along such lines as to be commercially profitable”.11 He then 
attacked the Norman scheme’s embrace of a relay system as threatening Australia’s interests: 
 
                                                          
7 W.M. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure: A Review of Empire Relations Within and Without the 
Commonwealth of Britannic Nations, Ernest Benn, London, 1929, p. 134. 
8 “Links of Empire – All-Red Wireless Chain” in The Argus, 8th July 1921. 
9 ‘Australia’s Position in Relation to the British Empire’s Wireless’, unspecified date. NAA: A3932, SC457 
PART 3. 
10 ‘Australia’s Position in Relation to the British Empire’s Wireless’, unspecified date. NAA: A3932, SC457 
PART 3. 
11 ‘Australia’s Position in Relation to the British Empire’s Wireless’, unspecified date. NAA: A3932, SC457 
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Although Australia must and will be linked by wireless with all parts of the Empire, this 
object can only be achieved by working out a scheme along our own lines, designed to 
suit our local conditions and circumstances. One thing is quite certain, Australia dare 
not, either commercially or strategically, leave its overseas communication dependent 
upon relay stations in other countries. We cannot entertain any system which will be 
dependent for its commercial success and for its vital communication in the case of 
attack, upon political or even meteorological and atmospheric conditions in some 
other country. Australia’s position and her circumstances demand that she shall have 
at least one high power station capable of communicating with any part of the world, 
and that there shall be a corresponding station in the United Kingdom capable of 
communicating with Australia…we cannot afford to be dependent upon relays either 
for commercial operations or for our defence.12 
 
In keeping with the conference’s themes of defence and foreign policy, Hughes’ speech placed 
his support for direct wireless and opposition to a relay system in a security context, portraying 
Australia as vulnerable if a relay scheme was adopted. Soon after, a subcommittee of the 
conference was established under the chairmanship of Winston Churchill to discuss the subject 
further. It appears that this body was established in response to a suggestion from Hughes 
“that a concrete scheme [regarding wireless] be put before the conference”.13 This is further 
evidence of Hughes being instrumental in the subject appearing on the conference’s agenda in 
the first place.  
 
The subcommittee deliberated over several weeks through July and early August, dominated 
by a dispute between Hughes and all of its other members. The other participants, led by 
Churchill, pushed for the adoption of the Norman scheme. To strengthen the case, Henry 
Norman himself appeared before the subcommittee. He claimed, contra Hughes, that direct 
wireless was not technically feasible, or at best would only be practicable under certain 
atmospheric conditions. Given that work had already commenced on stations in Britain and 
Egypt that would form links in the relay scheme, the British sought to attain Dominion 
cooperation in seeing the scheme through to completion.14  
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Hughes remained unimpressed by the Norman scheme. Having been assured by AWA of direct 
wireless’ reliability, and having himself participated in a demonstration of its capabilities in 
1918, he refused to accept a relay system. Such a design, he claimed, would not only see a 
delay in the transmission of messages both to and from Australia and Britain, it would also be 
less reliable as it would only take one station to be out of action to disrupt the entire scheme; 
a liability in the case of any future conflict. He also compared the Norman scheme 
unfavourably to the undertakings of other countries, writing in a cable to Acting Prime 
Minister Cook that “French station at Lyons can communicate direct Australia…America and 
Berlin have long-distance stations capable of covering the whole distance without relays…in 
my opinion British Empire cannot afford to be behind other nations in this vitally important 
matter”.15 As he summarised in a later account, “the [Norman] scheme bitterly disappointed 
me. We who expected to fly on the wings of light were offered a limping camel…I made up my 
mind that Australia would have nothing to do with it.”16 
  
As the subcommittee continued its deliberations, Hughes remained steadfast on this point. 
Unlike the leaders of the other Dominions, who were willing to acquiesce to the Norman 
scheme, he was unpersuaded by “the solemn and didactic assurances” of its advocates, later 
writing that “I passed through the hail of words and polite invective with unruffled plumage”.17 
The Prime Minister’s obstinacy was eventually rewarded with Australia being granted a 
concession. On 2nd August the subcommittee adopted the following resolution: 
 
It is agreed that His Majesty’s Government should take steps for the erection of the 
remaining stations for which they are responsible, as soon as the stations are 
designed; that the Governments of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and India, 
should take similar action so far as necessary, and that the Governments of Canada 
and New Zealand should also cooperate.18  
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However, a disclaimer noted that “the above scheme was accepted by the Prime Minister of 
the Commonwealth subject to giving full freedom of action to Australia to decide the method 
in which Australia will cooperate”.19 As Hughes gloated in a cable to Cook, “here I have 
managed to get for Australia an absolutely free hand. She can accept the Norman scheme, 
which means a certain annual loss of £20,000 and a limited service, or any other she pleases. 
Parliament can decide. The other Dominions have no such choice”.20  
 
Following this resolution, a report was published in The Argus explaining the concessions 
awarded to the Prime Minister and forecasting the next moves with respect to Australian 
wireless:  
 
Mr Hughes intends to bring home with him full information of all the schemes, with 
every possible variation. While personally he strongly supports direct communication, 
the responsibility will be thrown on the Federal Parliament of establishing wireless 
connection with Britain by whatever means it approves. Private enterprise will 
probably be invited to undertake the approved scheme, with Government backing, 
financial support being sought at each end. This, it is understood, has already been 
promised.21  
 
Hinted at by the newspaper, although conspicuously left unmentioned by Hughes at the 
Imperial Conference, was the proposal for a direct wireless scheme that the government had 
received from AWA. This is likely because he was aware of the antipathy towards Marconi and 
its associates held by other participants. It would, therefore, have been impolitic to advocate 
for it at the conference. Instead, he simply sought leeway for Australia to reject the Norman 
scheme and consider other options.  
 
While these debates were taking place before the subcommittee there appears to have been a 
flurry of activity behind the scenes. Hughes’ account of the Imperial Conference mentions, 
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albeit only in passing, the presence of Marconi’s Managing Director at discussions.22 This is an 
oblique reference to the lobbying efforts that were being conducted in private and parallel to 
the subcommittee’s formal proceedings. The evidence with regard to this is, however, scanty. 
While Hughes later told Parliament that “the Amalgamated Wireless interests had their 
representatives present” at the conference, he offered no more details.23 As Given reveals, Fisk 
was one of those who was present in London at the time.24 
 
Within the Commonwealth government’s archives, the only surviving record of the covert 
lobbying taking place is a letter to Hughes from the vice president of the Canadian Marconi 
subsidiary, who was also in London at the time. This letter told the Prime Minister that the 
company had just been granted permission from the Canadian government to construct a 
long-distance station on the country’s west coast “for the purpose of conducting a commercial 
wireless service between Canada and Japan”.25 The letter asked whether Hughes’ government 
could grant permission “for the erection of a corresponding station in the Eastern states of 
Australia”.26 Though there is no evidence of a written response to this letter, its contents 
would have added further weight to Hughes’ view of the obsolescence of a relay scheme of 
wireless. In addition, the combined presence of representatives from the Marconi Company, 
along with its Australian and Canadian affiliates, suggests a coordinated effort on behalf of the 
various Marconi concerns to undermine the Norman scheme. Ultimately, however, Hughes 
seems to have been the only Dominion representative willing to consider these overtures.  
 
Following the conference’s conclusion, Hughes returned to Australia. With regard to 
international wireless, he had won scope for Australia to consider alternatives to the Norman 
scheme. He had also laid a rhetorical platform for direct wireless through enunciating the 
weaknesses associated with a relay scheme. With this accomplished, he was able to publically 
unveil the proposal for partnership with AWA that had been received months earlier. 
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Translating AWA’s proposal into policy would be the Prime Minister’s next step with regard to 
wireless following his return to Australia.  
 
The manner in which the subject of international wireless was considered by the 1921 Imperial 
Conference emphasises the pivotal importance of Hughes to Australia’s rejection of the 
Norman scheme and embrace of AWA’s proposal for a direct wireless connection with Britain. 
Though it appears that representatives of AWA and other Marconi-aligned interests provided 
criticisms of the Norman scheme that Hughes could deploy in argument, it took a bloody-
minded political actor to resist the consensus of all other participants in favour of a relay 
system of Imperial wireless communication. Hughes had previously deployed his obstinacy on 
the world stage to attain concessions for Australia, such as through his single-handed defiance 
of Woodrow Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference, gaining an Australian mandate over 
New Guinea and Nauru and the rejection of a racial equality clause in the League of Nations 
charter.27 This indicates a persistent and particular aspect of Hughes’ leadership. Absent this 
individual trait, it is difficult to envisage how Australia would otherwise have secured the 
latitude to depart from the consensus that had emerged amongst the British and other 
Dominion governments. This is in addition to the fact that Hughes was the only actor of any 
significance within the Commonwealth government who had indicated any willingness to 
consider proposals for a direct wireless service constructed by private enterprise.    
 
Hughes had gained British acquiescence for Australia to reject the Norman scheme, but other 
hurdles on the path to adopting a direct wireless service remained. Legislation enabling its 
adoption required Parliamentary approval, and the domestic political situation meant that its 
passage was not guaranteed. The Prime Minister still faced a potentially large range of 
opposition to AWA’s proposal.  
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Parliamentary Manoeuvres, late 1921 
 
The debate surrounding wireless at the Imperial Conference had focused attention on the 
subject back in Australia, presenting a window of opportunity for the resolution of a long-
standing issue. A problem had moved to a position of prominence on the agenda, a ready-
made policy to address the problem was available, and the Prime Minister was willing to 
provide his political support. In the closing months of 1921 Hughes took the opportunity to 
push the AWA agreement through Parliament. However, while Hughes remained the pre-
eminent actor in the political system, his support did not make the passage of AWA’s proposal 
through Parliament a fait accompli. The circumstances under which an amended version of the 
proposal were approved provide further evidence that its adoption was contingent upon the 
ability of Hughes’ leadership and political skills to outweigh his deteriorating domestic political 
position and razor-thin House majority. Though the sweeping changes encapsulated in the 
policy, along with the fraught situation in Parliament, led to resistance, two dimensions of 
Hughes’ framing of the matter – the inadequacy of a relay system for Australia and the need 
for a quick decision – proved sufficient to gain the vital first stage of Parliamentary approval 
for the agreement. Although he was not able to completely control the outcome, his framing 
of the issue as of crucial importance to Australia and demanding a quick resolution was 
durable enough to see the passage of a slightly modified bill through Parliament.   
 
On 5th October, Hughes spoke before Parliament on the subject of wireless and, for the first 
time, revealed the proposal for a partnership between AWA and the Commonwealth. The 
major thrust of his speech was to portray the Norman scheme as unacceptable by drawing 
unfavourable comparisons between it and AWA’s offer. These were focused on its relay 
design, and its poor financial prospects. In relation to the former, Hughes criticised the relay 
system as vulnerable, noting that “if one link in the chain were broken” the scheme would 
effectively become useless.28  Furthermore, he portrayed the relay chain as particularly 
disadvantageous to Australia. Situated as the opposite terminus to Britain, its messages to that 
country would be stuck behind those messages from those stations in between. This meant 
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that in the case of interruption “that station which is the furthest outpost of the scheme will 
fare the worst”.29  
 
Hughes also criticised the Norman proposal in financial terms – highlighting the £185,000 
initial investment and “estimated annual loss of £20,000” that it adoption would entail.30 He 
drew a connection between this estimate and the “most unsatisfactory”  financial state of the 
Commonwealth’s existing network of coastal stations, lamenting that “we have had wireless 
telegraphy in the Commonwealth for some time, yet the scheme is still carried on at a loss”.31 
To emphasise the latter point he cited a document from the Postmaster-General’s Department 
detailing a loss of over £57,000 in the previous financial year. He claimed that the projected 
cost of the Norman scheme was a major motivation in his opposition to it at the Imperial 
Conference:  
 
We are asked now to incur a loss of a further £20,000 under the Norman scheme. It is 
because of these facts that I was not amongst the most cordial supporters of the 
Norman Committee’s suggestion, and I asked the Prime Minister of Great Britain to 
give this House an opportunity of putting itself in touch with Britain in the best way it 
sought fit.32    
 
This section of the speech did not just undermine the Norman scheme, but also, through 
identifying the poor financial performance of the Commonwealth’s stations, the entire 
paradigm of government enterprise in wireless.  
 
By framing these two dimensions of wireless – the need for direct communication with Britain 
and the need for financial viability – as the most critical, Hughes was building the case for the 
proposed agreement with AWA through contrast. He portrayed the Norman scheme as a bad 
deal for Australia because it would be costly and leave the country’s communications 
vulnerable to interruption. AWA’s scheme, in comparison, did not only promise a direct link, 
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but also the prospect of wireless becoming a money-making investment for the 
Commonwealth: 
 
[The scheme] would involve the Commonwealth in a capital expenditure of £500,000, 
but we should have the controlling interest, as under the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s 
agreement, and we should get an assured return of 10 per cent, namely £50,000 per 
annum. The private company promoting this scheme would take over the existing 
service, on which we now lose approximately £60,000 per annum. This proposal has 
been made by Amalgamated Wireless of Australasia…The House has to choose 
between these two schemes. I do not expect it to do so now. We shall have to discuss 
these matters as definite proposals, and honourable members must have time to 
consider them…Parliament may do what it pleases, but I think it should certainly do 
something to place Australia in touch with the world by wireless telegraphy. Our 
present position, I repeat, is most unsatisfactory.33  
 
Hughes concluded his oration with a caution that in relation to international communications 
the British Empire was in danger of falling behind other powers such as the United States, 
Germany and France – a warning against further delay.  
 
Hughes’ had insisted that Parliament should be given time to consider the subject, but his 
actions conveyed the opposite intention. On 7th October, two days after his announcement of 
the AWA proposal, he moved a motion “that the Ministerial statement re Imperial Conference 
made on 30th September and certain resolutions notified on 5th October be printed”.34 This 
motion, which passed, was introduced as the final item prior to the House’s adjournment for 
the week. Its intention was to bundle all of the Prime Minister’s commentary on the Imperial 
Conference, which had comprised large portions of two sitting days and covered a wide range 
of subjects, into one document to become a Parliamentary Paper; moving towards a formal 
deliberation on the subject. The logic behind this was to prevent an itemised consideration of 
the different subjects contained within the Prime Minister’s statements.  
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This manoeuvre, and its implications for the ability of the House to debate different aspects of 
Hughes’ report on the Imperial Conference, was highlighted on the next sitting day by a 
discontented government backbencher. Noting his surprise at “the sudden cessation of the 
debate on the Imperial Conference, and the way in which it petered out on Friday last”, the 
Member for Perth objected to the Speaker that the Prime Minister’s motion was out of order 
and pleaded that the Speaker consider “that the matter of the Imperial Conference is still 
before the House”.35 The Speaker’s response was unsympathetic, noting that it was too late to 
raise such an objection given that the motion to print the Prime Minister’s statement had 
passed, adding that “although the Prime Minister made two separate statements, he desired 
that they should be covered by the one motion…and that is how the business was set down on 
the notice paper as printed”.36   
 
An article appeared in The Argus a few days later that provided a justification for Hughes’ 
manoeuvre. While noting that when the motion to print was put before the House “there was 
not a full attendance of members [and] few realised what they were voting for”, the article 
claimed that “it was evidently not the intention of the Prime Minister…that the motion moved 
by him in the House of Representatives that his reports on the Imperial Conference be printed 
should be agreed to without debate”.37 Rather, it continued, Hughes had indicated “with 
regard to wireless development and communication with Great Britain he would present a 
definite proposal…[and] intended that the House should give full consideration to these 
matters, and members generally expected to be able to speak on it”, although because of “the 
position that had arisen” – a notable use of the passive voice – this would not be possible for a 
number of weeks.38 The impression conveyed by this article was one of an accidental 
development; unlikely given Hughes’ twenty years’ experience in Parliament and the intimate 
knowledge of procedure resulting from such experience. The Prime Minister’s actions appear 
calculated to progress the agreement through Parliament with a minimum of debate, owing to 
the widening fissures within the Nationalist Party and typical of his autocratic style. 
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The matter was next raised in Parliament on 24th November, when the proposed agreement 
with AWA was tabled by the Prime Minister with a minimum of fanfare.39 By this stage there 
had been another revision of the proposal, diluting a number of its terms that were overly-
favourable to AWA. While it still allowed for the provision of necessary licences to the 
company to realise its goals, there was no more reference to the empowerment of the 
company to itself control the distribution of licences. Also excised was the open-ended 
prohibition on the Commonwealth ‘doing any thing’ to inhibit the company’s profitability. This 
was replaced with a milder statement that “the Commonwealth will not impose any condition 
or restriction of any kind…calculated to obstruct the business of the company”.40 It is unclear 
who authored these revisions, but they were clearly calculated to make the proposal more 
palatable – a recognition of the potential for controversy that lay ahead.  
 
In support of the effort to pass the agreement through Parliament, AWA circulated a 
professionally-printed booklet to Members of Parliament as part of a broader lobbying 
campaign. George Wise, who was serving as Postmaster-General at the time, later described 
the “enormous amount of propaganda, both by printed matter and button-holing, that had 
been carried on by agents of the Wireless Company amongst honourable members”, and 
claimed that AWA’s efforts had been instrumental in attaining Parliament’s acquiescence to its 
proposal.41 A letter attached to the booklet outlined the proposal as one that would promote 
the further development of the industry, and be a profitable investment for the 
Commonwealth:  
 
Since you are interested in the provision of facilities for improving Australia’s 
communication with countries overseas, and for the establishment of the wireless 
industry in Australia on a basis which will enable this country to enjoy the fullest 
possible benefits of this new science, and on a sound commercial basis so that it will 
not involve an additional drain on the Treasury, I am submitting to you the enclosed 
notes.42    
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The booklet reiterated many of the arguments Fisk and other AWA representatives had been 
making to senior members of the government since 1918, spruiking the commercial, social, 
and defence gains that would be made from developing Australian wireless. Most significantly, 
however, the claims were a word-for-word repeat of Hughes’ comments from the Imperial 
Conference.43 Though it is unclear who the original wordsmith was, this demonstrates the 
coalescence of a cluster of arguments in favour of developing wireless which had been 
adopted by the proponents of AWA’s scheme; the development of a consistent frame.  
 
AWA’s lobbying campaign also included the reception of experimental direct transmissions 
from the Marconi Company. On 6th December, the day before the matter was again raised in 
Parliament, newspapers had carried reports of messages sent directly from Britain being 
received by an AWA experimental station in Australia.44 The timing and nature of these 
messages, being the first dispatched by the Australian Press Association’s London bureau to its 
headquarters in Australia, were calculated to draw the attention of the press prior to the 
impending debate in the House, and as a further demonstration of the feasibility of direct 
communication.   
 
The company was unable to control the fate of the agreement when put before Parliament. 
Nevertheless, it was doing all in its power to influence the votes of MPs. It tried to sway them 
both directly, through personal engagement and the distribution of literature, and indirectly, 
through enlisting the support of the press to create an atmosphere of inevitability for direct 
wireless. 
 
On 7th December the Prime Minister made his final case for Parliament to approve the AWA 
agreement, tying together a wide range of justifications in a long speech in support of a 
motion approving its execution. By this time another rival scheme had emerged from an 
unlikely source. A new firm called the Radio Communications Company had presented a 
scheme of strikingly similar detail to AWA’s, calling for a £350,001 investment from the 
Commonwealth for the purpose of establishing a direct wireless link with Britain. Though the 
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company offered the same service for a smaller investment, its offer was summarily dismissed 
by Hughes, who declared that it “must be ignored…for many reasons” – testament to the 
importance of AWA’s years-long campaign of ‘softening up’ prior to the moment of decision.45 
Having excluded the proposal of the Radio Communications Company, Hughes announced that 
the Parliament faced a binary choice – either the Norman scheme or AWA’s.  
 
Reiterating his earlier criticisms of the Norman scheme, Hughes dismissed it as unsuitable for 
Australia’s future security needs:  
The Norman scheme, then, is useless for the purposes for which we require it…We 
wish, above all things, to have direct communication with Great Britain. Australia is a 
country geographically remote, but happily, owing to Britain’s command of the sea, 
the cables were not cut during the war. But little imagination is necessary to 
understand what the severing of the cables would have meant to Australia, cut off, as 
it was, from Europe, and without an effective system of wireless.46  
  
The other major plank of the Prime Minister’s criticism was that the Norman scheme would 
lose money. As before, he tied this to the unprofitable history of Commonwealth involvement 
in domestic wireless to date. However, on this occasion he widened his attack to focus on the 
entire paradigm of government enterprise in wireless, claiming that there were “grave doubts” 
about the wisdom of the Postmaster-General’s Department continuing to control the 
medium.47 As an alternative, “if we want an efficient system of wireless, we must look for it in 
quarters where we shall have at our disposal men with scientific training and business 
capacity, and above all those in quarters that have control of those patents and apparati 
without which it is impossible for wireless to be successful”.48  
  
The Prime Minister’s reference to patents was a new element of justification for AWA’s 
scheme. Although its access to the global patent pool had been a constant selling point for the 
company, the Norman Committee’s report had expressed confidence that it would be possible 
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to proceed without the need to use any of the Marconi Company’s technology: the “important 
patents” involved in the scheme were “already the property of the British Government”.49 
However, Hughes’ invocation of patents carried an important implication. Because the 
Marconi Company, in conjunction with AWA, had been the only organisation to demonstrate 
its capability to provide direct communication between the countries, it would be necessary to 
cooperate with it to work towards that end. 
 
After critiquing the Norman scheme, Hughes shifted towards praising AWA’s proposal for its 
promise of financial profitability and benefits for national development. Gesturing towards the 
company’s record of profitability, and the scheme’s provision for it to absorb the unprofitable 
coastal stations, he declared that partnership with the company would not merely “prevent 
the continuation of the present loss, but [also] give the Commonwealth a return of 10 per 
cent” on its investment.50 The promise of profitability was connected with economic 
nationalism, and the fact that AWA was a national enterprise:  
 
I have here a list of the principal shareholders of the Amalgamated Wireless 
(Australasia) Ltd. I cannot say what is the total number, but they are all Australian 
citizens, and domiciled for the most part in the various State capitals of the 
Commonwealth. It is an Australian concern with which we are dealing. It is under the 
control of the Australian law. It is a business concern which is run at a profit, and 
contrasts very favourably with our own wireless scheme, which is not a business 
concern run at a profit, but, on the contrary, shows a loss.51 
 
Hughes’ speech also warned of the need for a speedy resolution, pointing out that other great 
powers had overtaken Britain in developing wireless:  
 
The people of other countries are not fools. France is in great financial straits, yet she 
has spent over £1,000,000 on the Bordeaux station, and is erecting a still more 
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50 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7th December 1921, p. 13978. 
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powerful one. In the United States of America there has been erected one of the most, 
if not the most, powerful stations in the world…Britain alone is doing nothing in this 
regard.52 
 
The implication was clear. Australia, and the British Empire at large, had to take swift action to 
remain competitive in the field of international communication. Because of the need for 
speed, Parliament had to choose between the two schemes that were available – additional 
delays would only mean falling further behind other great powers.  
 
Hughes’ motion did not escape criticism on the floor of the House, but, importantly, this took 
place within the frame that the Prime Minister had placed around the issue. One Country Party 
MP quibbled with the specific form of AWA’s agreement, noting that the agreement’s 
provision for granting the Commonwealth only three positions upon the company’s seven 
member Board of Directors meant that, despite its majority ownership, the Commonwealth 
would not be assured of “the measure of control that it would secure by means of the same 
number of shares in an ordinary company”.53 However, this line of criticism suggests that the 
Country Party was not opposed to the central feature of the proposal – that Australia’s 
international wireless service would be constructed by private enterprise – but instead sought 
to moderate some of its excesses.  
 
Labor’s criticisms, though stronger, also largely acceded to the Prime Minister’s frame. Deputy 
leader Matthew Charlton, speaking in response to Hughes, echoed the importance of 
constructing an international wireless service and, importantly, the unsuitability of the 
Norman scheme for Australia.54 He did, however, express concern regarding the speed at 
which the Prime Minister was looking to secure the agreement’s passage through Parliament. 
Noting the importance of giving “the fullest consideration to an important proposition of this 
character”, he claimed that the matter “should have been brought before Parliament some 
time ago, in order that ample opportunity might be afforded…to test and consider in detail the 
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various offers”.55 Despite Hughes’ insistence that the Parliament had had two months to do so, 
Charlton – correctly – described the detailed proposal the House was being asked to agree to 
as an altogether different matter to the statement made by Hughes after returning from the 
Imperial Conference. Charlton also concurred with the criticism made by the Country Party 
regarding the clause in the agreement giving the Commonwealth only three of seven seats on 
AWA’s Board of Directors, expressing strong reservations at the thought of effectively granting 
a monopoly to a private company while being unable to steer its direction. As a result, he 
moved an amendment to Hughes’ motion wherein “the whole question of wireless” was to “be 
referred to a Committee of this House for investigation and report”.56  
  
Earle Page, speaking after Charlton, also agreed with major elements of Hughes’ 
characterisation of the issue. Declaring that “the Post Office should not be called upon to 
handle this matter” because of its poor financial record in relation to the coastal network, he 
indicated his party’s preference for the medium to be left to private enterprise operating 
“under proper guarantees and safeguards”, which he was convinced would secure better 
results than government control.57 Whereas “the Norman proposition is not worth 
considering” because of its cost, he stated that AWA’s proposal “deserves favourable 
consideration from this House”, given the company’s record of successful management and 
profitability.58 Decisively, Page also signalled his intention to move towards a speedy resolution 
of the subject, as long as some changes were made to the terms of the agreement. In 
opposition to Charlton’s urging for a postponement, and for the issue to be re-examined in its 
entirety, he declared that the Labor spokesman was suggesting “rather a long delay. Australia 
is remote from other parts of the world, and it is essential that we should take action…I think 
the arrangement [with AWA] is one that can be indorsed”.59 Debate on the matter then 
adjourned for the day.   
 
Though no formal decision was made on the day, the Parliamentary debate surrounding 
international wireless on 7th December contained several important dimensions. The Prime 
Minister, commanding the narrowest of Parliamentary majorities and with a restive 
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backbench, could not be certain of the agreement’s passage through the House. Unified 
opposition from both the Country and Labor parties would only need to pull away a single 
renegade vote from the Nationalist members to sink the deal. Because of this, he did all he 
could to promote its passage. By allowing Parliament a minimum of time to consider the 
details of the proposal, and emphasising the importance of speed in light of the international 
situation, he sought to secure a quick approval. In this effort, he framed the issue as bound to 
fundamental concerns of national security. Because of this security imperative, it was 
necessary for Australia to determine its policy as quickly as possible. By implication, it was 
necessary to choose between those two schemes that were ready for quick implementation – 
the Norman scheme and the partnership with AWA. He then emphasised the inadequacy of 
the relay model, upon which the Norman scheme was based, for Australian security – a point 
upon which all parties came to agree. Hughes’ other main point of contrast between the two 
alternatives – that of cost – was calculated to appeal to the two non-Labor parties in the 
chamber. Ultimately, though Hughes could not predict the fate of his motion once introduced 
to the House, his framing of the issue would prove to be of decisive importance. Page’s 
accession in relation to the importance of speed, and all parties’ rejection of the Norman 
scheme, increased the likelihood that AWA’s scheme would be adopted.   
 
A printer’s error on the Order of the Day prevented debate from resuming on the following 
day, meaning that the matter was pushed back to 9th December – the final sitting day for the 
year.60 Debate resumed with a lengthy speech in favour of partnership with AWA from Charles 
Marr, the Nationalist Member for Parkes. Marr was a natural fit to speak on matters relating to 
wireless, having overseen the erection of the Commonwealth’s first wireless station at Sydney 
in 1912 and served as an officer for the Army’s Wireless Signal Squadron in the Middle East 
prior to being endorsed as a candidate for the 1919 election.61 Marr’s speech was focused on 
delegitimising the paradigm of government enterprise in the field of wireless. It presented a 
narrative of maladministration on behalf of both the Postmaster-General’s and Navy 
departments, bemoaning the “public money…poured into the gutters” under their control and 
claiming that “both the Department of the Navy and the Postal Department have mishandled 
wireless ever since its inception in Australia”.62 He urged Australia to adopt “an up-to-date 
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wireless service” because “it is essential for us to advance in wireless work…and keep abreast 
of other nations”.63 To move towards this end, “after weighing all the facts and the statements 
made most carefully”, he concluded that the proposal “of the Amalgamated Wireless 
(Australasia) Limited is the best”.64  
 
Labor’s John West spoke in response to Marr, defending the paradigm of government 
monopoly and attacking the Marconi Company. He registered his strong opposition to any 
involvement of private interests in Australian wireless and objected to Hughes’ attempt to rush 
the AWA proposal through the House with a minimum of scrutiny: 
 
I object to the Prime Minister being given a free hand. There should be the closest 
scrutiny by a Committee of the Federal Parliament. There is no Commonwealth 
Treasurer to-day, and we know that the Prime Minister is absolutely reckless in his 
handling of public funds. The people interested in the wireless scheme have got on the 
right side of the right honourable gentleman. He has lost his cautious balance, largely 
due, no doubt, to insidious propaganda carried on by friends of the Marconi 
system…while the Prime Minister was in England. It would be fatal to the best 
interests of the Commonwealth if the right honourable gentleman were permitted to 
go ahead without check.65    
 
The Country Party Member for Robertson similarly criticised the Prime Minister’s conduct, 
noting that the timing of his motion to approve of the deal with AWA meant “we can say 
practically nothing about the matter, as the House has its mind set on getting into recess as 
quickly as possible”.66 Nevertheless, he conceded the validity of the Prime Minister’s 
characterisation of the subject: 
 
He told us that wireless communication was necessary. I agree with him, and concur 
also in his view that Australia cannot afford to be left out of the stream of events. The 
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right honourable gentleman told us further that a relay service would be 
unsatisfactory. With that the House, I believe, will also agree; but the fact that such a 
service would be unsatisfactory does not necessarily mean that we should approve of 
the agreement. On the scientific side, of which I know nothing, it may be satisfactory; 
but on the business side it is certainly open to criticism.67 
 
The major obstacle remained the composition of the company’s Board of Directors, which was 
seen as an obstacle to the Commonwealth exercising the degree of control that its acquisition 
of a majority stake in the company would suggest. Because of this detail, the Member for 
Robertson pledged his continued opposition “unless the Prime Minister gives the House a 
definite promise that he will have the whole matter inquired into by a Select Committee”.68 
Nevertheless, the terms in which the Country Party members were criticising the proposal left 
open the possibility of a compromise solution. Unlike Labor, whose members had coalesced 
into blanket opposition and sought a wide-ranging re-examination of the issue, the Country 
Party parliamentarians were opposed on a comparatively narrow detail.  
 
When Charlton’s amendment from two days prior – to refer the whole question of wireless to 
a Parliamentary Committee – was put to a vote it was defeated, with enough members of the 
Country Party siding with the government to reject it. Immediately afterwards, the Prime 
Minister moved another amendment to his original motion, calling for the House to assent to 
the partnership with AWA “subject to investigation and approval, with such alterations as they 
may deem necessary, by a Committee” made up of two members of each of the three parties 
as well as three senators.69 Speaking in support of his amendment, Hughes admitted that “the 
form is unusual, but the circumstances are unusual” and restated the importance of a quick 
decision, claiming that “if the Commonwealth do not take action now it will probably be eight 
months before this Parliament will be in a position to even consider the question” given that 
upon resumption the following year “it will have to concern itself with financial and other 
matters of the first importance”.70 To mollify criticism, he assured that he would not be a 
member of the Parliamentary Committee and that in its composition “the Government will be 
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in a hopeless minority”, promising that “the matter to be considered must stand on its 
merits”.71    
 
Speaking in response, Charlton repeated his displeasure at the timing of Hughes’ measure, 
coming at the very end of the year, and further suggested that the Prime Minister, through 
shifting responsibility for approval of the partnership on to the Parliamentary Committee, was 
trying to shield his government from responsibility. Crucially, however, Earle Page signalled his 
intent to support Hughes’ amendment: “although I am opposed, on general principles, to the 
procedure which has been adopted, I will support it on this occasion, because each party in the 
House will have equal representation…and because it will also have on it members of the 
Senate who will not necessarily, the Prime Minister assures me, be Government supporters”.72 
Page also affirmed the importance of a swift resolution: “in view of the urgent importance of 
the matter, I feel that it should be dealt with at the earliest possible moment, and for that 
reason I intend to support the amendment”.73 Though Page’s Country Party colleagues did not 
uniformly side with him in the division, enough did to ensure that the amendment, and 
subsequently the motion, passed the House by 34 votes to 28. On the following day the 
Parliamentary Committee’s members were appointed. Despite Hughes’ assurances to Page, 
the three representatives of the Senate were all Nationalists, giving that party a majority of 
five of the committee’s nine members.74     
 
Hughes had been compelled to make concessions, but this episode was a crucial step towards 
the adoption of AWA’s proposal for a direct wireless link. The Prime Minister had framed the 
issue in two ways that were critical to the outcome. One was through his insistence of the 
importance of a speedy decision on the question of wireless, a point consistently made by 
AWA in its overtures – both public and private – at the time. Unlike the Labor leadership, Page 
concurred with the importance of speediness, and his support brought enough Country Party 
votes with it to enable the Prime Minister’s amended motion to pass. Hughes had also framed 
the matter as a choice between the Norman scheme – rejected even by Labor – and direct 
wireless, while presenting AWA’s proposal as the only realistic prospect of achieving the latter. 
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Thus the opposition, having rejected what Hughes portrayed as the only alternative, the 
Norman scheme, could be portrayed as procrastinating on the matter of wireless – a matter 
requiring urgent action. The Prime Minister’s advocacy created a rhetorical consensus on these 
two important points: that direct wireless, rather than a relay scheme, was the best option for 
Australia, and that speed was vital in its creation, lest Australia be left behind the rest of the 
world. Even those who opposed Hughes’ proposal, and the specifics of the deal with AWA, 
were in agreement with these points. Accepting these points, however, virtually necessitated 
an arrangement of some kind with AWA because of the ready availability of its proposal.   
 
Though the proposal still required the assent of the Parliamentary Committee, Hughes had 
managed to get the partnership with AWA over the greatest political hurdle in its path: his 
government’s bare majority in the House of Representatives. The wording of his amended 
motion meant that once the proposal had received approval from the committee it would be 
enacted, and therefore it would not be subject to any further scrutiny in Parliament. The 
circumstances under which his motion was passed – on the final sitting day of the year and 
with a minimum of discussion for a consequential policy measure – demonstrate an implicit 
acknowledgement on behalf of Hughes that the proposal was unlikely to prove popular 
enough to stand on its own merits. Its passage, though conditional upon further approval, was 
therefore dependant on Hughes’ skill at manipulating Parliamentary procedure. Subjecting the 
agreement with AWA to the analysis of a committee was a minor compromise to achieve its 
passage through the House of Representatives. 
 
This episode demonstrates the inability of any single actor, or group of actors, to completely 
control the policymaking process. With the opening of a policy window, and the introduction 
of the AWA proposal into the formal decision-making body of the Parliament, the proposal’s 
fate rested on the vagaries of conditions in the political stream. The government’s bare 
majority in the House, combined with a fickle backbench, meant that it was not possible to 
ram the measure through Parliament without alteration. Instead, it was necessary to find 
common ground with the Country Party in order to secure sufficient support. The cost of this 
was to refer the matter to a Parliamentary Committee for referral. To an even greater degree 
than Hughes, AWA’s executives were unable to direct the fate of their proposal once it had 
been introduced to the political system. The best they could do was to lobby MPs as a means 
to cultivate support, and to arrange a demonstration of direct wireless in conjunction with the 
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Marconi Company as a means of applying indirect pressure. These measures aside, the 
company was dependent upon their strongest supporter – the Prime Minister – when it came 
to the fate of their proposal in the political system. 
 
Once introduced into the political system, the policy proposal became the subject of that 
system and dependent upon the prevailing conditions within it, principally the balance of 
power in Parliament. This affirms several aspects of MSA. One is the relative autonomy of the 
three streams that flow through the system, only to be coupled at key moments with the 
opening of a policy window. In this case, the political circumstances which would come to bear 
on the fate of Australia’s international wireless service were the product of the 1919 federal 
election – through which the composition of the Parliament was determined – and other 
dimensions of the country’s political life at the time, such as the relationships between and 
within the three parties in the Parliament. Related to this is the importance that MSA 
attributes to timing. Because a policy window opens infrequently, and seldom stays open for 
long, the conditions in the three streams at that specific point in time are of great importance. 
In this case, the conditions in the political stream in late 1921 would prove decisive to the 
eventual outcome. The Country Party, upon which Hughes was dependent because of his 
narrow majority and backbench dissent on the scheme, was willing to countenance the idea of 
partnering with private enterprise for the provision of an international wireless service. 
However, this support was conditional on a closer inspection of the agreement’s details. This 
would lead to further moderation of some of its terms perceived as excessively favourable to 
AWA.      
 
Given the lasting consequences of these events, and the controversy that would come to be 
associated with it the following year, it is remarkable that the only overt resistance to it during 
this critical period was on the floor of Parliament and largely confined to the Labor Party. 
Officials of the Postmaster-General’s and Navy departments had long opposed any deals with 
AWA, but their records present no evidence of misgivings – or any commentary at all – 
regarding these political developments. Similarly, despite the fact that Hughes was at odds 
with his Cabinet colleagues on the subject, none had the temerity to challenge his actions. 
They had not been presented with a structured opportunity to do so, as the subject of 
international wireless had not been brought before the Cabinet since before Hughes’ 
departure for the Imperial Conference. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a simmering 
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discontent in relation to the subject. A wide-ranging Cabinet reshuffle on 21st December saw 
George Wise removed from the Postmaster-General’s portfolio. By all accounts, Wise, who had 
been a consistent advocate for government control of wireless, was displaced due to 
disagreement with Hughes regarding the impending partnership with AWA.75 As Wise later 
remarked in a speech on the House floor in the following year, “it [was] well known to every 
honourable member who spoke to me on the subject that I was strongly opposed to the 
Commonwealth having any relations with the Amalgamated Wireless Company”.76 Even 
though the decision to partner with AWA was contrary to his preferences and unambiguously 
related to his portfolio responsibilities, Wise had been unwilling to openly resist the Prime 
Minister on the matter. This reveals that although Hughes’ position within the Nationalist 
Party had been reduced in the post-war years, he still possessed enough personal authority 
over his Cabinet to forestall any overt challenge.       
 
Approval and Implementation 
 
The committee established by Parliament in December 1921 to investigate international 
wireless held sixteen sittings between January and March 1922 under the chairmanship of the 
new Treasurer, Stanley Bruce.77 The British government, having only discovered Parliament’s 
decision to refer the question to a committee through press coverage, had urged the 
Commonwealth not to proceed with this unilateral course of action, hoping instead to 
collaborate and find a mutually-acceptable policy.78  This plea was ignored by Australian 
decision-makers. The committee met in relative secrecy and, with the exception of the final 
report issued in March, few records of its proceedings are available. A letter accompanying the 
report notes that over the course of its proceedings the committee’s members “examined 
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many witnesses and documents, and in addition inspected Radio Stations operated by the 
Commonwealth and the Amalgamated Wireless Company”.79  
 
The documents examined by the committee included the brief report of the Cabinet sub-
committee presented prior to Hughes’ travel to the Imperial Conference in 1921,80 as well as 
the earlier proposal for a scheme of international wireless prepared by Balsillie under 
instruction by Watt during the latter’s tenure as Acting Prime Minister.81 Both of these 
recommended maintaining a government monopoly in wireless. The committee’s members 
were also informed of a new, January 1922, report from Frederick Golding, the Postmaster-
General’s Department’s Chief Electrical Engineer, who was in Europe investigating the latest 
advances in wireless. Golding’s observations led him to an important conclusion: recent 
innovations made the prospect of direct communication between Britain and Australia via 
high-power transmission stations feasible, but the patent rights to the innovations in question 
were exclusively held by the Marconi Company.82 By implication, the adoption of direct 
communication would necessitate some arrangement whereby the British firm’s patents could 
be accessed; another factor in favour of partnership with AWA.    
 
The bulk of the committee’s deliberations were dedicated to technical questions, principally 
focused on the practicability of maintaining a continuous direct link with Britain. To speak on 
such matters, “witnesses were called, who would be able, by their experience or technical 
position, to assist in deciding this vital point”.83 The witnesses who appeared before the 
committee included nearly every major figure that had influenced Australian wireless policy up 
until that point: the Prime Minister, Fisk, Cresswell, Balsillie and several other officials of the 
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Postmaster-General’s Department.84 The most salient theme of these discussions was a 
division between Fisk and a number of committee members, with the former expressing 
unrestrained optimism about the prospect of securing a reliable direct wireless link with 
Britain, and scepticism on this point coming from his questioners and representatives of the 
Postmaster-General’s Department. Another notable point in the committee’s report was a 
short description of Hughes’ testimony that revealed “he was not in favour of the Post Office 
in England or Australia controlling wireless”.85 The Prime Minister’s statement also revealed 
that, much as Thomas Hughes had suggested earlier, he was willing to lobby the British 
government to grant a licence for a reciprocal station to be erected in that country, if that 
government proved hesitant to do so.        
 
The committee considered the proposals to provide a direct wireless link to Britain from both 
AWA and the Radio Communication Company, and concluded that “after exhaustive inquiry 
we are unable to recommend the adoption of either of these agreements in the form 
presented”.86 It deemed, however, that of the two proposals AWA’s represented the more 
“suitable basis for a final modified Agreement”.87 This decision was justified in terms of patent 
control. While the Radio Communication Company’s access to patents was uncertain, pending 
litigation in Britain, AWA’s membership of the global patent pool gave it uninhibited access to 
all of the world’s major systems including Marconi, Telefunken and the newly-created Radio 
Corporation of America.88 This decision to adopt AWA’s proposal, rather than that of the Radio 
Communication Company, as the basis for a modified agreement also reflected the 
considerably greater political heft of the Australian company, and the extended campaign of 
‘softening up’ it had conducted since the Armistice. Though the committee was pledged to 
examine both proposals, only AWA’s was granted serious consideration. 
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The modifications to AWA’s proposal were made by a sub-committee consisting of two 
Nationalist Senators.89 The amended proposal was then returned to the committee proper for 
approval. The committee recommended the execution of the revised agreement although, 
notably, this endorsement was made by eight of the nine committee members, with Labor 
representative Frank Brennan’s name absent from the recommendation.  
 
There were a number of differences between the original proposal put before the committee 
and that which was subsequently recommended for execution. One of the most significant 
concerned the issue that had come under criticism in Parliament the previous December: the 
composition of the Board of Directors to oversee the operations of the joint venture. Whereas 
the original proposal allocated the Commonwealth three of the Board’s seven seats, with the 
remaining four elected by the company’s private shareholders, the revised version gave each 
of these blocs three positions, with the seventh to be “selected by a majority vote of the other 
six directors, and if the voting is equal shall be selected by arbitration”.90 In addition, a new 
clause was inserted into the agreement obliging AWA to take over the Commonwealth’s 
coastal network of stations – along with the staff operating the network – “and to operate and 
re-organize the service provided by these stations in such a way as to provide a service at least 
equivalent to that now being supplied by the Commonwealth Radio Service”.91 The company’s 
acquisition of the coastal stations would defray the capital invested into the venture by the 
Commonwealth, although the Commonwealth would continue to bear the costs associated 
with running the coastal stations for another three years. The revised agreement also limited 
the licences that would be guaranteed to the company, going from those required “for the full 
development of the industry” to those “necessary for the full realization of the programme” of 
direct wireless to Britain and establishing a network of feeder stations.92 This represented a 
considerable narrowing of the licences that would be allocated under the agreement. Another 
clause, forbidding the Commonwealth to “impose any condition or restriction of any kind upon 
the operations of the Company calculated to obstruct the business of the Company”, was also 
revised so as to only cover the services the company pledged to undertake in the agreement.93      
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Taken together, these amendments represented a reduction in the open-ended guarantees 
that the unaltered proposal would have extended to AWA. Rather than providing AWA with 
carte blanche, and government backing, to develop the sector as it saw fit, the revised 
agreement narrowed its focus upon the provision of a direct service to Britain. The original 
version was unanimously determined inappropriate by the committee’s members for being 
too favourable to AWA at the expense of the Commonwealth. Following the committee’s 
endorsement, the modified proposal was agreed to by AWA, and was dispatched to the Prime 
Minister for execution. It was signed by Fisk and Hughes on 28th March 1922. 
 
With the agreement ratified, three major steps to implement it followed. The first of these was 
the transfer of the Commonwealth’s wireless assets to AWA, which took effect in early May.94 
This consisted of eighteen stations around the Australian coastline and two in New Guinea, 
valued at £183,000.95 The company also took control over an additional seven stations of the 
Island Radio Service, hitherto administered as a separate organisation, consisting of stations in 
the former German South Pacific colonies now under an Australian League of Nations 
mandate.96 From this point, the only remaining wireless stations under control of the 
Commonwealth were the few retained by the RAN for its own purposes. A letter authored by 
the Secretary of the Postmaster-General’s Department in 1924 reflected upon the cost of the 
coastal network, noting that “since 1912 and 1913, when the coastal radio services were 
commenced, the Government has borne a loss of approximately £388,000”.97 Incidentally, the 
same letter also mentioned that the financial health of these stations had not improved after 
two years of AWA control, during which time they had incurred around £63,000 in losses – 
losses still borne by the Commonwealth under the terms of the agreement. AWA continued to 
operate the coastal network of wireless stations for the next 25 years.98 
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The next step was transferring the responsibility for the administration of wireless from the 
Postmaster-General’s to the Prime Minister’s Department, put into effect from 1st June.99 This 
included the transfer of the necessary staff from the Postmaster-General’s Department, whose 
functions were to include “advising the Prime Minister and Secretary on all wireless matters”, 
administering the Wireless Telegraphy Act, and overseeing the implementation of the 
agreement with AWA.100  This move was symbolic of the centrality of Hughes to the 
development of Australian wireless in this period, and the instrumental role he played in 
securing the agreement.  
 
The final step towards executing the agreement was appointing the company’s new Board of 
Directors. The three Commonwealth directors, eminent figures tied to the Nationalist Party, 
were nominated for their positions by the Prime Minister in May.101 Each was then assigned a 
single share in the new enterprise so as to provide them with speaking and voting rights at 
company meetings.102 The company, for its part, nominated Fisk along with two other of its 
employees as its directors.103 These six positions were confirmed without incident. However, in 
the weeks to come the appointment of the crucial seventh director position would result in 
great controversy, and threaten to kill the newly-formalised agreement in its infancy.  
 
The Seventh Director and a Failed Counterattack 
 
The composition of the Board of Directors to oversee the joint enterprise had been a major 
point of contention when the issue had been before Parliament in late 1921, with the original 
plan for AWA to control a majority of its seats attracting criticism from the Labor and Country 
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parties. The Parliamentary Committee had revised this aspect of the agreement, to ensure a 
greater balance on the board, as part of a number of alterations to make the agreement less 
overtly favourable to AWA. An attempt by the company to secure itself a majority of seats on 
the board, in defiance of these alterations, led to a political firestorm that threatened to 
destroy the new paradigm in its first weeks. In the end, it was Hughes’ personal intervention in 
the matter that saved the agreement.  
 
With an election due by the end of 1922, the Labor opposition had identified the agreement 
with AWA as a potential vulnerability of the Hughes government. When Parliament resumed in 
June, after a lengthy recess dating from the previous December, Labor began attacking the 
government over its wireless policy. To coincide with the resumption of Parliament, and 
despite the fact that the decision had been enacted three months prior, Frank Brennan, the 
only member of the Parliamentary Committee who had not endorsed its final decision, 
published a letter to Hughes attacking the agreement with AWA. This letter provided a basis 
for the opposition to attack the government, and a defence of Labor policy on wireless dating 
back to the Fisher government. 
 
There were several elements to Brennan’s statement. One was an endorsement of the 
principle of direct wireless and a rejection of a relay system, demonstrating how effective 
Hughes’ consensus-building had been on this question. Nonetheless, Brennan was scathing on 
the original proposed agreement with AWA, which he described as “crude and compromising” 
to the Commonwealth’s interests.104 While conceding that the amended version approved by 
the committee was “immeasurably better than that originally submitted”, he still attacked it 
for its reliance upon private enterprise. As an alternative he put forward to desirability of a 
direct wireless link undertaken by “a Commonwealth enterprise unhampered by any legal 
nexus with any Company”.105 He framed his position in terms of Australia’s national interest, 
declaring that “this Agreement compromises and hampers the nation by association with 
interests whose main objective is pecuniary gain rather than national service”.106  
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On 29th June Labor requested that a copy of the Parliamentary Committee’s report be tabled in 
Parliament.107 The following week, Opposition Leader Matthew Charlton launched a spirited 
attack upon the government’s agreement with AWA. Charlton’s speech sought to accredit his 
party for the changes that had been made to the agreement by the Parliamentary Committee. 
In it, he cited Brennan’s letter as proof that even the amended agreement was unsatisfactory 
for the interests of the Commonwealth: 
 
He [Brennan] says that the project is experimental, and that there is grave doubt as to 
whether it can be carried out satisfactorily…He questions whether Parliament should 
accept the proposal, but says that if the scheme is to be carried into effect the 
Commonwealth should control it. There is a good deal to be said for that point of 
view.108 
  
This was part of a broader attack upon many areas of government policy undertaken by the 
Opposition Leader in a wide-ranging speech – an attempt to establish himself as the leader of 
an alternative government in an election year. Even before AWA’s attempt to secure itself a 
majority of seats on the Board of Directors became public knowledge, wireless was on the 
political agenda. In some form or another, matters concerning wireless were raised in 
Parliament on every subsequent sitting day leading up to the middle of July. 
 
On 13th July the ongoing debate on the subject became a furore as AWA’s machinations came 
to light. In early June Thomas Hughes had resigned from the company’s executive and soon 
thereafter was nominated by the AWA-appointed directors to fill the position of seventh 
director. The Commonwealth-appointed directors, for their part, nominated Frank Leverrier, a 
prominent barrister and the serving Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University, who held an interest 
in wireless.109 The three Commonwealth directors all opposed Thomas Hughes’ nomination on 
the grounds “that the Government which they represent does not desire a member of the old 
Board to be elected as seventh Director”.110 Each nominee received three votes from the blocs 
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which had nominated them and, according to the terms of the agreement, an arbitrator was 
appointed to decide the matter. 
 
In early July the arbitrator – the President of the Law Institute of New South Wales – decided 
that Thomas Hughes was the best candidate for the position of seventh director. Following this 
decision, Thomas Hughes assumed his position and, to add to the affront, was then elected to 
the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors. The Commonwealth directors protested 
“that the appointment by the Arbitrator of the seventh Director was not a proper one in the 
circumstances, having regard to what…were the intentions of the Commonwealth 
Government” in amending the agreement to deny AWA majority control over the board.111   
 
On 13th July, Thomas Hughes’ appointment as seventh director was first raised in Parliament. 
This revelation both increased the intensity of the ongoing debate around wireless, and 
prompted, for the first time, non-Labor MPs to add their voices to the chorus of criticism. 
Whereas the debate in this session of Parliament had hitherto been between the government 
and the Labor opposition, with no intervention from the Country Party, AWA’s breach of faith 
in appointing Thomas Hughes to the Board of Directors saw extra impetus added to Labor’s 
attack on the government’s handling of wireless by dissident Nationalists who began openly 
speaking against the agreement.  
 
The first sign of division within the Nationalist Party on the subject was a question from one 
government Senator who was a member of the Parliamentary Committee, John Millen, to 
fellow Nationalist Edward Millen, who represented the Prime Minister in the chamber. This 
question asked who had been appointed as directors, whether four of those had served on the 
previous board, and “whether such an arrangement is absolutely opposed to the intention of 
the Wireless Parliamentary Committee, whether such a state of control was viewed with great 
misgiving, and any agreement only consented to on the understanding that the seventh 
director should be independent of either interest?”.112  In response, Edward Millen evaded any 
reference to the propriety of the company’s actions, merely noting that “the appointment of 
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the seventh director was in strict accord with the agreement approved by the Wireless 
Committee”.113  
 
On the following day the subject of Thomas Hughes’ appointment was raised in the House by 
Brennan. Citing the previous day’s exchange in the Senate, which had revealed a “very startling 
and ominous piece of information”, he inveighed against AWA’s actions in securing its former 
chairman as the seventh director, further described by another Labor MP as “the hottest thing 
I have ever heard”.114 Brennan claimed that AWA had intended to do so from the outset, 
casting doubt over the propriety of the agreement with the company:  
 
It explains to me, absolutely, why Amalgamated Wireless jumped at every alteration 
which we made in the agreement. It reveals to me most clearly why, step by step, we 
drove them back, and why everything they said at first that they could not accept, they 
did accept. It was, of course, for the simple reason that Amalgamated Wireless 
realised that they would have the last say. The whole business is not only open to 
criticism, but to suspicion.115  
 
Notwithstanding the questionable veracity of these claims – the decision with relation to the 
seventh director had been made by an independent arbitrator – the effect was to portray the 
government as in thrall to the company. The seventh director controversy was the catalyst for 
others who had previously kept quiet to voice their misgivings about the wireless agreement, 
including Nationalists such as Watt, Wise – the former Postmaster-General dropped from 
Cabinet the previous December and now serving on the backbench – and George Maxwell, 
another Nationalist who had been a member of the wireless committee. The latter claimed 
that Thomas Hughes’ appointment “constitutes a violation of the terms of the agreement”.116 
Debate in the House on this day was dominated by criticism of AWA and the agreement, 
spearheaded by Brennan, who also took the opportunity to attack the feasibility of the 
company’s plans for a direct wireless connection to Britain.  
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In this context Brennan made an aggressive move against the agreement, moving a motion to 
require Parliamentary approval prior to the erection of any station for the scheme. With 
Hughes absent from the chamber on the day, the duty of shielding the government fell upon 
Bruce. Bruce’s defence took the form of attacking Brennan for opportunism, claiming that the 
latter had been active in the committee’s proceedings and instrumental in making changes to 
the agreement prior to its execution, meaning that “it did not occur to any one of the other 
eight members of the Committee that it was not to be a unanimous report”.117 Furthermore, 
the Treasurer claimed, Brennan had not voiced any of his scepticism regarding the feasibility of 
direct wireless during the committee’s hearings, which would have been the appropriate time 
to do so. Importantly, however, Bruce was himself critical of the company’s move to appoint 
Thomas Hughes as seventh director. While he conceded that the decision made by the 
arbitrator was technically in line with the agreement, “as a member of the Parliamentary 
Wireless Committee, I will say that it was not our intention…that a person who had been 
previously associated with the company should be chosen as the independent seventh 
director. And I feel bound to say that I was equally surprised…to learn of the decision”.118 
Nevertheless, given that Thomas Hughes had accepted the position, Bruce concluded that it 
was probably too late for anything to be done about it. Bruce’s criticism was followed by 
similar statements from the Defence Minister, who added that the affair was “as great a shock 
to the Government as it came to the House. We learned of it only quite recently. The 
Government, however, is giving notice to the company that in no circumstances whatever can 
it consent to the nomination of Sir Thomas Hughes”.119  
 
In response to these concessions and criticisms from the government, the Opposition Leader 
called for the cancellation of the agreement “if Sir Thomas Hughes is not removed from the 
position of chairman”.120 This was directed at members of the Country Party, which in 
combination with Labor and one dissident Nationalist would be sufficient to pass a motion in 
the House. The Country Party’s members had, though, largely remained silent during the 
debate. Finally, shortly before the House’s adjournment for the day, Page spoke on the 
subject. He was non-committal, voicing displeasure at the company’s action while also 
recognising that any withdrawal from the agreement could result in “costly litigation”.121 For 
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this reason, he called for an adjournment of debate on the subject until the following week to 
allow time for further consideration. In an illustration of the political firestorm that had ignited 
over the matter, the controversy received considerable newspaper coverage on the following 
day.122 
 
AWA’s actions had resulted in a political crisis and a genuine threat to the agreement’s 
viability. The previous December had seen the enabling motion pass the Parliament with the 
tacit support of much of the Nationalist Party. Even the Postmaster-General at the time, Wise, 
who privately opposed engaging with AWA, had voted with the government. On this occasion, 
following AWA’s breach of faith, dissent was growing within the Nationalist ranks. Similarly, 
Labor’s reservations from the previous December had morphed into condemnations, aimed at 
mobilising the support of the Country Party and Nationalist backbenchers to overthrow the 
agreement.  
 
Debate resumed on the subject the following week. Page, under the circumstances the most 
pivotal person, was the first to speak. He expressed regret that he had given sanction to the 
motion passed the previous December, claiming that in hindsight he would prefer to have seen 
the Parliamentary Committee present a report, which would then have required the approval 
of Parliament. The unconventional approach followed by the Prime Minister in its passage had 
led to a situation in which “the interests of the public do not appear to have been 
preserved”.123 Crucially, however, Page declared that he was not inclined to withdraw from the 
agreement – his disapproval was limited to the circumstances that had arisen in relation to the 
Board of Directors: “I am not opposed to the agreement as it stands, provided there is a clear 
understanding as to the appointment of the seventh director”.124 While this was couched in 
criticism of the Prime Minister, it also suggested a way to salvage the agreement. 
 
The Prime Minister was the next to speak. After attacking the motivations of both Page and 
Brennan for speaking against the agreement, he raised the subject of his namesake’s 
appointment as seventh director. He spoke of opposing the appointment from the first 
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moment he heard about it, claiming that “I have myself written to Sir Thomas Hughes setting 
out the position which has arisen out of the discussion in Parliament…[and] that we took the 
view that it was the intention of the agreement that the seventh member should be an 
independent man”.125 The Prime Minister also added that he had instructed his staff to inform 
the three Commonwealth directors that they were not to consent to the appointment, 
although they had already refused to do so from the first moment. When pressed, however, 
he did not respond to questions regarding what response he would take to the company’s 
actions.  
 
The letter which was sent by the Prime Minister to Thomas Hughes on that day characterised 
his appointment as seventh director as a breach of the spirit of the agreement. It also 
emphasised that this view was held by the Prime Minister himself, and concluded that the 
government could not support his presence on the Board of Directors: 
 
The objection to your appointment is not in any sense a reflection upon yourself 
personally. We believe that you did not take the same view of the intention of the 
agreement as to the seventh director as we do, and that you were actuated in this, as 
in all other business transactions throughout your career, by the highest motives. But 
we think you will see that in all the circumstances the Government has a right to 
decline to accept a nomination which gives the company a preponderance on the 
board.126    
 
The subject remained at the forefront of discussion for the remainder of the day’s proceedings 
in Parliament. Though exhaustive in length and detail, this discussion was circular, largely 
consisting of Labor MPs – with occasional input from Watt and Wise – lashing out in multiple 
directions: at the Prime Minister; at the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Committee; at the agreement’s initial and modified contents; at AWA; and at 
the Marconi Company. Ultimately, however, this rage masked impotence. The agreement had 
already been executed and, with the resolution of December 1921, the Parliament had 
abrogated its capacity to alter it once approved by the Parliamentary Committee. This point 
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was effectively conceded by future Prime Minister James Scullin, who noted that the 
Commonwealth’s legal position to remove Thomas Hughes from his new position was poor, 
while criticising the government for putting the Commonwealth in such a situation in the first 
place.127 While the option remained to pass a motion in the House modifying or withdrawing 
from the agreement – such as that moved by Brennan in the previous week, still awaiting a 
vote – the chances of this winning majority support were effectively precluded by Page’s 
unwillingness to withdraw from or otherwise alter the agreement, provided that the problem 
of the seventh director was resolved. The political survival of the agreement with AWA for a 
direct wireless service had thus become connected with the removal of Thomas Hughes from 
the position of seventh director. 
 
In addition to disrupting the government’s agenda in Parliament, the controversy also 
prompted a lot of bad press for the Prime Minister. On the following day another lengthy 
report was published in The Argus detailing the wide range of criticisms that had been directed 
at the government on the subject.128 In addition, the newspaper carried an editorial 
condemning the haste with which the Prime Minister had committed the Commonwealth to 
the partnership with AWA, and attributing the subsequent controversy to the “impetuosity” of 
Hughes’ insistence upon a quick passage of the agreement the previous December – a 
recognition of how important this frame had been to the agreement’s passage.129 Despite 
placing responsibility with the Prime Minister, the editor suggested that the appropriate next 
step would be for Thomas Hughes to step down from his position as seventh director in order 
for the company to salvage its public reputation. 
 
The next day’s proceedings in Parliament again focused almost exclusively upon wireless. 
While many of the speakers were different, the course of the day’s discussion followed a 
similar pattern of non-government MPs taking turns to criticise various facets of wireless 
policy. As with the previous day, however, the discussions were exhaustive in length and detail 
but represented little more than bluster. The day’s only substantive development was a 
division on the motion moved by Brennan almost a week earlier to refer portions of the 
agreement back to Parliament. This motion was soundly rejected. Though it was supported by 
                                                          
127 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19th July 1922, p. 564. 
128 “Wireless Agreement – Sir T. Hughes’ Appointment” in The Argus, 20th July 1922. 
129 “Haste and its Results” in The Argus, 20th July 1922. 
238 
 
all Labor members, it only attracted three Country Party votes.130 This marked the failure of 
the last ditch effort to derail the agreement through a reassertion of Parliamentary control 
over its implementation. 
 
The following day’s sitting saw the attention of Parliament, for the first time in days, shift to 
other subjects. At the end of the day, however, the Prime Minister gave notice of an end to the 
stand-off over AWA’s seventh director. This was a letter from Thomas Hughes announcing his 
resignation from the position. Thomas Hughes’ letter justified his appointment as safeguarding 
the company’s interests in the face of a majority stake in the enterprise being held by the 
Commonwealth, and motivated by the business interests of AWA’s private shareholders who 
“are in our opinion better entitled to control details of business management than 
Government nominees, who have no personal stake or interest in the company’s affairs”.131 He 
further added that the process of his selection, by an independent arbitrator, was fully in 
accord with the terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, he recognised that his position had 
become untenable: 
 
There is, however, one course only open to me in the interests of the company as a 
whole, and that is to avoid as far as possible any cause of friction between it and the 
Government which may be prejudicial to the success of an enterprise we all desire to 
bring to a successful issue. Under these circumstances, while I feel assured that I am 
lawfully and properly selected both as director and chairman, and that I cannot be 
removed from either position without the unanimous consent of my co-directors, I am 
prepared to retire from the board, and I have forwarded my resignation to the 
secretary.132 
 
While the Labor Party continued to press the issue afterwards, Thomas Hughes’ resignation 
blunted the effectiveness of its attacks and the resumption of Parliament in the following week 
saw wireless superseded by other subjects. In the meantime, the position of the seventh 
director remained vacant.  
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The position remained unfilled for the remainder of the winter, with the other six members of 
the Board of Directors resolving to “consider and discuss” potential candidates on an informal 
basis.133 The first indication of who would eventually take up the position was a mention by the 
Prime Minister in Parliament on the last day of August. In response to a question from a Labor 
MP regarding the vacant position of seventh director, he hinted that he might have to fill the 
position himself: 
 
Efforts have been made to secure the services of a suitable man, but the task has so 
far been found impossible…it is extremely difficult to get competent men willing to 
give up their time to the Commonwealth who have had no connexion with 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Limited, and yet some knowledge of wireless…I 
thought seriously of taking the position myself, but it would be undesirable for me to 
do so. I gather from the views expressed by honourable members that there is a 
feeling that the Commonwealth should be represented by some one whose 
association with this Parliament is so close and intimate that we could rely upon him 
to protect our interests under the agreement. I am very sorry that the Government 
have not been able to secure the services of any such person.134   
 
Within a week, at a meeting of the AWA board, the Prime Minister himself was nominated for 
the position of seventh director. Though he was not present at the meeting, he was 
unanimously elected to the position by the other directors and informed of such by 
telegram.135 Compared to the furore that had erupted upon the previous appointment to this 
position, the reaction in Parliament to the Prime Minister’s appointment was subdued, 
consisting of little more than a sarcastic congratulation from the Deputy Opposition Leader.136 
Hughes attended his first meeting of the AWA Board of Directors in late September 1922, and 
would remain involved company’s affairs in the position of seventh director until his death in 
1952.137 The appointment of Hughes to the position, and his service upon it for three decades, 
                                                          
133 ‘Seventh Director’ folder. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910, Box 1, Seventh Director, 1922-1924, 
Correspondence, Documents, Memos, etc, 1922-1924. 
134 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 31st August 1922, p. 1833. 
135 ‘Seventh Director’ folder. ML: MSS 2954/Add-On 1910, Box 1, Seventh Director, 1922-1924, 
Correspondence, Documents, Memos, etc, 1922-1924. 
136 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7th September 1922, p. 1993. 
137 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 155-161. 
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symbolise the pivotal role he played in the determination of policy towards international 
wireless, and the enduring legacy of his influence over this sector.  
 
Constituting the International Wireless Service, 1921-1922 
 
The subject of an international wireless service that would connect Australia with Britain first 
arose in 1910, but a concrete policy decision on the matter was not enacted until March 1922. 
Faced with the choice between the Norman scheme and that of AWA, Parliament opted for (a 
modified form of) the latter. The decision to partner with private enterprise represented a 
break from the established tradition of government monopoly in Australian communications. 
That the Parliament chose this option was a result of structural pressures operating in 
combination with a dynamic policymaking process responsive to immediate circumstances, 
with one important dimension being the conditions in the political stream at the time.  
 
The chief structural pressure was geopolitical – the need to develop Australia’s international 
communications by establishing a trans-oceanic wireless service. On this point, ‘the need for 
wireless’, there was a consensus among the three parties represented in Parliament. This 
reflected a shared goal of strengthening Australia’s communicative bonds with the rest of the 
Empire, and escaping the country’s dependence on submarine cables for its international 
communications. Subsidiary to this, there was also a consensus that the Norman scheme did 
not serve Australia’s interests because of its reliance on a relay model placing Australia several 
links in the chain away from Britain. This model had two potential drawbacks. One, already 
experienced in the cable network, was the potential for substantial delays as messages were 
held up at relay stations. The other was potentially more serious because of its security 
implications – the chance for a station elsewhere in the relay chain to be interdicted, whether 
by enemy action in a future war, or through unrest in the territory in question. Either 
eventuality would render Australia unable to exchange messages with Britain. Among those in 
Parliament, there was an accord on these fundamental points. As Page declared, “the solution 
of the problem of wireless should not be regarded as a party question”.138 All parties 
                                                          
138 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7th December 1921, p. 13985. 
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responded to the geopolitical imperatives – the importance of wireless for Australia’s security 
in the post-war world – by endorsing the need for wireless and rejecting the Norman scheme. 
 
The consensus on these points coupled with an important element of the Prime Minister’s 
framing of the subject as one which required a swift resolution. Though Labor did not agree on 
this point, recommending that the entire matter be submitted to a Parliamentary inquiry, it 
was convincing enough to secure the support of Page and other members of the Country 
Party. As a result of this support, the motion to execute the agreement, albeit on the condition 
of referral to a Parliamentary Committee, passed on the final sitting day of 1921. Though Page 
was reluctant to agree, he elected to do so because of “the urgent importance of the matter” 
and a belief “that it should be dealt with at the earliest possible moment”.139 This factor, which 
was instrumental to the proposal gaining the assent of Parliament, demonstrates the power of 
the frame established around the decision by Hughes. 
 
Members of the Country Party, including Page, also responded to the framing of the decision 
in financial terms. The comparison between AWA’s proposal as one of investment in a firm 
that promised profitability, against the Norman scheme which forecast running at a loss for its 
first decade of operation, was another point of comparison that AWA had highlighted while 
refining the arguments in favour of its scheme. It was this comparison between the schemes, 
not the security dimension, which Page highlighted as the principal reason to reject the 
Norman scheme.140 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, this was an argument that AWA 
had devised while ‘softening up’ the political system in anticipation of its scheme receiving 
formal consideration. It was then taken up by the Prime Minister as one of the arguments in 
favour of choosing the agreement with AWA over the Norman scheme. Though it was a 
subsidiary, and not the main, dimension of Hughes’ argument in favour of the AWA scheme, it 
resonated with Page and the Country Party, who, under the political circumstances prevailing 
at the time, were of utmost importance to the agreement’s approval. 
 
                                                          
139 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9th December 1921, p. 14229. 
140 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7th December 1921, pp. 13985-
13986. 
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The importance of the Country Party’s support to get the agreement through Parliament 
demonstrates the significance of the immediate political conditions under which the subject 
received formal consideration. This supports MSA’s conceptualisation of three relatively 
autonomous streams that join together at certain points in time. In this case, the Country Party 
bloc in Parliament proved to be essential because of the delicate balance of power in the 
House of Representatives, with the government holding the barest of majorities and the Prime 
Minister being unable to depend on the unconditional support of his backbench. In this 
situation, the Country Party, members of which had had virtually nothing to do with the 
determination of wireless policy to that point, rose to a position of vital importance because of 
the fact that it, in effect, held the balance of power. Without Country Party support in 
December 1921, it is unlikely that the agreement would have been enacted in the form that it 
was. Had Page elected to support Labor’s motion to refer the entire subject to a Parliamentary 
Committee, and delay any concrete decision until afterwards, it is likely that the Parliament 
would have ended up deciding between different policy options.     
 
In this respect – that the outcome of the policy decision depended on the political 
circumstances at the point that the policy window opened for a decision – timing was crucial 
to the outcome. Another important influence of timing related to the policy stream. The fact 
that the policy window opened at a time when the two available alternatives were the AWA 
and Norman schemes, with the latter effectively without supporters in the political system, 
made it considerably more likely that the AWA proposal would form the basis of Australian 
policy. Timing was also of significance in relation to Hughes’ introduction of a motion to 
approve of the agreement at the very end of the sitting year. In combination with his emphasis 
on a speedy resolution, and a threat that “if the Commonwealth do not take action now it will 
probably be eight months before this Parliament will be in a position to even consider the 
question”, this gave strong impetus to the motion’s passage with a minimum of debate in 
Parliament.141 These facts demonstrate the necessity of appreciating the temporality of 
policymaking; understanding it as a process that unfolds in time, and in which timing is crucial 
to the determination of policy outcomes.   
 
                                                          
141 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9th December 1921, p. 14228. 
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During the period examined in this chapter, the Prime Minister came to play an important role 
as a policy entrepreneur. It was through Hughes’ actions that that policy window opened after 
the Imperial Conference, and he also played an instrumental role in coupling the AWA scheme 
with the underlying problem of Australia’s languishing international communications. It was 
because of Hughes’ initiative that the subject was given a place on the agenda at the Imperial 
Conference. Though it appears that he had been quietly supportive of instituting a scheme of 
direct wireless, possibly since his participation in the September 1918 demonstration arranged 
by Fisk and Marconi, the Imperial Conference marked the first occasion on which he 
confronted the issue publically. Though he conspicuously did not raise the proposal for 
constructing a direct service in conjunction with AWA that had been put to him by Fisk months 
before, he did use the opportunity to speak forcefully against the only concrete alternative to 
it: the Norman scheme. His steadfast opposition to the relay scheme, in the face of all other 
participants, secured acquiescence from the British for Australia to opt out of the Norman 
scheme and instead determine its own policy. Having secured this concession from the British, 
Hughes wasted little time in placing international wireless on the Parliamentary agenda after 
his return to Australia. On the second sitting day after his return, he outlined his objections to 
the Norman scheme and, for the first time, unveiled the proposal that AWA had presented to 
him in the previous year. Then, several weeks later, he took the leading role in advocating for 
the enactment of the agreement with AWA. 
 
However, the concessions that had to be made to secure Parliamentary assent demonstrate 
that the Prime Minister was unable to completely control the process once the matter entered 
the political system. The principal illustration of this was the controversy surrounding the 
composition of AWA’s Board of Directors. Though Hughes framed the subject as a minor 
matter, and as consistent with the Commonwealth’s previous agreement with the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, he lost control of the debate on this point as other Parliamentarians 
expressed concern that the Commonwealth would not be able to exercise the degree of 
control commensurate with its majority stake in the company. In response to this 
apprehension, he proposed an amendment to his own motion calling for the matter to be 
referred to a Parliamentary Committee upon which all parties would be represented. The 
major revision to the agreement sanctioned by the committee was on this subject, and the 
ferocity of the counterattack in 1922 after AWA’s attempt to secure Thomas Hughes in the role 
of seventh director revealed the political importance that this point had assumed. This again 
forced the Prime Minister to intervene and defuse the situation. Once this had happened, 
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although this was dependent on the willingness of Thomas Hughes – who had been appointed 
in accordance with the terms of agreement – the political counterattack on the agreement lost 
its impetus, and the last chance to overturn the decision was defeated. 
 
If Hughes was limited in his control over the decision once it entered the political system, AWA 
had even less. Its activities were limited to lobbying Parliamentarians through distributing 
literature making the case for its proposal, and arranging a demonstration of direct wireless on 
the eve of its introduction into Parliament. Though these activities helped to build a favourable 
atmosphere to encourage the passage of the agreement, ultimately they could not guarantee 
support on the floor of Parliament.  
 
Nevertheless, the frame that Hughes and AWA had placed around the subject was firm enough 
to secure Parliament’s assent. This demonstrates the importance of the years of preliminary 
work in policy development and ‘softening up’ that had been done by the company’s 
representatives. To a large degree, it was because of these preliminary efforts that the AWA 
scheme was well-positioned to be adopted as the basis of future policy. In comparison, there 
were no other actors doing comparable work advocating for the Norman scheme and 
undermining the alternatives to it. As a result, the political forces inclined towards opposing 
the agreement with AWA – a significant portion of the House of Representatives – were 
unprepared to counter the arguments in favour of it. In contrast, the arguments deployed in 
favour of the AWA scheme and against the Norman scheme had been refined over an 
extended period, and the terms in which the matter was debated on the floor of Parliament 
echoed arguments that had been refined by AWA during its campaign of ‘softening up’.  
 
In accordance with MSA, the passage of a major policy change through an open policy window 
was the result of a confluence of the streams of problems, policies, and politics. The underlying 
problem of a lack of progress in the field of international wireless had been widely 
acknowledged for an extended period. From 1919, AWA’s executives, chiefly Fisk and Thomas 
Hughes, functioned as policy entrepreneurs by attaching a proposal for the firm to take charge 
of constructing a wireless service with Britain with this underlying problem, and identifying the 
Prime Minister as a supporter. Following this, it was Hughes who functioned as a policy 
entrepreneur, taking the necessary steps to open a policy window after the Imperial 
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Conference provided a focusing event to direct attention to the subject of international 
wireless. The Prime Minister, using arguments honed by AWA and emphasising the importance 
of a quick resolution to the subject, then depicted the deal with the company as a solution to 
the problem of international wireless. Political circumstances, though forcing some 
compromises on contentious aspects of the agreement, proved favourable enough to secure 
the passage of the agreement in a revised form. The result was a paradigmatic shift in 
Australian communications history: the constitution of Australia’s international wireless 
connection with Britain as a direct service undertaken through a mixed enterprise wherein the 
Commonwealth provided capital and diplomatic weight, and AWA provided technical and 
operational expertise.  
 
 
246 
 
The Origins of Australia’s International Wireless 
Service 
 
This study set out to examine the origins of the 1922 agreement between the Commonwealth 
government and AWA to establish a direct wireless communications service between Australia 
and Britain. It took inspiration from Starr’s notion of constitutive decisions pertaining to “the 
material and institutional framework” placed around new forms of communications 
technology, and Headrick’s warning that “the history of radio cannot be told simply in terms of 
devices, inventors, and manufacturers, but must be integrated with the history of political 
power”.1 Though the central focus was on technology, and the way that a new form of 
technology came to be used, the arrangements covering its use were not dictated by the form 
of the technology itself, but by political decisions made in response to its appearance.  
 
As a result, the thesis has focused on the political determination of a major policy decision. 
Specifically, it has sought to explain the most distinctive feature of the 1922 agreement: the 
embrace of private enterprise to construct Australia’s international wireless service. It was this 
feature that made the decision a pivotal moment in Australian communications history, 
marking a shift in the established paradigm of government monopoly which had been in place 
since the first establishment of postal services in the colonial era, and which had subsequently 
characterised the country’s telegraphic and telephonic communications. The 1922 agreement 
not only marked a deviation from the tradition of government monopoly in other forms of 
communication, but also from the prior history of Australian wireless itself. A decade before 
the agreement was enacted, in 1912, Australian wireless was following a strikingly different 
trajectory of development to that which it later took. In that year the Commonwealth 
government had responded to the first iteration of the Imperial scheme of wireless by 
declaring that there was no scope for any arrangements with private enterprise in service of 
Australia’s participation in the scheme, and the Wireless Telegraphy Branch of the Postmaster-
General’s Department had recently been created to secure the medium as a government 
monopoly under the stewardship of Balsillie. Yet, within ten years, the medium initially 
                                                          
1 P. Starr, The Creation of the Media, p. 1; D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, p. 116. 
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constituted as the preserve of government – with little opportunity for private participation – 
had been transformed into one in which private enterprise came to function as the main driver 
of development. 
 
One striking feature of the Parliamentary debate surrounding the agreement when it was 
introduced for adoption by Hughes in December 1921 is that its most revolutionary feature – 
the overthrow of the principle of government monopoly in Australian communications – was 
scarcely mentioned. Despite the strong consensus that had existed around this principle within 
the Commonwealth government since the first appearance of wireless telegraphy in Australia 
years earlier, the paradigm was replaced with a minimum of discussion. 
 
Many factors feed in to a major policy decision such as the 1922 agreement. It is not merely 
the case that decisions are produced by a dynamic process of policymaking with many inputs, 
but also that the contextual environment surrounding the process, which can exert major 
influence over its operation and outcome, is itself “unstable and often rapidly changing”.2 
Complexity and dynamism are irremovable considerations in the study of the origins of policy 
decisions. 
 
For this reason it is neither possible to present a simple, nor a single, line of causation that led 
to the 1922 agreement. The agreement was a product of complex links between deep 
structural factors – Australia’s position in the British Empire and the broader geopolitical 
environment, the impact of the Great War – and smaller-scale, proximate factors such as the 
interactions of individual and group actors, commercial strategies, framing, timing, and 
political manoeuvring. Each of these factors, which tied together in intricate, complicated, and 
ever-shifting ways, contributed to the policy outcome. Much as Anduaga’s investigation of 
ionospheric research in the interwar years eschews the straightforwardness of “direct causal 
effects” and “simple causal relationships” in favour of “a much more intricate thread of 
interconnected categories”, so this study has situated causation within a range of interacting 
spheres, all of which contributed to the outcome in its own way.3  
                                                          
2 P. Cairney, Understanding Public Policy, p. 126. 
3 A. Anduaga, Wireless and Empire, pp. xvii-xix. 
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The analysis presented in the thesis draws out a range of large, underlying structural forces 
and small, immediate factors that led to the enactment of the 1922 agreement. With regard to 
the former category, it is not possible to understand the policy outcome without reference to 
the broad structures surrounding it, particularly wireless’ emergence in the early twentieth 
century as a geopolitical asset intertwined with great power rivalries. The project of 
establishing an international wireless service to connect Australia with Britain, plans for which 
were under consideration for more than a decade before the constitutive choices were 
formally settled in 1922, was a product of this fundamental consideration. Though many other 
aspects of the international environment shifted over the years covered by this study, the 
imperative for Australia to establish a wireless service with Britain for geopolitical reasons was 
a constant pressure. Furthermore, the intensity of this pressure increased with each additional 
delay, as the British Empire threatened to fall behind its great power rivals in the field of trans-
oceanic communication.  
 
Basal geopolitical considerations compelled Australia to establish an international wireless 
service, but they did not determine the shape that it would come to take in the 1920s. As 
Chapter Three of the study documents, once the first contract for the Imperial scheme had 
been signed between the British government and the Marconi Company in 1912, Balsillie 
began drawing up plans for the scheme’s Australian station with the goal of excluding any 
participation from private enterprise. While the geopolitical environment created the 
pressures for an international wireless scheme, they did not determine the details of its 
constitution. These details were the outcome of a process that was responsive to a range of 
structural and proximate influences. 
 
Review and Findings 
 
Using a blend of history and public policy theory, the thesis has presented a detailed 
examination of the many different factors that contributed to the paradigmatic shift in 
Australian communications policy embodied in the 1922 agreement. Though covering a subject 
that has been examined by other scholars, its approach has uncovered new historical evidence 
not previously documented, and its systematic framework has provided a richer, more 
complex analysis of the political causes of the AWA/Commonwealth partnership, as well as the 
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process by which AWA’s proposal to establish a direct link between Australia and Britain was 
transformed from an abstract idea into the foundation of government policy.  
 
Comparison with Earlier Research 
This study has covered much of the same ground previously examined in the scholarship of 
Ross Curnow and Jock Given. All cover the early history of Australian wireless telegraphy, and 
as a consequence deal with important developments such as the passage of the 1905 Wireless 
Telegraphy Act; the creation of the coastal scheme under Balsillie; the formation of AWA; the 
transfer of responsibility over wireless to the Navy during the Great War; the first direct 
wireless messages in 1918; and the 1922 agreement. All provide a broad survey of the same 
historical terrain.    
 
Beyond this point of commonality, however, this thesis differs from the other authors’ works 
in major ways. Most fundamentally, it represents the first study with a central focus on the 
causes of the 1922 agreement. Though the agreement receives a prominent place in the other 
works, in each case it is examined in relation to a different primary focus. In the case of 
Curnow’s monograph, this is to explain the origins of Australian broadcasting in 1923. For 
Curnow, the 1922 agreement represents one of many significant developments leading to the 
inauguration of Australian broadcasting in 1923. Given’s most detailed work on the subject, on 
the other hand, is centred on the career of Ernest Fisk. For Given, the 1922 agreement 
represents one of the pivotal episodes, and greatest triumphs, of Fisk’s career. Whereas this 
study has centred on explaining the causes of the 1922 agreement, and the resultant 
paradigmatic shift in Australian communications history, this is not the principal concern of 
either Curnow or Given. Both give prominence to the event, but in neither case is it a primary 
concern. 
 
Curnow’s monograph, published in 1963, represents the pioneering work on early Australian 
wireless. Though he covers many of the major events between 1901 and 1922, the breadth of 
the subject and comparative thinness of his work means that his explication of these events is 
often cursory and lacking detailed analysis. This is the case with his coverage of the 1922 
agreement. Curnow’s study does not offer in-depth analysis of the decision, and that which he 
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does provide is based on a pluralist framework which portrays interest groups as the major 
drivers of policy formation. He portrays actors within government, whether elected officials or 
bureaucrats, as essentially reactive to the actions of interest groups. In general terms, his 
approach to policy formation is one in which a proposal is put forward by an interest group 
and its merits are considered by the government, which then makes a choice whether or not 
to adopt the policy. Policy decisions made by government are therefore seen as responsive to 
the actions of interest groups. Curnow describes the 1922 agreement as fitting this pattern, 
with AWA, and Fisk in particular, as the driving force behind its enactment. The major 
components of his narrative are AWA submitting its proposal for direct communication with 
Britain in 1920, which was not acted upon because of the impending Imperial Conference. 
Then, because of its embrace of a relay design and its financial costs, and because of Fisk’s 
“lobbying”, which “did not pass unrewarded”, Hughes rejected the Norman scheme at the 
conference.4 Following that, the Prime Minister placed the AWA agreement before Parliament 
and, despite the objections of the Labor Party, it was passed.5   
 
Given’s scholarship covering the area is much richer and more detailed than Curnow’s. 
Whereas Curnow study discusses the agreement as a preliminary to the birth of broadcasting, 
Given assesses its importance in relation to its impact on AWA’s future activities by bringing 
the company into partnership with the Commonwealth and diluting the Marconi Company’s 
influence. These would both be important as the company, under Fisk’s leadership, later set 
about colonising the domestic wireless market and, from 1927, operating the international 
service. Because of his biographical focus on Fisk, the AWA Managing Director is Given’s chief 
focus, although this part of his work does also discuss the critical importance of Hughes to the 
outcome. Given’s narrative is of a triumphant journey from the first demonstration of direct 
wireless in September 1918 to the formal enactment of the Commonwealth/AWA partnership 
in March 1922. In this narrative, centrality is placed on Fisk’s efforts to overcome many 
obstacles: the technical challenges; the criticism of opponents; the Marconi Company’s 
withdrawal from advocating direct wireless in early 1920; and political unease at the shape of 
his proposed scheme. These obstacles were overcome largely because of Fisk’s efforts and 
talents. He refined the technology and arguments to establish a direct wireless scheme, and 
cultivated a crucial partnership with the Prime Minister to support the proposal.6 This 
                                                          
4 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, p. 81. 
5 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, pp. 80-82. 
6 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 121-163. 
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partnership, “decisive in Australian communications history”, was one in which the two men 
played specialised roles: 
 
Fisk worked with Marconi’s to create the technical capacity for a new type of 
communications link between Australia and the rest of the world. Hughes provided 
the political influence, first within the Empire, then in Australia, to establish the 
service, and give a recapitalised AWA a big role in providing it.7   
 
Given’s work is abundant in contextual detail, although his account of the origins of the 1922 
agreement focuses on the roles of key individuals – a natural corollary of biographical study. 
He portrays Hughes’ motivations for supporting Fisk’s direct wireless scheme as a combination 
of idealism and pragmatism. In relation to the former, direct wireless “linked to the idea of 
progress and Australia’s new standing as an independent nation. If direct wireless was the best 
thing available, Australia should have it”.8 Elsewhere, he describes Hughes’ motivations as 
pragmatic, with the Prime Minister willing to partner with AWA because “he needed access to 
the patents of international wireless companies, and thought the project would never happen 
if he left it in the hands of post offices”.9  
 
Finally, Given also concludes that “the timing of the initiative, and the unusual political 
circumstances, were critical” to the enactment of the 1922 agreement.10 The importance of 
these factors, in his account, came from Hughes’ uneasy position as a former Labor leader at 
the head of a Nationalist government cobbled together in wartime, with “just enough personal 
authority to push the deal through before voters put an end to his coalition, his prime-
ministership, and his ‘half-breed’ enterprises”.11 In this sense, Given portrays the agreement as 
a race against time – without Hughes in power there would not have been such an 
arrangement between the Commonwealth and AWA.  
 
                                                          
7 J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 161-162. 
8 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 127. 
9 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 404. 
10 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 162. 
11 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 162. 
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Given grants importance to a range of factors in relation to the 1922 agreement. However, it is 
difficult to make side-by-side comparisons with this study because of the differences between 
their respective primary focuses and analytical lenses. Unlike this study, Given’s analysis is 
broader than the field of policymaking. Whereas this study has focused on identifying the 
causes of a specific policy decision, Given’s also includes different dimensions, such as the 
technical and business challenges that Fisk faced during the period. 
 
Contribution of the Thesis 
The unique blend of history and public policy contained in this study is the source of its most 
significant contributions. These can be separated into two broad categories. The first covers its 
contribution to historical knowledge through unearthing new evidence, and new episodes in 
this area of Australian history, that have not featured in previous works. The second relates to 
the analysis it presents, which emphasises the connections between the Great War and the 
subsequent development of policy in the sector, and, through its adoption of Multiple Streams 
Analysis, the first detailed analysis of how the 1922 agreement came to be enacted as policy. 
These add several new dimensions to our knowledge of the area. 
 
The study’s depth of research into the archival collections of the Commonwealth government 
enabled it to present a more extensive examination of policy development in relation to 
wireless telegraphy within the bureaucracy than any previously done. Though both Curnow 
and Given draw on the collections of the National Archives, this study has done so in 
considerably greater depth. It has uncovered new evidence, revealing some hitherto 
undocumented episodes in Australian wireless history. One of these was the plan devised by 
Balsillie in late 1914 to nationalise AWA’s maritime assets under the cover of war, covered in 
Chapter Four. This plan never came to fruition, but, as evidenced by the fact that it received 
Cabinet approval, was seriously considered by policymakers.  
 
Another cache of new evidence presented in the study covers the flurry of activity surrounding 
international wireless in the immediate post-war period, while Hughes was in Europe and Watt 
was serving as Acting Prime Minister. The study has revealed the aspirations of the Marconi 
Company and AWA to establish a commercial wireless link between Australia and Britain in 
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late 1918 and early 1919, as well as strong opposition to these plans from Watt, the remainder 
of Cabinet, and the bureaucracy. Furthermore, it has revealed that Watt, while Acting Prime 
Minister, personally commissioned Balsillie to design a scheme of international wireless in 
1919 as a way to pre-empt the penetration of the field by private enterprise. This – the first 
example of an international wireless scheme of Australian origin – is something else which has 
not been documented by other scholars who have examined the area. The study has also 
uncovered cable correspondence between Hughes and the domestic Cabinet during this 
period, revealing strong disagreements in relation to the subject of future policy towards 
international wireless centred on the desirability of dealing with private companies to establish 
a service. Finally, the exchange between Hughes and Fisk in relation to the AWA Managing 
Director’s letter to The Argus covered in Chapter Five adds another element to our 
understanding of the relationship between these two men.  
 
The study has also presented evidence to overturn two of Given’s claims surrounding this 
period. First, that the Postmaster-General’s Department and Navy had “jostled for control” of 
wireless in the post-war era, when in reality the hierarchy of neither department wanted 
responsibility for the medium.12 Second, that the agreement with AWA was not considered by 
Cabinet before its enactment – it was, but, customary of Hughes’ administrative idiosyncrasies, 
Cabinet’s recommendations to avoid collaboration with private enterprise was not an 
influential factor in decision-making. These are new insights into Australian wireless history 
that have not been revealed in the works of earlier researchers.  
 
Another major contribution of the thesis comes from the connections it has outlined between 
the Great War and the 1922 agreement. Though the works of Curnow and Given cover the 
conflict’s effects on Australian wireless,13 this study has developed these connections to a 
considerably greater degree. Within the domestic industry, the impact of war swept aside the 
status quo that had emerged in Australian wireless prior to August 1914, wherein the Wireless 
Telegraphy Branch of the Postmaster-General’s Department had adopted a central 
administrative role and relations between the Commonwealth government and the newly-
formed AWA were antagonistic. The war’s dissolution of established conditions created 
                                                          
12 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 130. 
13 R. Curnow, “The Origins of Australian Broadcasting”, pp. 66-70; J. Given, Transit of Empires, pp. 103-
111; J. Given, “Born Global, Made Local”, p. 9. 
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opportunities to reshape policy towards wireless following the return of peace. The study has 
also detailed the connections between other developments in Australia resulting from the war 
– the power of Hughes as Prime Minister and the emergence of economic nationalism – and 
the recasting of policy settings over wireless communications in the post-war years. Each of 
these would, in its own way, prove a crucial influence over the outcome. Furthermore, the 
study has provided additional evidence to support the claim of Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 
that Prime Ministerial power in Australia reached its historical apex under Hughes,14 by 
documenting his steerage of the wireless agreement through formidable international and 
domestic obstacles.  
 
This study has also made another major contribution through its adoption of Multiple Streams 
Analysis (MSA) to examine this area of Australian communications history. There are two 
dimensions to this particular contribution. The first is that it represents the first in-depth 
analysis of policymaking centred on the 1922 agreement between AWA and the 
Commonwealth government. While Curnow’s monograph on early Australian wireless is a 
public policy study, its principal focus on the birth of broadcasting, combined with its reliance 
on a crude pluralistic analysis, lead to an unsatisfactory explanation of the origins of the 1922 
agreement. The second dimension of this contribution comes from the way in which the study 
has applied MSA to a case study that is radically different from those to which the framework 
is usually applied. Since its formulation on the basis of empirical observations from the 
American political system in the 1970s, MSA has proven highly adaptable in a wide range of 
applications to different contexts because of its ‘universal’ features.15 Nevertheless, it has not 
hitherto been applied to any historical case study of policymaking in Australia, as has been 
done in this study.  
 
The study’s adoption of MSA is fruitful to its analysis. It has enabled the study to situate its 
explanation of why AWA’s proposal came to be accepted as the basis of policy within the 
specifics of how this happened, by tracing the proposal’s progress through the process of 
policy formation. Rather than concentrating on the actions of individuals and groups in 
explanations of outcomes, it has placed those actions within a system-level analysis that 
                                                          
14 R.A.W. Rhodes, J. Wanna and P. Weller, Comparing Westminster, p. 102. 
15 P. Cairney and M.D. Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach”. 
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explains how policy decisions emerge from a dynamic system with a wide range of inputs. This 
approach is useful because it represents a way to conceptualise two important features of 
policymaking: dynamism and temporality. Consideration of these features has enabled the 
study to expand on Given’s insights about the importance of timing to the outcome.   
 
Drawing on MSA, the thesis has used the powerful analytical categories of separate streams of 
problems, policies, and politics, policy entrepreneurs, and policy windows to conceptualise the 
developments under focus in Part IV. This has allowed the study to conceptualise the two key 
figures highlighted by Curnow and Given – Hughes and Fisk – as playing identifiable roles 
within a policymaking process. In the case of Fisk, and also of Thomas Hughes, whose actions 
receive less attention from the other scholars, this was the role of a policy entrepreneur. By 
advocating for their preferred policies, crafting and framing arguments in favour of them, and 
‘softening up’ the political system to gain support for their eventual adoption, the actions of 
the AWA executives bore the hallmarks of policy entrepreneurship. So too did the actions of 
the Prime Minister in placing the subject at the top of the agenda when, following his return to 
Australia after the 1921 Imperial Conference, he attached an available ‘solution’ – the direct 
wireless proposal received from AWA the previous year – to the underlying problem of a lack 
of progress in international communications and the inadequacy of Australia’s exclusive 
reliance on cables to communicate with the centre of the Empire. These factors, combined 
with a temperament disposed to swift and decisive action, led Hughes to frame the subject as 
one requiring a speedy resolution. 
 
This speaks to the importance of another key concept within MSA: the work of policy 
entrepreneurs in framing discussions, the importance of which stems from the pervasive 
ambiguity surrounding policymaking.16 When, for the first time in years, a policy window 
opened to allow the possibility of a decision on international wireless, Parliamentarians were 
compelled to decide between those schemes that were available for adoption at that point in 
time. These were the Norman scheme, with its principles of relay service and government 
monopoly, and the AWA scheme, based upon direct wireless and a partnership between the 
company and the Commonwealth government. These were the two available policy options 
from which Parliamentarians had to choose and, as Hughes emphasised in his framing of the 
                                                          
16 N. Zahariadis, “The Multiple Streams Framework”, pp. 66-70. 
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matter, there was an imperative for a quick resolution to the subject. The Prime Minister’s 
framing was crucial. His emphasis on the need for a swift resolution, combined with the 
unacceptability of the Norman scheme’s relay design for Australian policymakers, added 
considerable weight to AWA’s proposal, being the only one available for direct wireless.  
 
Despite the great power he had exerted as Prime Minister since coming into the office, Hughes 
was not able to dictate Parliament’s response to the proposal – especially because of the 
conditions in the political stream at the time the policy window opened, in which his 
government faced a restive backbench and an uncooperative Country Party. His inability to 
force the matter through at will is why the proposal had to pass through the approval of a 
Parliamentary Committee in early 1922. The power of the framing that was placed around the 
proposal proved vital to its passage under the prevailing political circumstances. In this case it 
was the work of AWA’s executives who, in their extended campaign of ‘softening up’, had 
framed their company’s proposal as one which would bring strategic, developmental, and 
financial benefits. These benefits were promoted as ‘solutions’ to the ways in which the 
existing and alternative policies had been framed as problematic: the strategic risks of the 
Norman scheme’s relay model, and the poor financial prospects of both it and the 
Commonwealth’s network of coastal stations.  
 
The reasons behind the failure of the bureaucracy to influence the 1922 decision have not 
been systematically analysed before. As much as the adoption of the agreement was a triumph 
for AWA, it was also a failure for the bureaucracy, which had previously played a central role in 
the development of Australian wireless policy and was a strong defender of government 
primacy in the field. One reason for this lay in the preceding history of the medium in the years 
leading up to 1922. Though wireless had begun as a medium under the monopoly control of 
the government, a control that was solidified with the establishment of the Wireless 
Telegraphy Branch in the Postmaster-General’s Department, this had been eroded by the 
experience of the Great War. The conflict had led to the rise of AWA as a national enterprise in 
cooperation, not confrontation, with the Commonwealth government. The war also proved 
greatly disruptive to the bureaucratic administration of wireless with the transfer of 
responsibility for the Wireless Telegraphy Act from the Postmaster-General’s Department to 
the RAN in 1915, and then back again in 1920. This disruption, along with a desire to defer to 
British preferences, meant that there was little activity within the bureaucracy to formulate 
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policy alternatives in the crucial post-war years. During the same period, AWA’s executives 
were busy refining their own proposals, framing the arguments to support them, and 
‘softening up’ the Prime Minister to the idea. This contrast in activity within the divided policy 
stream prior to the formal policy decision – another insight derived from the study’s adoption 
of MSA – was another instrumental factor in the outcome.    
 
Overall, the study has demonstrated that a wide range of factors influenced the paradigmatic 
shift embodied within the 1922 agreement between AWA and the Commonwealth 
government. These included a number of large-scale structural developments, and the small-
scale actions of individuals and groups. These factors combined with other considerations, 
such as framing and timing, in a dynamic process of policymaking to produce the outcome. 
This study has not minimised the importance of individual or group actions, but argues that in 
order to explain the 1922 agreement it is necessary to situate individual and group actions 
within a dynamic process of policymaking that was given shape by a wider context, and in 
which other considerations such as framing and timing were pivotal to the outcome. It is 
through their relationship with these other factors that individual and group actions become 
meaningful in relation to policy outcomes. 
 
Consequences 
 
The developments covered in Part IV of the study, culminating in the 1922 agreement, had far-
reaching implications for the development of the domestic wireless industry in Australia, of 
international schemes to connect the British Empire, and of Australia’s overseas 
communications. At the domestic level, it ensured that AWA would be central to the future of 
Australia’s emerging electronics industry, which would “soon be unrecognisable” after the 
inauguration of broadcasting in 1923.17 Though in a sense the 1922 agreement marked a 
recognition of the significance that AWA had already achieved since its formation in 1913, it 
also heralded the beginning of a new era in the company’s history. By quintupling its capital 
and diluting the Marconi Company’s stake, the 1922 agreement was transformative for the 
company – entrenching it as Australia’s dominant wireless organisation.18 Thus, although the 
                                                          
17 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 165. 
18 J. Given, “Born Global, Made Local”, p. 17. 
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1922 agreement was enacted for the purpose of creating an international wireless service, it 
also had important domestic implications. Because of the agreement’s flow-on effects, AWA 
came to exert an enormous influence over the birth and subsequent growth of broadcasting 
from 1923, and became a major domestic “manufacturer of high-technology goods for retail 
customers and industry” as wireless and electronics became further integrated into Australian 
social and economic life throughout the interwar period.19 This was part of a wider pattern of 
development in industries of strategic importance during this period, spearheaded, when 
commercially viable, by private enterprise.20 With the coming of the next global conflict in 
1939, AWA’s domestic manufacturing capabilities were shifted towards the production of 
advanced electronic equipment for military requirements, such as wireless transmitters, 
receivers, aircraft electronics, and radar.21  
 
Another weighty consequence of the events discussed in Part IV of the study related to the 
development of international wireless services throughout the British Empire. Hughes’ 
opposition to the Norman scheme at the 1921 Imperial Conference, and his insistence upon 
establishing a direct service, was a mortal blow to British plans for a relay system linking the 
territories of the Empire. Australia’s unwillingness to participate in the Norman scheme 
prompted the British government to reconsider its opposition to direct wireless as the basis for 
a scheme of international wireless.22 Ultimately, Marconi’s invention of shortwave in 1924 – 
which his company dubbed the ‘beam’ system – compelled the British government to 
negotiate with the Marconi Company for access to the new technology, which offered a 
veritable revolution in the medium due to the substantial advantages it offered in speed, 
reliability, and cost compared to established forms of long-distance wireless.23 In July 1924 the 
British signed a contract with the Marconi Company to erect shortwave stations, to be owned 
and operated by the government, for direct communication with the territories of the Empire, 
including Australia. In 1926, a direct shortwave service between Britain and Canada was 
inaugurated, followed by other services with Australia, India, and South Africa in the following 
year. After more than fifteen years of sporadic action, the Imperial scheme of wireless had 
                                                          
19 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 245; M. Counihan, The Construction of Australian Broadcasting. 
20 A.T. Ross, Armed and Ready, pp. 58-59. 
21 A.T. Ross, Armed and Ready, p. 193; J. Given, “Born Global, Made Local”, pp. 27-29. 
22 See cable to the Governor-General from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19th December 1921. 
NAA: MP341/1, 1924/7815.   
23 A. Anduaga, Wireless and Empire, pp. 186-187. 
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finally materialised.24 Its consequences for international communication were dramatic, 
halving cable receipts on those routes now serviced by shortwave in the service’s first year of 
operation. This posed a dire threat to the viability of the cable companies, which later led to a 
government-mandated merger of Britain’s international communications assets into a single 
organisation in 1929. Later known as Cable and Wireless, the new organisation was nominally 
a private firm but in practice run according to government strategic priorities – a unified 
system of Imperial communications.25    
 
The arrangements struck between AWA and the Commonwealth in 1922 proved durable 
enough to withstand more than two decades of disruption, uncertainty, and change. The beam 
service between Britain and Australia was inaugurated in April 1927, five years after Hughes 
and Fisk signed the agreement.26 The delay resulted from the vacillations of the British 
government in the intervening period, and the consequent difficulties of establishing a 
reciprocal station in that country, as well as the need to recalibrate plans after the invention of 
shortwave. Despite the delays and frustrations of the intervening period, the Bruce 
government, which came into office after the fall of Hughes in February 1923, continued to act 
as a strong backer for AWA. Through changing circumstances, it upheld the fundamental 
structure of the relationship between the Commonwealth and the company which had been 
established under Hughes – amending the terms of the 1922 agreement to allow for more 
time for the service to be established, lobbying the British government to permit the 
establishment of a long-distance station in that country for communication with Australia, and 
defending its arrangements with AWA from Labor criticism in Parliament.27 There was, 
therefore, a strong thread of continuity with the constitutive decisions originally made under 
the Hughes government in 1922. Through the upheaval of the Cable and Wireless merger, the 
turbulence of the 1930s, and another global conflict, AWA continued to operate the service, in 
partnership with the Commonwealth, until 1946. In that year the international wireless service 
was incorporated into the Overseas Telecommunications Commission by the Chifley 
                                                          
24 D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, pp. 202-204; J. Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global 
Communication, p. 226. 
25 Chapter 11 in D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon; chapter 7 in J. Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global 
Communication. 
26 W. J. Baker, A History of the Marconi Company, p. 224; see also “The Beam – First Day’s Work” in 
Sydney Morning Herald, 9th April 1927; “Beam Wireless – Commercial Service Opened” in The Argus, 9th 
April 1927. 
27 See E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant, pp. 202-215; many primary documents concerning this can be 
found in NAA: MP341/1, 1924/7815; NAA: MP341/1, 1926/2782, Wireless Imperial scheme, 1921-1926; 
NAA: MP341/1, 1926/2784, Imperial Wireless services, 1925-1926. 
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government, in the wake of a wartime decision to nationalise communications throughout the 
British Empire.28 
 
The persistence of the arrangements put in place in 1922 to structure the international 
wireless service underlines Starr’s focus on the importance of constitutive decisions to the 
subsequent course of communications development. Once put in place, the constitutive 
choices concerning international wireless described in the preceding chapters endured for 
decades, despite considerable change in the surrounding political, administrative, commercial, 
and technological contexts. AWA’s control of Australia’s overseas wireless service survived the 
terms of several hostile governments, the persistent opposition of the Postmaster-General’s 
Department, the financial collapse of its British parent company, and the invention of 
shortwave before finally being overthrown by the Chifley government.29 This affirms the 
significance of the 1922 agreement as a pivotal episode that laid the foundation for Australia’s 
international communications services for more than two decades. 
 
 
                                                          
28 See chapter 6 in J. Given, Transit of Empires; chapter 14 in D. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon; chapters 
9 and 10 in E. Harcourt, Taming the Tyrant. 
29 J. Given, Transit of Empires, p. 321. 
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